Papers presented at a Conference on Energy Prices, Inflation and Economic Activity, November 7-9, 1979. by MIT Energy Lab
THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THE AUTHORS'S RESPONSIBILITY
AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THOSE OF THE MIT ENERGY
LABORATORY OR THE MASSACHUSETTS ISTITUTE OF TECHNOLOG'
PAPERS PRESENTED AT
A CONFERENCE ON
ENERGY PRICES, INFLATION AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
NOVEMBER 7 - 9, 1979
MIT ENERGY LAB WORKING PAPER No. MIT-EL 79-065WP
NOTE: All of these papers were distributed as discussion points for the
conference, and should thus be considered only as discussion drafts.
"
·_/
_j
i(-
Y"h-·-
ibr
WLI.
7YI
p
rC
re
A Brief Introduction to Papers Presented
at the M.I.T. Center for Energy Policy Research Conference,
November 7-9, 1979
The relationship between energy price increases and economic activity
has drawn increased attention recently, and public policy debates have
begun to consider this as one of the fundamental questions. The M.I.T.
Center for Energy Policy Research has funded research into this question
for the past two years, and the results from those investigations have
occasioned considerable interest.
To further understanding of this question, CEPR held a conference
November 7-9, 1979, bringing together other researchers, and individuals
from government, industry, and public interest organizations. The purpose
was not to reach consensus, but to understand better what were perceived
to be the critical elements of both research activity, and public policy
initiatives.
To set a framework for these discussions, participants spent the
first two sessions reviewing the world oil market situation, and what
likely developments there would be. The materials relating to these
sessions are included here, and were sent in advance to participants.
The other-papers here (following the tab) were prepared for the
second part of the conference, dealing with Energy Prices, Inflation and
Economic Activity. Dohner's paper gives an introduction to the subject
of the conference, and surveys the issues and the research related to
energy supply shocks. As an introductory survey paper, this was not
actually presented at the conference, but was sent in advance to the
participants.
The remaining papers were presented in three sessions at the conference.
The first section, entitled Macroeconomic Analysis of Energy Price Shocks,
featured papers by Mork and Hall, Eckstein, and Thurman and Berner. Mork
and Hall's research is carried out at the Energy Laboratory, with CEPR and
NSF funding. Their paper presents a broad outline of their model. Its
most significant feature is stated as its integrated treatment of long-term
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supply issues on the one hand and short run macroeconomic disturbances,
related to aggregate demand, on the other. The paper also reports on an
application of the model to the 1979 oil price increase. Eckstein's
paper gives a summary account of the role of energy in the DRI model and
reports some significant recent changes in the model. The Core Inflation
Model, an integrated part of the DRI model, is also presented in some detail.
The paper then goes on to analyze the effects of the energy price increases
in 1973-74 and in 1979. The quantitative results are similar to those of
Mork and Hall. Thurman and Berner's paper reports the results of analyzing
the effects of energy price changes in the MPS model, which is utilized by
the Staff of the Federal Reserve Board. They describe the transmission channels
for energy in the model. For their analysis of the 1979 energy price shock,
they give a detailed calculation of the effects of decontrol policy. Since
they assume a larger price increase as a result of decontrol, their estimate
of energy-induced reduction in GNP over this period is somewhat larger than
that of Eckstein and Mork and Hall.
The second session dealt with Macroeconomic Policy Responses to Energy
Price Shocks. Papers were presented by Eckstein, Mork and Hall, and Pindyck.
For the former two, the policy analysis was closely tied to their papers in
the first session. Eckstein analyzes the level of general demand restraint
needed to counteract the energy-induced inflation, and finds this policy to
have a rather large impact on employment. Mork and Hall discuss the pros
and cons of monetary versus fiscal expenditure policy. They express a
preference for modest monetary expansion, because of its favorable effect on
investment, although it will increase inflation in the long run. They also
obtain encouraging results for payroll tax cuts and in increase in the invest-
ment tax credit, which encourage investment as well. Pindyck discusses
alternative frameworks for analysis of policy after an energy shock, including
the desirability of accommodative policy, and particularly how fast one
wants to accommodate. The answer is found to depend on policymakers'
preferences in regard to inflation and unemployment.
In the third session, Macroeconomic Analysis of Energy Price Shocks,
papers were presented by Goettle (Dale Jorgenson Associates) and Schink
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(Wharton Econometrics), based on the models of their respective institu-
tions. Goettle analyzes the real economic cost of conservation policies
versus development of alternative energy policies to reduce oil imports.
His general equilibrium analysis shows the former alternative to be cost
superior. Schink presents an analysis of Carter's energy plan, with
respect to energy saving and security, balance of payments issues, and
economic efficiency. He finds this plan to hurt efficiency in the form
of reduced economic activity. On the other hand, significant gains are
reported in the form of an improved balance of payments and a strengthened
dollar.
Loren C. Cox
Executive Director
CEPR
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SCHEDULE
NOVEMBER 7
5:30 - 7:00 p.m.
6:00 - 7:00 p.m.
7:00 - 7:45 p.m.
8:00 - 10:00 p.m.
Varied arrivals and check-in at Sonesta Hotel, Cambridge, MA
Open Bar (Charles River Suite A - Upper Lobby)
Dinner (Charles River Suite A)
World Oil Session (Charles River Suite A)
"Interpreting Recent History - Demand Adjustments and Market
.Behavior"
Presentation: Morris Adelman
Comments: Warren Davis
Moderator: Loren Cox
NOVEMBER 8
7:15 - 8:00 a.m.
8:00 - 10:00 a.m.
Coffee Break
10:15 - 12:15
12:15 - 1:00 p.m.
1:00 - 2:30 p.m.
Breakfast (Charles River Suite A)
World Oil - "Condition of the International Financial System"
(Charles River Suite B)
Presentation: James Paddock
Comments: Scott Pardee
Moderator: Loren Cox
Foyer
World Oil - "The Outlook for Capacity and Price"
Presentation: Henry Jacoby
Comments: John Mitchell
Moderator: Loren Cox
Lunch (Charles River Suite A)
Presentation to participants of CEPR sponsored research on
Energy Prices, Inflation and Economic Activity
Macroeconomic Analysis of Energy Price Shocks
Presentation: Robert Hall
Knut Mork
Moderator: Loren Cox
NOVEMBER 8 (Cont.)
Coffee Break
2:45 - 4:00 p.m.
4:00 - 5:15 p.m.
6:30 - 7:00 p.m.
7:30 - 8:30 p.m.
NOVEMBER 9
7:30 - 8:00 a.m.
8:00 - 10:15 a.m.
Macroeconomic Response to Energy Price Shocks
Presentation: Robert Hall/Knut Mork
Moderator: Loren Cox
Macroeconomic Analysis of Energy Policies
Presentation: Robert Hall/Knut Mork
Moderator: Loren Cox
Cocktails (Charles River Suite A)
Dinner (Charles River Suite A)
(Evening free)
Breakfast (Charles River Suite A)
Macroeconomic Analysis of Energy Price Shocks (Charles River Suite B)
Presentation (30 min.): Otto Eckstein
Robert Hall, Knut Mork
Richard Berner, Stephan Thurman
Opening Discussion (30 min.): Robert Gordon
Alan Blinder
Robert Solow
General Discussion: Moderator: Loren Cox
toffee Break
10:30 - 12:15 Macroeconomic Response to Energy Price Shocks
Presentation (30 min.): Otto Eckstein
Robert Hall, Knut Mork
Robert Pindyck
Opening Discussion (30 min.): Franco Modigliani
George Perry
Stephen McNees
General Discussion: Moderator: Loren Cox
Lunch and Check Out (Charles River Suite A)
Foyer
Foyer
12:15 - 1:15 p.m.
NOVEMBER 9 (Cont.)
1:15 - 2:45 p.m. Macroeconomic Analysis of Energy Policies
Presentation (20 min.):
Discussion (30 min.):
General Discussion:
Richard Goettle
George Schink
Bill Hogan
Ray Scheppach
Denny Ellerman
Moderator: Loren Cox
Concl usion/Departure3:00 p.m.
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Energy Prices, Inflation and Economic Activity
Background Materials for Discussion of
THE WORLD OIL SITUATION
prepared by
M. A. Adelman, H. D. Jacoby and J. L. Paddock
November 7 - 9, 1979
The materials presented here are drawn from the work
of the M.I.T. World Oil Project. The Project is fin-
anced primarily by the National Science Foundation
Grant No. DAR78-19044; the application of financial
analysis to particular exporting countries is supported
by the Department of Energy.
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QThe World Oil Situation--Discussion Outline
1. INTERPRETING RECENT HISTORY--DEMAND ADJUSTMENTS AND MARKET BEHAVIOR
As preparation for looking forward, we want to begin with a review
of what has happened in the last few years. This comes in two parts:
the 1973-78 evolution, and the 1979 turbulence. During each period, we
need to look at demand and supply separately.
Table 1 shows the response of demand to the 1973-74 increases. (The
estimate of real prices in the OECD is for 1976, but there was little net
change in 1976-78; in some OECD areas there were even some decreases.)
The growth of oil consumption has been the joint effect of: (a) GNP
growing at 2.5 percent per year, (b) energy use per GNP unit declining at
about 1.5 percent per year, (c) oil use per GNP unit decreasing at an
average 2 percent per year. As Note 1 attached shows, this would be
broadly consistent with the demand model constucted by the M.I.T. World
Oil Project, assuming a delayed response to the 1973-74 price changes,
with its half life about 7 to 9 years. If the trend continues,
non-Communist consumption in 1988 will be about 54 MBD. Table 2 compares
these results with other studies.
These observations lead to several questions about the demand
history:
(1) Have we overlooked some important factor that would explain the
consunption record? For example, the RFF group (Dunkerley et
al.) have found an energy-GNP relation above 1.0 which would
imply a stronger price effect than that calculated in Note 1.
2(2) The 1973-78 experience shows a small but significant
substitution of non-oil for oil. Is this a transitory
phenomenon or does it have some years to run before being
played out?
(3) Why has LDC consumption risen much faster than that of OECD?
Will limits on borrowing constrain it?
The core OPEC nations (Persian Gulf, now excluding Iran) can export
more than is demanded, to put down prices. Or they can export less, to
raise prices. To see which seems more likely, we look back on the price
history. Table 3 gives movements in list prices since 1970, and Figure 1
shows the relation between list prices and spot prices and net backs.
Figure 2 shows the details of the past year. The figures indicate how
the two big price increases have been brought about by production
cutbacks, which made spot prices rise, which then drew contract prices
after them. In the 1974-78 interim, there were modest price rises
imposed by the OPEC nations, by changing the value of the marker crude.
But during 1979, the marker crude has not been a representative list
price. In Figure 1, therefore, we have supplemented it with the value of
Iranian Light, whose intrinsic value is very close to Arab Light.
The recent picture has been further confused by several developments.
First, the producing nations have practically ousted the multinational
companies from the marketing of crude. They have put much more into the
spot market, and now into the contract market, we cannot say how much.
One would expect that with more going into the spot market, and
particularly since current production has for some months exceeded
consumption, spot prices would be falling swiftly toward contract, while
3contract would be rising slowly toward spot, with approaching
convergence. But this has not happend. Even when spot prices were
weakening in mid-Summer 1979 they stayed far above contract prices, and
recently they have strengthened. The persisting uncertainty about
near-term supply and the desire to add to inventory even at very high
prices, would explain it.
It has recently become clear that contract prices have moved
substantially above the OPEC "list prices", and both OPEC and non-OPEC
nations are charging them.
Tables 4 and 5 show the production behavior of key producers during
the Iranian shortfall. And Tables 6 and 7 indicate the level of excess
capacity held by OPEC throughout these events. Table 6 uses PIW figures
for capacity, Table 7 is based on the more conservative CIA figures.
These capacity estimates are further elaborated in Tables 8 and 9. As
Tables 6 and 7 show, considerable excess capacity has existed over the
past year, even during the worst of the Iranian crisis.
How are we to explain the restrained production of the Persian Gulf
countries? There seem to be three main types of hypothesis:
Political. These countries are displeased with U.S. policy,
particularly the Camp David agreements. Thus the U.S. Embassy in
Jiddah: if we agreed to Saudi demands on Palestinian rights, "they
would let us have all the oil we needed, and at very good prices."
Technical. Saudi Arabia no longer has spare capacity with
which to expand output and keep down prices. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi
don't care to help.
Economic. It is argued that Saudi Arabia and others in OPEC
have not yet gotten price up to the wealth-maximizing level, and
4this is being achieved by capacity controls and exploitation of
disruptions to ratchet the price up. Commissioner Brunner of the
E.E.C. has stated that the objective of Saudi Arabia and neighbors
is to maintain a constant small deficit, and calls this "economic
brinkmanship". The path toward optimal revenue is along a
backward-bending supply curve, an idea which has gained a
distinguished adherant (British Petroleum) in a recent publication.
In the debate over these hypotheses, Saudi capacity has become a
controversial subject. The CIA credits them with only 9.5 MBD (Tables 7
and 9), although they actually produced 10.5 in the first half of
January. In any case, the CIA does not estimate the well capacity, but
rather the narrowest bottleneck above ground.
There are persistent reports of technical difficulties, lower
pressure, rising gas-oil ratios, especially in the Ghawar field. If we
read the annual reports in the International Petroleum Encyclopedia, and
in World Oil, there is no hint of any such problem. There are repeated
estimates of Saudi capacity in the 11-12 MBD range. In early 1978, the
Saudis were planning an early expansion to 12 or more MBD; this appears
to have been shelved. The wells have actually produced nearly 13 MBD in
a single day, according to some Saudi sources.
(4) Is anything known about capacity which is more precise than
what the trade press or U.S. Government sources give us? In
particular, we must distinguish among: (a) what the wells can
safely produce at any given moment, (b) the capacity of
above-ground installations, which may be greater or less, and
(c) what additional capacity could be supplied in any given
number of months?
5(5) Given our understanding of the technical and economic issues
of capacity, which of the three hypotheses above (which are not
mutually exclusive) seems most accurate in explaining behavior
over the past year?
All these are hypotheses of adjustment to a rapidly changing Iranian
industry. Our perspective is a gloomy one. Past work of the World Oil
Project has indicated that the Iranian industry is more than usually
vulnerable to under-maintenance. Capacity was expected to be maintained
only by a massive gas injection project, which has been suspended, and
cannot be resumed without the expelled foreign personnel. There is also
continuing unrest among the ethnic Arabs of Khuzistan province.
(6) Is there anything at all promising which we have not discerned?
Further background data on oil operations and primary stocks are
provided in Tables 10 and 11.
62. THE CONDITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM
In the face of the recent and continuing oil price increases, there is
renewed concern about the world financial system. The role and capacity
of the international financial system are key factors in facilitating
world trade and economic growth. Therefore we need to examine the
strengths and weaknesses of that system as they relate to oil trade.
Accomodation of an oil-importing country's trade by international
financial markets has a direct impact on its rate of growth. A country's
oil imports may be less responsive to a rising oil price if international
financial transactions are possible, and thus the financial adjustment
mechanism will allow a higher growth rate of GNP than would otherwise be
the case. Simultaneously, however, a greater amount of oil imports may
have an adverse effect on the importer's balance of payments, at least in
the short-run. This effect may induce contractionary monetary and fiscal
policies, or cause international capital markets to restrict lending to
the country. Likely, the implications are different for industrialized
countries than for LDCs.
Since the 1973 oil cutback and price jump, the international
financial system has functioned adequately to handle the increased flows
of payments. The absorptive capacity and responsiveness of the system
has been able to accomplish the primary and secondary recycling demandsl
including portfolio investments of the OPEC "surplus." Most of these
financial functions were carried out by private institutions, such as the
1
"Primary recycling" refers to direct payments for oil; "secondary
recycling" refers to payments made with the help of loans from third
countries.
7Euromarkets. For example, the amount of loans outstanding to non-OPEC
LDCs by commercial banks more than tripled between 1974 and 1978. (See
Table 15). Much of the planned government involvement (e.g., the
Kissinger "safety net") apparently was not needed unless simply to
inspire confidence, which then allowed the private sector to function.
Of course the IMF oil facility has been used.
Financial market transactions probably were not a constraint on oil
trade or growth for most developed countries. For some LDCs, however,
there may have been some inhibiting effects on economic growth, though
they are difficult to estimate. Undoubtedly, some adjustment to higher
oil prices took place through other markets as well, e.g., unemployment.
The predicted massive surpluses on OPEC current account which would
somehow seriously disrupt the international economic system never
materialized. For example, the OPEC cumulative surplus will be
l-o approximately $308 billion in 1980 versus $68 billion in 1974.. (See
Tables 12 and 13). Of course, a substantial wealth transfer has taken
place nonetheless.
Now we face a significant increase in the expected OPEC surplus over
the near term, as shown in Tables 12, 13, and 14.
(1) Are there points of stress in the world's financial system
which could have disruptive and/or differential effects on the
growth rates of the world's economies? For example, there is a
growing concern that the debt capacity of LDCs has been pushed
to near its limit (see Tables 15b and 15c). Interest rates
also have increased dramatically, as shown in Table 16.
(2) What is the financial system's shock absorbing ability in case
of sharp price jumps? What future conditions or constraints
may cause strain and damage to that international system?
8It is often claimed that payments for the large imports of oil into
the U.S. have direct depressing effects on the growth rate of U.S. GDP
and on the value of the U.S. dollar. These effects are presumed to come
from sources such as higher inflation rates, "excess" dollars for
investment by OPEC countries, an increase in the supply of dollars as the
U.S. "issues" more of them to pay for its oil imports, and an immediate
"worsening" of the U.S. balance of payments due to its increased oil
bill. For example, see Tables 17 and 18. The result will be lower U.S.
economic growth, less confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency, and
a decreased role for the U.S. as "banker to the world." On the other
hand, if this flow of dollar credits has facilitated international
financial intermediation, then perhaps a substantial decrease in U.S. oil
imports would have a negative effect on world credit availability, oil
trade, and, therefore, growth.
(3) To what extent are these monetary factors directly OPEC/oil
related, and how much have they affected inflation rates and
economic growth? What is the contribution of these factors to
the rising differentials between U.S. economic growth rates and
those of other industrialized countries?
(4) Can the U.S. deficit on current account really be blamed on our
"large oil bill"--what about the counter-examples of West
Germany and Japan?
(5) If the dollar remains "weak," what implications will that have
for OPEC policy regarding the denomination of oil prices in
dollars? Has the U.S. somehow been subsidizing the growth of
West Germany and Japan as the real cost of dollar-denominated
oil falls to those countries as their currencies rise against
the dollar? (See Tables 3 and 18).
93. THE OUTLOOK FOR CAPACITY AND PRICE
Tables 6 and 7 show the excess capacity in OPEC over the period
October 1978 through July 1979. The prospects for future price movements
depend importantly on likely developments in capacity, and on market
behavior in the face of supply interruptions, or changes in oil policy,
in key supplier states.
(1) What are the prospects for expansion in Saudi capacity over the
next 5 to 10 years?
(2) What is known about the deterioration of Iranian field capacity
and other facilities, and what is the likely overall technical
capacity to export over the next few years?
In the period of the Iranian interruption, several nations had
excess capacity that was not used in the period of perceived shortage
(see Tables 6 and 7). One may suppose that they had no interest in going
very far out of their way to restrain the price ratchet. Indeed, many
producers have an incentive to cut back during these periods, as they are
experiencing increasing revenues--and perhaps expect higher revenues in
future months, after the disruption is over and the price ratchet
complete.
(3) Should we consider that there always will be this hesitancy to
push to the limits of capacity in a short-term disruption? For
financial reasons? For political reasons? Even in the face of
severe price crisis? If so, does this mean that excess
capacity means little in the face of these kinds of events?
(4) What kind of worldwide excess would there need to be (and be
used) to avoid a price ratchet in the face of a loss of, say, 3
million barrels per day for a period of a few months?
10
As a result of the Iranian events, there appears to be a shift in
expectations on the part of many observers: they expect more disruptions
and consequent price increases, and they have a higher estimate of the
long-term price--say, on a ten to fifteen year horizon.
(5) What effect are increased oil price levels, and changed
expectations, having on capacity plans in non-core countries
such as Mexico, U.K., Norway, etc?
With markets kept tight, the expectations for still more price rises
may well be realized over the next year or two. But, as noted above,
demand adjustment to price is well under way. And, as we will discuss
later in the conference, the pressure of rising price is taking a toll
in growth. Thus the price ratchet cannot go on without end. At some
point, the demand effects are so great that significant excess capacity
again appears.
In April, Sheik Yamani said a price of $40 (presumably in 1979
prices) was conceivable. The staff of the Joint Economic Committee wrote
a worst-case scenario in which they put the price at $130 in 1979
prices. Mr. Laoussine of Algeria has called the synthetic production
cost, which he thinks to be in the $30-$40 range, the natural ceiling to
the world oil price. The one safe generalization is that nobody seems to
think the maximum has been reached, nor that it would be less than $30.
(6) If we assume that the OPEC nations will not raise the price of
crude oil so high as actually to decrease revenues, where is
the neighborhood of that profit-maximizing price? Can we say
that the numerous models which estimated an optimum OPEC price
of $15 or less have been discredited by recent events? Or is
11
there any reason to think the producing nations have made a bad
mistake in raising the price?
(7) What is a reasonable expectation for the price increases that
can be sustained (or expected) over the period from now to 1990
or 1995?
(8) Is this expected path substantially different if policy
measures (say in the U.S.) could cut demand by 1 or 2 million
barrels per day below that which would result from the effects
of rising prices and current policy? What effect would a U.S.
reduction of 5 MBD (say, due to a synfuels program) have if it
could be reached by 1990?
NOTE 1. ROUGH ESTIMATE OF PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND,
AND 1988 ENERGY CONSUMED PER UNIT OF GNP
Assumed relation: Q = a G1 0 b pE
Assuming a one-time price change, after t years:
/Q Et
Gt/G0 (Po)
In the OECD, after 5 years: (see Table 1)
.927 = 1.38Et
Et = -.235
Assume Et approaches long-run elasticity as the capital stock is replaced.
According to the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
capital stock project, average service life of corporate assets is 18 years.
Then if capital disappears exponentially, half-life is 11 years. Our
estimate should be lower than the half-life because of retrofitting and
net growth of the capital stock. If we alternatively take 7 years and 9
years as half-life, then the effect of the price change may be assumed to
-7c -9cdecay exponentially at such a rate that e .5, or e = .5; hence,
c = .09 or C = .077 and
E = -.235/(1-e-'5 ) = .601, or
E = -.235/(1-e' 4 ) = .735
Such results are broadly consistent with the estimates of the M.I.T.
World Oil Project.
Assuming the lower elasticity, in 1988, t = 15,
E = .601 (1-e 15c), and G15/Go = 1.38' 47 .86), and G15/G8
-2-
The real increase in the crude oil price in 1979 will be about
($21/$12) /1.15 = 1.52. If we suppose the increase in the real consumer
energy price will be about 30 percent, and that the response will be
about as in 1973-1978, then ElO = 0.6 (l-e - ( 10 x 099) = .38, and the
lowered energy consumption per unit of GNP should be:
QlO/Qo 38QGl/G: = 1.30-'3 .905
G1/G o
Reckoning together the 1973 and the 1979 round, we would expect
Q88/G88 to equal (.905 x .860) or .78 of the 1973 level. This is 84
percent of the 1978 level. At a uniform percentage rate, this would be
a decrease of 1.7 percent per year, a little faster than the 1.5 percent
in 1973-1978.
FIGURE I
OPEC PRICES. NETBACKS. AND SPOT PRICES
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TABLE 1
INDICES OF ENERGY, OIL, PRICES, AND REAL GNP IN 1978
(1973 = 100)
OECD U.S.
ENERGY AND GROWTH
(1) Real GNP 112.7 112.1
(2) Total energy consumption 104.5 104.9
(3) Residential & commercial * 107.5
(4) Industrial * 99.6
(5) Oil consumption 102.5 108.7
(6) Energy/GNP ratio 92.7 93.6
(7) [Decrease, %/yr.] [1.5] [1.3]
(8) Oil/ GNP ratio 91.0 97.0
(9) [Decrease, %/yr.] [1.9] [0.6]
REAL PRICES
(10) Total Energy 138 133
(11) Households * 122
(12) Industries * 144
* not available
Sources:
(1) Economic Report of the President
(2), (5) BP Annual Statistical Review
(3), (4) Monthly Energy Review, U.S. Department of Energy
(10) Dunkerley, et al, unpublished estimate
(11), (12) Economic Report of the President (BLS)
TABLE 2a
SOURCES OF NON-COMMUNIST OIL CONSUMPTION
(MBD)
Non-OPEC Supply
Consumption, Non-
Commun. World
Year (excl. OPEC)C
U.S. &
Canada
Latin
America
Western
Europe
Communist
Exports
1973f
-at 1978 f
1985
1985
46.2
48.8
13.1
11.8
52.6a EIAd
52.6a MITe
12.3
8.9
1.8
2.8
N/A
7.7
0.4
1.8
4.1
2.6
0.9
1.8
0
0
1.3
3.2
9.3
3.1
17.5
21.4
25.7
22.3
~' a. Assumes same rate of change as 1973-78.
b. Includes some non-OPEC at Persian Gulf.
_= c. OPEC internal consumption estimated: 1973, 1.6 mbd; 1978, 2.2 mbd.
d. Mid-mid-forecast, EIA Annual Report to Congress, 1978.
e. Assumes development drilling increases at 5%/year.
f. Figures for 1973 and 1978 from British Petroleum, "Statistical Review of World
Oil Industry", 1978.
Al 
Other
Non-
OPEC
Total
Non-
OPEC
Net
Demand
on OPEC
(Exports)
28.7
27.4
26.3
29.7
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TABLE 3
WORLD OIL PRICE, NOMINAL AND REAL (1970-79)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)** (6) (7)
List price U.S. Real Saudi German Real Saudi List Price List Price
Saudi Light GDP Light Price GNP Light Price Iran Light Libya ES
($/bbl) Deflator to U.S. Deflator to Germany ($/bbl) Sider
(in 1970 US$) (in 1970 ($/bbl)
DM Prices)
1970
1971
1972
1973-Jan. 1
Dec. 1
- 1974-Jan. 1
Nov. 1
1975-Jan. 1
Oct. 1
1976-Jan. 1
July 1
1977-Jan. 1
- July 1
1978-Jan. 1
July 1
1979-Jan. 1
April 1
June 1
July 1
1.35
1.75
1.90
2.10
3.60
9.60
10.46
10.46
11.51
11.51
11.51
12.09
12.70
12.70
12.70
13.39
14.55
14.55
18.00
1.00
1.05
1.09
1.12
1.19
1.22
1.32
1.35
1.42
1.43
1.46
1.51
1.55
1.60
1.67
1.71
1.76*
1.79*
1.81*
1.35
1.67
1.74
1.88
3.03
7.87
7.92
7.75
8.11
8.05
7.88
8.01
8.19
7.94
7.60
7.83
8.27
8.13
9.94
1.00
1.07
1.14
1.16
1.23
1.35
1.41
1.46
1.52
1.57
4.91
5.33
5.33
5.79
21.07
18.59
21.38
19.54
17.54
15.52
1.36
1.76
1.91
2.11
3.75
10.63
10.67
10.67
11.62
11.62
11.62
12.81
12.81
12.81
12.81
13,45
16.57
18.47
22.00
2.09
2.80
2.80
3.10
6.45
14.30
12.43
11.98
12.21
12.21
12.40
13.74
14.00
13.80
13.68
14.52
18.09
21.09
23.28
* Assumes 13% annual inflation rate over 1st half of 1979
-* Calculated by dividing the nominal price of oil in terms of German mark by German
GNP deflator.
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TABLE 5
Non-OPEC Production Increases (Decreases) From 3Q78 Levels
Oct.78 Nov.78 Dec.78 Jan.79 Feb.79 March 79 April 79 May 79 June 79 July 79
-WESTERN HEMISPHERE
25 1 (16)
88 129
268 291
152
202
(1 6)
158
326
33
154
311
14
158
265
(32) (47)
163
216
174
282
12 12 (15) (56)
229 393 406 282
(67) (52)
311 446
(51)
386
(51) (19) (19)
296 390 431
WESTERN EUROPE
(16)
61 187
(12) (12) ( 8)
255 364
(2)
407
(9)
342
26
361
11 (11)
545 645
(3)
42 178
3 4 9 9 16
247 365 414 349
MIDDLE EAST
(14) (12) (8) (13) (16) (10) (5) (3) 2 (1)
"ASIA-PACIFIC
(21) 15 5 22 23 4 102 56 102
24 69 60 50 52 52
83 83 183
0 0 90
209 174 159
183
0
159
183
0
109
233
0
189
183 183 183
0 (40) (40)
(141) 139 172
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
342 291 422 42 282 315
954 1137 1099 1149 1368
U.S.
Mexico
Canada
18
60
139
Others
- Norway
0
177
273
UK
Others
9
608
16
403
..AFRICA
566
(43)
645
OMMUNIST
(44)
628
47 49
- China
Rumani a
USSR
83
0
159
118
OthersOf
242 291
Non-OPEC
" TOTAL
257 432
435 822 1007 1473 1543
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TABLE 8
OPEC Output Dips Despite 'Extra' Saudi Oil
Total OPEC crude oil produc.
tion slipped 460,000 b/d from July
to 31.4-million b/d in August, as
Saudi Arabia's efforts to improve
world supplies were eroded by cuts
other producers made. Iran's pro-
duction fell an estimated 300,000
b/d, its third consectuive monthly
drop, reflecting continued political
turmoil. Nigeria and Libya each
cut back by over 80,000 b/d,
claiming the reduction was for
technical reasons.
On the other hand, Iraq was at
record levels, and Kuwait still pro-
ducing far in excess of its output
ceiling. Ecuador's output rebound-
ed and Sharjah's tiny production
was at a 1979 high.
Jan.-Aug. production was up
5% from a year earlier when
world supplies exceeded demand.
MIDEAST OPEC: 1,
Saudi Araia
Aramco'
Divided Zone
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait
Kuwait
Divided Zone
Abu Dhab, UAE
ADCO
ADMA
Others
Dub, lUAE
Shaah,bA UA
Oatar
Onshore
Offshore
Mieat OPEC 2
OTHER OPEC:
Venezuela
Nigeria
Ubya
Indonesia
Algerle
Gabon*
Ecuador
OPEC Total 3
NON-OPEC MIDEAST:
Oman
Bahrain
.- August-
Volume % Chg
,000 b/d v78
9,771.1 +36.0
9,500.0 +37.0
$271.1 +8.7
3,500.0 -39.7
3,500.0 +32.1
2,524.0 +7.3
2,250.0 +7.3
§274.0 +6.7
1,454.4 -0.1
867.3 +0.9
491.2 -3.1
95.9 +6.6
362.2 0.9
14.0 -40.4
533.3 -1.3
232.3 -9.2
301.0 +5.8
1,659.0 +6.3
2,330.0
2,300.0
1,988.7
1,600.0
1,125.0
225.0
220.0
1,447.7
+5.7
+11.6
-3.7
-0.7
-8.2
0.0
+11.1
+5.0
Previous Two Months
July June
Volumes In 1,000 b/d
9,773.1 8,778.9
9,500.0 8,500.0
273.1 278.9
3,800.0 3,900.0
3,500.0 3,500.0
r2,551.3 2,582.0
r2,275.0 2,300.0
276.3 282.0
1,454.2 1,490.3
864.6 863.4
489.8 524.8
99.8 102.1
368.8 366.8
10.9 12.0
519.0 -- 455.1
217.8 226.6
301.2 228.5
r21,97.3 21,0.L1
2,332.2 2,250.7
r2,381.3 '2,400.0
r2,078.3 r2,036.3
1,609.2 1,612.2
1,125.0 1,125.0
225.0 225.0
180.0 230.0
r31,9083 r30,9643
- Jan.Aug.-
Volume % Chg
1,000 b/d v'78
9,384.2 +22.8
9,100.0 +22.3
284.2 +42.8
2,817.5 -49.9
3,350.2 +37.9
2,573.6 +31.9
2,286.2 +30.5
287.4 +44.1
1,451.3 +0.6
861.6 +1.3
493.3 -1.1
96.4 +4.0
363.4 +0.9
12.6 -49.2
507.8 +9.3
242.7 +7.2
265.1 +11.2
20,460.6 +2.6
2,3402
2,399.2
2,0662
1,606.1
1,174.4
225.0
212.7
30,484.4
+11.3
+36.7
+7.8
-3.1
-4.1
0.0
+6.4
+5.1
290.5 -6.1 293.6 297.3 299.7 -5.4
'50.0 -5.3 50.0 50.0 50.3 -6.2
tThis capacity is estimated maximum production achievable and sustainable for several months
without regard to government restrictions. Includes 193,000 b/d offshore and 78,135 b/d
onshore. §lncludes 193,000 b/d offshore and 81,035 b/d onshore. *Estimated. r Revised.
Source: Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, October 8,1979.
tOutput
Capai/
1,000 b/id
10,840
10,500
340
6,990
4,000
3,340
3,000
340
2,075
1,035
630
140
36t
55
650
350
300
2U,15
2,400
2,500
2,500
1,800
1,225
250
225
39,215
w,-.
TABLE 9
OPEC: Crude Oil Productive Capacity
Capacity
Maximum
Installed ' Sustainable ' Available '
Total
Algeria
Ecuador
Gabon
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Kuwait '
Libya
Neutral Zone '
Nigeria
Qatar
Saudi Arabia '
United Arab Emirates
Abu Dhabi
Dubai
Shariah
Venezueh
40,750
1,200
250
250
1,800
7,000
3,400
2,900
2,500
680
2,500
650
12,500 
2,520
2,100
390
30
2,600
34,260
1,100
225
225
1,650
5,500'
3,000
2,500
2,200
600
2,400
600
9,500
2,360
1,965
370
25
2,400
31,515
1,100
225
225
1,650
4,000'
3,000
2,000
2,200
600
2,160'
600
9,500"
1,855
1,460
370
25
2,400
1,100 (Jun 79) 900
260 (May 74) 180
230 (Dec 77) 210
1,740 (Mar 77) 1,610
6,680 (Nov 76) 3,750
3,100 (Dec 78) 3,000
2,990 (Dec 76) 2,300
2,210 (Mar 77) 2,080
670 (Dee 76) 550
2,440 (Jan 79) 2,380
610 (Dec 75) 520
10,090 (Dec 78) 9,500
1,830 (Jul 75) 1,455
370 (Apr 79) 370
60 (Dec 74) 10
2,950 (Jun 74) 2,330
' Installed capacity, also called nameplate or design capacity, includes all aspects of crude oil production,
processing, transportation, and storage. Installed capacity is generally the highest capacity estimate.
' Maximum sustainable or operational capacity is the maximum production rate that can be sustained for
several months; it considers the experience of operating the total system and is generally some 90-95 percent
of installed capacity. This capacity concept does not necessarily reflect the maximum production rate
sustainable without damage to the fields.
I Available or allowable capacity reflects production ceilings applied by Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia. These ceilings usually represent a constraint only on annual average output, and thus
production may exceed the ceilings in a given month.
'The precise loss in sustainable capacity remains uncertain.
'This figure represents the upper end of the range of available capacity, according to government
statistics
' Excluding share of capacity in the Neutral Zone, shown separately.
'Capacity and production is shared about equally between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
' Estimated production ceiling effective 1 August 1979 based on announced average 10 percent cutback.
'In Saudi Arabia, the concept of "facility," rather than "installed" capacity, is used. Facility capacity
refers to the total installed capacity of gas-oil separating plants, main trunk pipelines, and oil-load terminals;
it does not include the capacity of salt water-oil separators or flow lines.
" The Saudi Arabian production ceiling for Ist Qtr. 1979 was 9.5 million b/d, 8.5 million b/d for 2d Qtr,
and is 9.5 million b/d for 3d Qtr 1979.
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, International Energy
Statistical Review, 3 October 1979.
Thousand b/d
Production
Latest -
Post-Embargo
Peak Current
(Jul 79)
(ul 79)
(ul 79)
(Jul 79)
(Jul 79)
(Jul 79)
(Jul 79)
(ul 79)
(Jul 79)
(Jul 79)
(Jul 79)
(ul 79)
(ul 79)
(ul 79)
Uul 79)
(Jul 79)
__ : 
TABLE 10
Worldwide oil and gas at a glance
COUNTRY
ASIA-PACIFIC
Australia ..........
Bangladesh ........
Brunei .... ........
Burma .............
Rep. of China (Taiwan)
Guam .............
India .............
Indonesia .........
Japan.
Korea, South .......
Malaysia ............
New Zealand .......
Okinawa (R. ........
Pakistan ..........
Philippines ........
Singapore ..........
Sri Lanka .........
Thailand ...........
WEST EUROPE
Austria .............
Belgium .........
Cyprus .............
Denmark ..........
Finland .............
France .............
Germany, West .....
Greece ........
Ireland .............
Italy-Sicily ..........
Netherlands .........
Norwamy .............
Portugal ...........
Spain ..............
Sweden .............
Switzerland ........
United Kingdom ....
Yugoslavia ..........
5 Wtt
MIDDLE EAST
Abu Dhabi .........
Bahrain ...........
Dubai .............
Iran ..............
Iraq ..............
Isreelit ............
Jordan ..............
Kuwait .............
Lebon ...........
Divided (Neutral) Zone
Oman .............
Qater ..............
Saudi Arabia .......
Sharjah ............
South Yemen (Aden) ..
Syria ..............
Turkey .............
ESIMATED
PROVED RESERVES
1.11978
onil
(1,000 bbO
=i]11 I i
m
m
I
m
2,100,000
1,480,000
45,000
'12,000
......
2,900,000
60,000
2,800,000
110,000
0.... 0
200
.20,007,20O:.1 
150,000
300,00
* 56,000
310,000
150,000
650,000
70,000
5,900,000
-80,000
16,000,000
300,000
. 6. I .,.w8;O-.* ,.1 &4. 
30,000,000
250,000
1,300,000
59,000,00
32,100,000
. 10,000
6,480,000
2,500,000
4,000,000
165,700,000
, 16,000
2,080,000
360,000
..]- p .
(10' c
(109 to It)
= 
31,000
8,000
8,000
150
700
......
3,500
24,00
500
.....
17,000
6,000
......
16,000
6'000
- 119,850
y1S;>y.,,,,
420
6,500
. 6,3004,000
1,000
8,000
62,000
24,000
......
27,0001,34
.. ,.....
.. #W;-%
20,000
7,000
1,600
500,000
27,80060
31,300
000......
5,000
40,000
93,900
......
730,660IITh ,a
. . R .
. ;- I-.~ ,. , . .. .- '-
'." OIL PRODUCTION
Producing
wells
July 1, '78
375
558
429
66
1,600
3,644
. 154
10
17,
-. 2."
:i .2
X1_. A,.4o.i
1,250 
.... _....
--2,933.
'- -:.:':
: 120 .
- 416
.7.-. 50.:
..... '
NA -
: 240
233. .
. : 71
..: 551
:' -250:
..: ; . 25 -
: 586
.455
100
95,
875
.4
; 380-
.4.a, tw.
Estimated
1978(1,000 b/d
' .43 
43210.0
25.0
.43
.....
230.0
1,650.010.0
- 2i.0
13.0
. .?. -3
! i g
:...-..
: .,-.,:.. .
;': 21.0
.- 102.0
- 20.0
0....0..
'." 20.0
-1,450.0
--.-; 56.0
-.' 360.0
5,250.0
:- 2,500.0
. 1,900.0.
420.0
320.0
·.- 480.0
7,800.0
. 24.0.
170.0
500.
M. k9.0
% change
from
1977
+5.0
-15.0
+9.5
.. -2.1
:·+5.0
..-13.4
;770rZ
·-- e -.:~- ,-
, @* _ ,,J
.,~ -- ;? i .. :,
~. -. .-
..- .%: .. ':
·-.? is-!
.. .. .4
. 5: .- *
; v . . *'. 
.... ~;.... ,.,--:
'* :.'
+25.0
·.+25.0
:.. ...
.+20 -
.. "
...... ..
+432
'' ' ' F
-12.9
+12.9
-+12.9
+900.0
-+6.7
-62
+10.3-
-14.3
s-16.3
- -7.4
/
No.
of
ref.
12:
2:
. .
10!
,3 9:451
%4
I3T
L
i.
32
1.
19i
1
...
;5,'
:
'5,,i
c
I a
.I
...
.. *.: : -,- REFINING --
.. Capacity (b/led) January 1, 1979
C. ud
Crude -
708,100
31,200
26,000
425,400
'- 29,500
625,750
7527,700
5,479,602542000
-:140,000
74,000
. 195,967
.. 110,140
'. . 253,300
; 917,650
'38,000
- 160,657
280,000
--:'971,900
-::-. 15,000
?-215,000
336 000
; 3,468,625
-3,102,982
.. 411,000
' 56000
.4,196,850
.1,857,250
. .264,000
- 360,780
: 1,424,944
:-.410,900
*-137,300
2,526,805
· '--293,278
...-j s t 
:...15,000
-- 250,000
920 500
-:- 168,500
*':195,000
-:;712,000
i:-: 53 060
-: 10,500
: .48733
I42,857
. 223,040
:*; 338,000
" Catalytic
Cracking
:'121225
:' ' 9040
51,800
:; 19,500
. 325,885
*... *..-
. :,:.' ',-:
. ... .g.. ', . '. .,r 24,900
r 000
.-...16,500
-.-190,500
'178,800
. 251,250
-' 75,000
-. . ....
... 6575
- .-1,960
..... .. 
-. 
-
..... - .
34,200
A'..--
.e 36 000
, 4,410
-,. 7,250
.:: ., ' .
.:.. ,5.... ':*. t>,~~.~-.
Thermal
Cracking
* .. ..
· ''
62,954
30,700
: .;. :e;;.:.'T.;. . W. ·?: -:...~..
~'. .. 'P- '.
~. .... '..~.~. ':
.. : '~.:: .. M
;712,500:i-:2~t0.
-. .. .
·J~qdC. - ;
- 4400
1246,000
r- 43,700'
208,f935::
; -36300
-. 157,100.
":::'. 33,00 '
.: 24,000
- 78,000
:r-.- 6100
.,,s'
.-~ , a.,,
,. ..
19,000._
-. 4280o-
5-': 39,000
6-~-~ .·c
-.'-·
:,~20679:
.2e 409, .
Reforming
156,500
. 1,720
49,760
:.: 26318
34,400
's. 557,009
* 4 25,640
24,000
< 5,210
.? 38,300 
s ssw'l20,000
-:. 3J50
;23,178;
d .. ,. -
. kjsr,6"
4,?:22,600'
'109,250
-' :2,400j.; 37,700.
: .54,800
'..'441,050
- 439,778
'- 14,00
:422,110
': ,199,600
-r- 30,000
-'52,932
719,382
:;-24,500
.'452,235
:X 46,96.
-b 6 3 8 3
,.. - 5..
:. 9602845
:. 2,600
:45386.
: :9,524.
-,., , .,.1 241 353&
.6,a9Z8751i I5
·'
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TABLE 10 (continued)
COUNTRY
AFRICA
Algeria .............
Angola-Cabinda ......
Cameroon ...........
Congo Republic ......
Egypt ..............
Ethiopia ............
Gabon ..............
Ghana ..............
Ivory Coast .........
Kenya ..............
Liberia .............
Libya ..............
Madagascar .........
Morocco ............
Mozambique .........
Nigeria .............
Senegal .............
Sierra Leone ........
Somalia ............
South Africa ........
Sudan ..............
Tanzania ............
Togo ...............
Tunisia .............
Zaire ...............
Zambia .............
Total Africa.
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Argentina ...........
Bahamas ............
Barbados ............
Bolivia ..............
Brazil ..............
Chile ...............
Colombia ...........
Costa Rica ..........
Dominican Republic ...
Ecuador ............
El Salvador ..........
Guatemala ..........
Honduras ...........
Jamaica ............
Martinique ..........
Mexico .............
Netherlands Antilles ..
Nicaragua ...........
Panama ............
Paraguay ...........
Peru ..............
Puerto Rico .........
Trinidad & Tobago ....
Uruguay ............
Venezuela ..........
Virgin Islands .......
United States ........
Canada .............
Todal W. Hemisphere
Tot Non-Communist
COMMUNIST AREAS
U.S.S.R ............
China ..............
Other6 .............
Total Communist
TOTAL WORLD
ESTIMATED
PROVED RESERVES
1-1-1978
Oil(1,000 bbl)
6,300,000
1,115,000
50,000
315,000
3,200,000
24,300,000
125
18,200,000
2,300,000
142,000
-57,892,125
2,400,000
500
250,000
1,200,000
400,000
750,000
1,170,000
16,000
186666
2 8,500,000O O
6,000,000
75,746,500
547,607,825
71,000,000
20,000,000
3,000,000
.:94,000,000
641,607,825
Gas(IV cu ft)
105,000
1,200
2,260
3,000
2,400
..... ·
*2,20
.... ia
30
50
6,00
50
.....
'C, 185,290
12,000
6,00
1,500
2,500
4,800
......
48006
......59,000
o...o..
......
37,950
59,000
:178,950
1,557,010
910,000
25,000
10,000
9 645,000
2,502,010
OIL PRODUCTION
Producing
wells
July 1, '78
989
182
13
107
430
211
'"8i~
12
~':;:4,180 ~--
6,020
286
1,522
425
1,980
"'i
4,145-
3,284-
508,340
25,800
'587,283
588,365
(NAJ(N.J(N.AJ
-'. (HpA.U"
Estimated
1978
(1,000 b/d)
1,260.0
130.0
10.0
28.0
490.0
ih'.o
2,050.0
1 ,800.0
i6.0
20.0
86,058.1'
450.0
".7
30.0
160.0
20.0
130.0
200.0
:.. ~ .7.
'1,270.0
iSO.0
. 2400
2,150.0
8,660.0
1,300.0
:14,761.4'
.L:'46,183,'
11,400.0
2,000.0
410.0
.:13,810.0 '
1 59,993.3. -
% change
from
1977
+15.5
-33,o
1"5~.2
+20.1
-24.4
-0.7
+9.3
+.11.0
+4.7
+ i36.0
-14.3
6.5
+ 11.0
+74.4
+4.4
-38
+5.9
-1.3
. +4.5
!.' O: ~ _;-.8
" 4.5
11.1
.... oI.
:.: 5.3
i: A: ~0.6
r
No.
of
_ref.
,.3!
1'
'It
45
-I,
;z
i
1
'4
12
"2
':6
.t.:l
2
M4
.I
;2JZI. 
`1
,
12
.f3
I .0 i-
.~,, 755. 7:
, 'F: "I
,- 31-~'Z
.?7 20.-
:?.37 :-
I~ .43-~.-q 1'
REFINING .
Capacity (b/cd) January*1, 17.
.: Crude'
122,400
32,100
251,000
14,430
20,000
_26,000
:. 39,000
95,000
-15,000
.137,100
11440
72,000
16,000
159,000
:'20,138
-*g-10,000
10,000
. 478,000
,26,000
-;?'17,000
20,000
34,000
-.17,000
25,000
i:-:g,67,608
655 039
:500,000
' 
' : ' :3,000
:'74,300
:1209,200
144,000
173,500
12,000
· 46,461
'92,815
-"17,000
.14,000
14,000
'32,600
14,000
71,243,500
842,000
14,900
100,000
: 5,000
'370,100
-284,000
j '461,000
.?43,000
'L1;445,500
728,000
*17,150,000
t2,225,000
.- 2.,.13,915
6351,132-
10:478,00
1,578,000
,"2,692,000
2148.3
L~,3
Catalytic I Thermal I
Cracking Cracking 1 Reforming.
5,600:
26,000
:8!,400
1 000
34,500
52,000
.12, 600.
'42,000
23,390'
47,000
.->26,500
4,000
53,400
5,050,000
· 550,000
6,423,872
8,15,827.
NA
NA
NA
ts-7,200
-"58,500
65700
39,930
8,800
18,000
12 600,
i,666
'20,000:
:73700:
436,000
:42,900
'1,031,930 
.5 -5j
NA
.NA
<::NA
,i,600
1,900
7 '?:,000'1, 8901 400.
5;-t9200
`6 00
'2114`
";-: 3,020 ?.I.d7
3,000..
5,6001.:
3684
:;i13,800*'
21,600
,000
5000
95502 ,"?2 780::3,000
3,100
96,000
15,000,
2 00:
.-:1,760':
.' 76,000,'
27,00
:1,000
21,900.
80,000
t3,840,000
*,,450,000
C8,767,H -'
:,-- NA:
.. NA-
!'' t. 'NAL., -.
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TABLE 11
Selected OECD Countries: Oil Stocks
Thousand Barrels, End of Month
Belgium Denmark France Ireland Italy
1973 Sep
1974 Mar
Jun
Sep
Dec
1975 Mar
Jun
Sep
Dec
1976' Mar
Jun
1,057,911'
995,365'
1,102,467 2
1,156,105'
1,115,916'
1,076,360
1,071,150
1,147,338
1,111,810
1,060,489
1,108,703
Sep 1,191,450
Dec 1,111,810
1977 Mar 1,086,808
Jun 1,195,272
Sep 1,303,685
Dec 1,311,900
1978 Mar 1,167,740
Jun 1,185,228
Sep 1,263,105
Dec 1,277,940
1979 Mar 1,145,996
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
1,169,888
1,182,700
1,194,800
1,233,800
Luxem- Nether-
bourg lands
1973 Sep
1974 Mar
Jun
Sep
Dec
1975 Mar
Jun
Sep
Dec
1976 Mar
Jun
Sep
Dec
1977 Mar
Jun
Sep
Dec
1978 Mar
Jun
Sep
Dec
1979 Mar
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
569
504
548
511
438
584
584
606
650
620
606
650
657
591
496
664
577
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
82,724
82,738
83,614
80,059
71,336
71,744
84,315
80,190
75,438
83,388
86,819
79,935
68,094
69,686
68,846
78,584
69,642
308,000
265,000
333,000
367,000
342,000
302,000
322,000
339,000
335,000
303,000
333,000
374,000
366,000
337,000
372,000
386,000
390,000
371,000
382,000
377,000
397,000
368,000
378,000
396,000
372,000
396,000
113,193
116,060
N.A.
148,305
142,233
133,805
140,617
147,939
138,462
121,490
132,174
135,020
125,934
123,757
138,808
142,660
143,545
128,476
127,777
130,086
121,459
110,430
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
45,968
44,983
51,644
51,538
42,340
47,187
48,165
40,077
41,508
49,589
57,371
51,618
42,961
42,756
43,121
43,508
36,989
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Norway Portugal Spain
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
12,534
11,921
13,563
13,702
16,958
18,980
17,162
17,454
14,133
15,936
17,009
18,805
15,717
15,739
18,965
16,549
15,089
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
6,541
5,876
8,556
7,680
7,008
9,176
8,838
9,629
9,132
11,147
8,198
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
61,393
58,845
61,743
59,181
57,874
66,211
68,240
66,897
77,760
81,694
77,701
77,833
67,759
76,650
80,344
74,467
70,846
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
34,770
34,887
44,333
43,836
36,281
35,033
42,033
41,296
36,354
39,456
46,340
46,107
39,259
40,610
45,698
47,056
38,478
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Switzer-
land
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
27,638
28,368
30,332
30,565
28,360
29,375
30,580
32,230
32,018
34,500
35,222
35,573
34,522
34,536
36,157
36,945
37,558
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
254,296
222,051
191,245
202,684
239,265
231,133
209,868
201,130
225,592
234,629
194,640
187,632
213,715
198,166
184,347
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
7,636
7,899
7,716
6,293
5,913
6,563
6,570
6,008
5,840
7,066
6,979
7,023
6,512
7,840
8,030
8,045
7,818
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
1.36,890
142,335
152,490
142,153
117,260
132,882
141,496
140,773
135,692
162,381
163,958
159,972
135,692
140,240
156,943
150,164
123,187
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
United West
Turkey Kingdom CGermany
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
9,636
10,957
11,271
6,979
10,424
10,103
9,870
11,680
8,475
14,089
10,614
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
145,555
156,417
163,323
163,111
146,518
155,884
157,768
145,985
138,204
139,800
140,664
144,671
128,232
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
148,832
151,424
170,083
184,004
165,783
172,244
190,858
204,787
203,342
201,677
216,971
222 110
203,743
204,933
216,747
224,606
221,073
' US stocks include Strategic Petroleum
1979.
Estimated.
Reserves (SPR). According to DOE, the SPR held approximately 88.8 million barrels as of 31 July
I As of January 1977, US Bureau of Mines changed the reporting of crude oil stocks to include foreign crude oil not yet received at
refineries. Figures beginning in 1976 have been computed on the new basis.
'lJapanese stocks include government-owned strategic stockpiles estimated at about 33 million barrels.
Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, International Energy Statistical
Review, 3 October 1979.
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Notes to Table 12
(1) Current prices data from 1973 to 1978 are all from OECD, Economic
Outlook, July 1979. Data for 1979 are also from this source except
for exports of goods. Here we have assumed oil exports of 28.5 mbd
at an average price of $19.00 a barrel. (The C.I.A. estimate of
production for the first 5 months of 1979 is 30.5 mbd and we allow 2
mbd for OPEC internal consumption.) Non-oil exports of goods are
projected to be $11 billion in 1979 by Morgan Guaranty. For 1980
we assume exports of 28.5 mbd at an average price of $23 per barrel
and non-oil exports of goods of $13 billion. In 1980 imports of
goods and net service imports are assumed to increase by 15%
in value terms.
(2) The "Low Absorber" group is made up of the following countries:
Bahrain, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates.
(3) The series in 1975 prices were constructed by deflating the current
prices series by a unit value index for the export of manufactures
from OECD countries. This unit value was constructed from data
provided in various issues of OECD: Economic Outlook.
.
TABLE 13
POSSIBLE OPEC OIL AND NGL REVENUES (REV) AND SURPLUS
ON CURRENT ACCOUNT (SCA), 1979 AND 1980
(Billions of Dollars)
Quantity of Oil Exported
Price of Oil 30 mbd 28.5 mbd 27 mbd 25.5 mbd 24 mbd
Rev. 186.2 176.8 167.5 158.2 148.9
$17.00 SCA '79 49.2 39.8 30.5 21.2 11.9
SCA '80 28.2 18.8 9.5 0.2 -9.1
Rev. 208.1 197.6 187.2 176.8 166.4
$19.00 SCA '79 71.1 60.6 50.2 39.8. 29.4
SCA '80 50.1 39.6 29.2 18.8 8.4
Rev. 230.0 218.6 207.0 195.5 184.0
$21.00 SCA '79 93.0 81.6 70.0 58.5 47.0
SCA '80 72.0 60.6 49.0 37.5 26.0
Rev. 251.9 239.3 226.7 214.1 201.5
$23.00 SCA '79 114.9 102.3 89.7 77.1 64.5
SCA '80 93.9 81.3 68.7 56.1 43.5
Rev. 273.8 260.1 246.4 232.7 219.0
$25.00 SCA '79 136.8 123.1 109.4 95.7 82.0
SCA '80 115.8 102.1 88.4 74.7 61.0
Rev. 295.7 280.9 266.1 251.3 236.5
$27.00 SCA '79 158.7 143.9 129.1 114.3 99.5
SCA '80 137.7 122.9 108.1 93.3 78.5
(1) Constituents of the current account, other than oil exports, are
assumed to sum to -$137 bill and -$158 bill in 1979 and 1980 respec-
tively. These figures reflect the same sources as those of Table 12.
(2) The C.I.A. estimates of OPEC production for the first five months
of 1979 average 30.5 mbd. Assuming OPEC consumption of 2 mbd
yields the export figure of 28.5 mbd used in Table 12.
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TABLE 16
EUROCURRENCY DEPOSIT RATES
U. S. Dollar Pound Sterling
One Month Twelve Month One Month Twelve Month
June 1973 8.75 8.75 10.38 10.00
Dec. 1973 9.87 9.38 17.19 15.00
June 1974 13.88 11.88 12.06 14.13
Dec. 1974 9.06 9.56 18.00 15.50
June 1975 6.00 7.63 10.00 11.75
Dec. 1975 5.25 7.00 10.63 11.50
June 1976 5.00 7.13 14.50 14.13
Dec. 1976 5.13 5.56 17.00 14.38
June 1977 5.62 6.25 7.75 10.13
Dec. 1977 6.87 7.67 6.50 7.37
March 1978 7.13 7.88 7.00 8.25
June 1978 8.06 9.13 10.75 12.13
Sept. 1978 9.37 9.50 12.38 12.75
Dec. 1978 10.87 11.87 12.00 13.00
March 1979 10.25 10.56 12.38 11.63
June 1979 10.81 10.19 14.25 12.63
Sept. 1979 12.88 12.19 14.00 13.63
*Prime bank bid rates in London, on the last trading day of each month.
Source: Financial Times, London.
TABLE 17
U. S. G.N.P. AND CURRENT ACCOUNT, ANNUALIZED
(Billions of Dollars)
FIGURES
Real G.N.P. G.N.P. Current Merchandise
G.N.P. % Growth Current Acc. Trade
1972 $ Rate Dollars Surplus Surplus
1228.
1231.
1236.
1243.
1230.
1225.
1217.
1200.
1170.
1190.
1220.
1228.
1256.
1267.
1277.
1288.
1316.
1331.
1354.
1361.
1368
1 395
1407.
1427
1431.
1422.
9.1
1.1
1.7
2.0
-3.9
-1.9
-2.5
-5.6
-10.0
6.9
10.1
2.6
9.0
3.8
3.1
3.4
8.6
4.7
6.8
2.2
1.9
8.0
3.5
5.5
1.1
-2.4
1265.
1288.
1318.
1355.
1373.
1400.
1430.
1452.
1453.
1499.
1564.
1598.
1650.
1683.
1716.
1756.
1820.
1876.
1931.
1971.
2011.
2104.
2160.
2235.
2292.
2329.
-4.82
-3.73
2.30
6.34
-5.20
-7.96
-6.38
-0.57
12.67
21.12
18.43
21.55
6.97
8.68
1.47
1.30
-13.74
-9.82
-11.63
-21.20
-27.74
-13.70
-12.90
-1.25
0.62
-3.77
-0.99
2.88
5.52
-0.59
-5.94
-9.36
-5.58
5.83
13.14
8.32
8.90
-5.40
-6.22
-11 .25
-14.32
-30.67
-26.26
-26.75
-36.82
-47.60
-31.63
-32.05
-25.48
-24.39
Source: Survey of Current Business
1973 I
II
III
IV
1974 I-
II
III
IV
1975 I
II
III
IV
1976 I
II
III
IV
1977 I
II
III
IV
1978 I
II
III
IV
1979 I
II
TABLE 18
U. S. DOLLAR EXCHANGE RATES
(Units of foreign currency per dollar)
Effective Exchange
D. Mark Sterling Yen Swiss Franc Rate May 1970=100
1973 I 3.01 0.413 284.1 3.45 86.0
II 2.74 0.395 265.0 3.15 82.1
III 2.39 0.403 265.0 2.93 79.3
IV 2.55 0.420 274.6 3.13 81.8
1974 I 2.73 0.439 292.3 3.21 85.7
II 2.50 0.417 279.1 2.97 82.6
III 2.61 0.426 294.6 2.98 84.3
IV 2.52 0.429 300.0 2.76 84.0
1975 I 2.34 0.418 293.3 2.49 81.3
II 2.35 0.430 292.4 2.52 81.4
III 2.55 0.470 298.0 2.67 85.2
IV 2.60 0.490 303.6 2.65 86.2
1976 I 2.57 0.500 302.4 2.58 86.9
II 2.56 0.553 299.2 2.50 88.1
III 2.53 0.566 291.1 2.48 87.7
IV 2.41 0.606 293.6 2.45 88.0
1977 I 2.40 0.584 285.6 2.52 88.0
II 2.36 0.582 275.2 2.51 87.4
III 2.31 0.576 266.2 2.40 86.8
IV 2.22 0.551 247.1 2.18 84.7
1978 I 2.08 0.519 237.6 1.93 81.9
II 2.08 0.545 220.8 1.92 80.7
III 2.01 0.518 192.8 1.68 76.6
IV 1.87 0.504 190.6 1.63 75.2
1979 I 1.85 0.496 201.5 1.68 76.1
II 1.89 0.481 217.7 1.71 77.8
Source: I. M. F. International Financial Statistics.. .
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by
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November 9, 1979
Preliminary - To Be Revised for Publication
Energy has become a macro topic. Energy, along with industrial capacity, is the
effective supply constraint of the economy, frequently decisive for inflation,
growth and employment performance, and therefore at the very center of macro
policy.
As a result, the major macro economic models used for forecasting and policy
analysis have incorporated energy sectors designed to permit a tracing of energy
and related supply effects on the economy. This paper summarizes the energy
analysis embodied in the structure of the DRI Model of the U.S. Economy, an
800-equation construct used for both short-and long-term studies. Because it
is the goal of the model to represent the economic process in considerable detail,
the energy sector traces through numerous micro effects.
° 1979, Otto Eckstein
There is always the danger of losing sight of the forest for the trees, and so I
have recently developed a s.mall model which is largely recursive in its relation
to the U.S. macro model and therefore benefits from the full detail, but is easier
to interpret and to relate to macroeconomic theory. The model is used to analyze
the impact of the two energy shocks, 1973-74 and 1979-80, on the economy. The
companion paper extends the analysis to policy choices of the 1980s.
The Energy Sector in the DRI Model of the U.S. Economy
The detailed structure of the energy sector can be seen from Chart . The ex-
ogenous variables are an index of the OPEC marker price, production of domestic
oil and natural gas, major tax rates levied by the various levels of government
on gasoline, crude oil, electricity, etc., and the price control schedules on the
various domestic sources. In addition, the macro model treats as exogenous energy
supplies derived from solutions of DRI's energy models, including the breakdown
of electricity generation by source according to coal, natural gas, petroleum and
the domestic production of oil, gas, and coal. On the cost side, the model traces
the prices of imported and domestic oil into the final energy products bought
by consumers, such as retail prices of gasoline, electricity, natural gas and heating
oil. Prices of the basic energy sources are traced through stage-of-processing
equations to the various wholesale prices for different industries, and into retail
prices generally. On the demand side, household demand is derived from consump-
tion functions which include relative price terms, as well as the household stocks
to which energy use is related, such as housing and automobiles adjusted for their
efficiency ratings.
On the supply side, energy is one of four factors in the model's aggregate pro-
duction function, along with capital, labor and the stock of research and develop-
ment. Indirectly, energy also affects other supplies, of course. Industry invest-
ment equations include the energy sector, and help determine aggregate invest-
ment and the physical capital stock. The growth rate of the residential construction
stock depends upon the rental price of housing, which includes energy among the
operating costs. The supply of finance to the economy as a whole is affected
by energy both through the general impact of prices on the financial system as
well as the particular capital requirements of the energy industries.
2
Chart 
THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE DRI U.S. MACRO MODEL
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There are various other indirect effects of energy on the economy. Consumer
sentiment, one of the determinants of consumption, contains energy prices as
a separate term, and should (but does not yet) also contain a term for energy
disruption. The exchange rate in the model is affected by the trade balance, which
is, of course, heavily determined by oil imports.
The model calculates the aggregate demand for energy in terms of quadrillion
Btus (quads). In the case of the household demands, the separate consumption
functions are the input to calculate energy requirements directly. In the case
of industrial, transportation, commercial and other demands, the equations are
very simple, relying on activity levels at relative energy prices, leaving it to the
DRI energy model to provide the more detailed estimates. The two models can
then be solved simultaneously to insure consistency. Thus, the total energy demand
estimates of the macro model are mainly for the purpose of simulation exercises
and for the identification of the oil import problem.
The oil import bill is calculated as a residual in the current version of the DRI
Model. Given total energy demand and exogenous domestic energy supplies, the
import requirement is simply a residual. It then becomes a matter of further
analysis to assess whether OPEC will, in fact, make the calculated supplies avail-
able and at what price.
A more technical account of the energy sector in the DRI macro model is presented
in the Technical Appendixl to this paper.
THE CORE INFLATION MODEL
An aggregate conceptual framework has been developed as a near-recursive com-
ponent of the DRI Model to improve understanding of the inflation process. This
model distinguishes three kinds of inflation: demand inflation, shock inflation
and core inflation. The core rate originates in the long-term expectations of
IThe version of the energy sector described here was developed by Frank Cooper,
Douglas Rice, and Virginia Rogers.
4
inflation in the minds of households and businesses, and in the contractual arrange-
ments which sustain the wage-price momentum. Core inflation can be made
better or worse by the particular circumstances of any short period, but can only
be modified gradually. No brief experience will undo the cumulative effects of
previous reality on expectations.
Chart 2 shows the core inflation rate since the late 1950s. It can be seen that
it improved early in the period and was nearly eliminated by 1964. Since then
it has deteriorated steadily, even in the years when the measured inflation rate
showed dramatic improvement.
The conceptual structure can be set out as follows. The total inflation rate of
a period is equal to the sum of the three separate inflation sources: demand,
shock, and the core.
(1) P = P + Ps + Pd
where:
p = inflation rate
pc= core rate
p5 = shock rate
Pd = demand rate
The core rate of inflation can be viewed as the rate that would occur on the economy's
long-term growth path, provided the growth path were free of shocks, and the
state of demand were neutral in the sense that markets were in long-run equilibrium.
The core rate reflects those price increases made necessary by increases in the
trend costs' of the inputs to production. The cost increases in turn, are largely
a function of underlying price expectations. In a competitive Cobb-Douglas economy
with Hicks-neutral technological change, the long-term equilibrium price, Pc,
can be written as,
2For a fuller theoretical treatment of equilibrium price, see William D. Nordhaus,
"Recent Developments in Price Dynamics," in Otto Eckstein, ed., The Econometrics
of Price Determination, Federal Reserve Board, 1972, pp. 28-30.
Chart 2
The Core Inflation Rate Compared to
the Consumer Price Index
(Year-over-year percent)
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where q is the rental price of the capital required per unit of output in a base
period, w is the wage rate of the unit labor requirement, h is the aggregate
factor productivity rate of technological progress, and al and a2 are the Cobb-
Douglas factor share weights which, under the assumption of constant returns
to scale, must sum to unity.
The core inflation rate is the change in the long-term equilibrium price along
the balanced growth path. It can be written
(3) Pc = a q + a2 w - h.
The rental price of capital depends on the relative price of capital goods,
depreciation and tax parameters, interest rates and equity rates of return.
Let
(4) q a(rJ),
where r is the market cost of financial capital and J is the tax variable.
Financial cost is determined by the long-term inflation expectations embodied
in nominal interest rates and equity yields, so that
(5) q = a(pe J)
Similarly, wages on the equilibrium path are determined by the price expectations
underlying wage claims, or are based on
(6) w = (pw).
Therefore, the core rate of inflation depends on long-term price expectations
in labor and capital markets, tax provisions and factor productivity,
Pc = a (Pqe 3) + a2 P(Pe) - h.
7
Price expectations are formed on the basis of inflation experience, as measured
by distributed lags on actual prices, and need not be the same for bond buyers
as for workers. Thus,
(8) Pc = al l jpdJ) + a p(g 0 *Pj) -.
The demand inflation rate will depend on utilization rates of resources.
Presumably both unemployment and the operating rate of capital are pertinent,
and the effects are nonlinear.
The shock inflation rate is, by definition, exogenous to the analysis. While,
in fact, such shocks as OPEC and food prices are in part endogenous, with
aggregate demand playing the conventional price-lifting role, they are considered
to be determined primarily by non-controllable conditions here: OPEC political-
economic decisions in one case, weather and crop conditions in the other.
Government shocks, such as payroll taxes, are considered exogenous because
they are policy levers which can be controlled.
The various inflation components must be pursued further into their own
root causes. The core inflation rate is partly determined by the productivity
trend, which depends upon the rate of capital formation, human resource
investment and technological progress. The capacity utilization rate affecting
demand inflation incorporates supply considerations including the tax system,
as well as the level of demand created by fiscal and monetary policies and
private spending propensities. A theory of investment is needed for capital
supply, a theory of labor force participation for labor supply.
In effect, to fully trace the three components of inflation to root causes
requires a full description of the economy such as is represented in a complete
macroeconomic model. As will be seen in discussion of the empirical treatment
below, the actual implementation of the core inflation model is drawn almost
entirely out of the 800-equation DRI Quarterly Econometric Model of the
U.S. Economy. Thus, there is no need to develop a special purpose theoretical
or empirical model to conduct a full core inflation analysis. 3
3 The core inflation analysis can also be treated as a stand-alone analytical device
in which its inputs-the level of aggregate demand, the shock rate, the rental
price of capital, the rates of wage and productivity increase are treated as ex-
ogenous.
8
The large DRI macro model is an eclectic, detailed empirical representation of
the economy. The core inflation analysis could as easily be tied into a monetarist
model, in which aggregate spending is driven exclusively by the monetary factor.
Apart from the particular decomposition of the problem into its three components
to provide analytical focus, the core model makes strong empirical statements
only in one crucial regard-the formation of price expectations for determining
long-run capital and labor costs is a gradual learning process rather than a quick
response to policies or other particular events. The theory is consistent with
the rational expectations viewpoint that price expectations are free of bias, but
it is inconsistent with the viewpoint that these price expectations are formed
quickly from particular policy or other events.
Energy and Core Inflation
Chart 3 shows the historical role of energy in the inflation process. Until 1973,
energy was, if anything, helpful to the economy's cost structure. Thereafter,
the energy component of shock inflation has been very large. Gradually, via the
expectations of workers and investors, it converted itself into core inflation.
The chart shows the actual record of core inflation and contrasts it with a hypo-
thetical path in which energy prices continue their previous moderate behavior,
with average increases of just 5% a year.
The comparison shows not only the importance of energy in core inflation, but
also indicates that there is far more to the recent inflationary experience than
this one factor. The core inflation rate had risen from its brief near-zero levels
of the mid-sixties to 5% by the time the OPEC actions began, and would have
continued to worsen anyway. By the end of 1978, whereas the actual core infla-
tion rate was 8.1%, the "No Energy" scenario would have had the core rate at
7.2%, still a very serious figure.
The Impact of Energy on the Economy-A Fuller View
While the core inflation analysis focuses on the fundamentals of the inflation
problem, a full economic analysis, including the impact on real activity of capital
formation, requires a full macro model simulation. Tables I through 3 contrast
a historical tracking simulation of the DRI model with a hypothetical historical
solution in which energy prices rise only 5.5%. The solution without the energy
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Chart 2
The Core Inflation Rate (Percent)
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Table I
Summary of Tracking Simulation of the U.S. Economy(Percent change)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports ($bil)
Government Purchases
Importea Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
5.0
2.9
-1.9
5.5
4.7
12.3
-4.0
7.6
-0.2
5.9 7.1 7.6
3.9 1.1 0.6
1.1 1.0 -2.4
-1.4
-0.9
-0.3
-24.9
15.8
2.0
-1.3
1.8
-13.2
-13.8
22.5
1.9
5.9
5.9
5.0
23.4
15.8
0.2
7.9
0.8
-1.8
5.3
5.0
8.8
20.9
10.3
2.0
8.1
1.1
-1.0
4.4
4.5
8.5
4.0
10.8
1.7
44.5 242.7 11.0 7.6 7.7 2.5
5.5 10.9 8.1 5.1 5.7 6.8
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate (rate)
1.8 -3.3
4.2 3.3
4.8 5.6
1.9 3.6 1.8 1.0
3.2 2.7 2.6 3.0
8.5 7.7 7.0 6.0
Table 2
Summary of No Energy Trouble (1973-1(Percent change)
979) Scenario
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports (bil)
Government Purchases
Importea Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
5.0
2.6
-1.9
5.6
4.7
12.5
-3.5
9.1
-0.2
5.6 6.3 6.7
1.t 0.3 0.4
1.2 1.2 -1.7
-0.4
-0.2
1.5
-19.7
17.7
2.2
1.3
3.8
-8.5
-4.6
25.9
2.5
6.0
6.3
5.9
13.6
19.0
0.9
6.9
0.3
-1.1
4.4
4.6
6.4
13.7
12.6
2.5
7.1
0.9
-0.5
4.4
4.7
8.0
8.2
9.9
1.9
4.2 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
5.1 7.8 5.9 4.1 4.9 6.2
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate
2.1 -1.2
4.2 3.4
4.8 5.4(rate)
2.2
3.6
7.5
2.6 1.8 1.0
3.2 3.1 3.4
6.4 6.3 5.5
11
Table 3
Economic Impact of First Round of OPEC Price Increases:
No Energy Trouble (I973-1979)
Compared to Tracking Simulation
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Difference in rate of change
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
0.0 -0.3
-0.3 -2.7
0.0 0.0
Percent Difference
Real GNP (3972 Dollars) 0.1 1.1
Total Consumption 0.0 0.7
Nonres. Fixed Invest. 0.2 1.9
Invest. in Res. Structures 0.5 7.5
Net Exports 19.3 12.1
Government Purchases 0.0 0.2
-0.7
-0.9
0.3
3.8
2.7
7.4
19.0
15.2
0.7
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
-27.9 -77.8 -78.9
-0.4 -3.1 -5.1
-79.3 -79.7 -79.1
-5.9 -6.6 -7.1
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate*
0.2 2.4
0.0 0.1
0.0 -0.2
*Difference in rate
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-0.9
-0.3
0.7
4.0
3.1
8.4
9.6
20.3
1.4
-1.0
-0.5
0.8
3.1
2.7
6.0
3.2
22.1
1.9
-1.0
-0.2
0.5
3.1
2.9
5.4
7.3
-8.0
2.0
2.7
0.5
-1.0
1.7
1.0
-1.3
1.6
1.6
-0.8
1.7
2.0
-0.5
crisis portrays a significantly different outcome. The energy crisis was not the
only factor pushing the economy off its equilibrium path in 1973-74. However
without it, the economy would have suffered no worse than a year of a small GNP
decline in 1974, and would have seen 1975 as the first year of recovery. By 1976,
real GNP would have been 4% higher than in the historical tracking simulation.
The energy crisis was also largely responsible for the poor investment and pro-
ductivity results of the last five years. In the "No Energy" case, investment averages
4.9% higher and productivity 1.7% higher between 1973 and 1978. This helps boost
the potential output of the economy by 2% in 1978.
This analysis is a repetition of the work reported in greater detail in my recent
book, The Great Recession, Chapter 9, but performed on the current version of
the DRI Model. During the last three years, the model has become considerably
more elaborate through the inclusion of the full energy sector as well as through
various new supply formulations and a heightened sensitivity of the wage-price
block. Despite various changes, the results are very similar to the figures reported
in the earlier book. 4
Effects of the Second OPEC Shock
In January 1979, the industrial world experienced the second OPEC shock. As
Table 4 shows, the total magnitudes of the current round are very similar to the
1974 experience.
To assess the impact of the second OPEC shock, the most recent DRI macro
forecast and the recent history are contrasted with the hypothetical history shown
by a solution which assumes continuing moderate energy price behavior. Tables
5 through 7 show the second OPEC shock has worsened the economic outlook very
considerably. Inflation in the years 1979-81 is higher by an average of 1.8% a
year, and the core inflation rate, the legacy we leave to the future, is worsened
from 7.7% to 8.3% by the end of 1981. Real activity is curtailed, and unemploy-
ment is boosted from 6.7% to 7.5% for the years 1980-81.
4 The paper by Mork and Hall, analyzing the same experience, also has very similar
results. See Knut Mork and Robert E. Hall, "Energy Prices, Inflation, and Recession,
1974-75," Energy Laboratory Working Paper, May 1979.
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Table 4
Energy Price Inflation After Two Rounds
of OPEC Price Increases
(Compound annual percent change)
1st~~~~~~ OPE DR
ist OPEC DRI
Shock Forecast
1973-76 1978-81
OPEC Marker Price 60.0 28.0
(Change, S/barrel/yr.) 2.90 4.64
Avg. U.S. Import Price 53.9 29.1
Wholesale Prices
Fuels and Power 25.5 24.2
Coal 19.1 8.7
Gas Fuels 31.3 23.9
Electric Power 17.1 12.7
Crude Petroleum 26.2 31.0
Refined Petroleum 29.0 29.2
Real Fuels and Power 11.0 11.1
All Industrial Commodities 13.1 11.7
Consumption Deflators
household Energy Prices i5.2 21.5
Gasoline and Motor Oil 14.7 26.3
Fuel Oil 22.3 30.0
Electricity 12.6 11.6
Gas 16.2 16.2
Real Energy Prices 6.7 11.5
All Consumer Prices 8.0 8.9
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Table 5
Summary of Tracking Simulation (979: - 1979:3) and
DRI Six-Year Forecast (979:4 - 1985)(Percent change)
/23 S.% /z.- z 3. 3g /3,
Table 6
Summary of No Energy Trouble (1 979-1985) Scenario
(Percent change)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Core Inflation Rate 8.2 8.0 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.4 '8.5
Shock Inflation Rate 1.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.6
Demand Inflation Rate -0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 1.2
7. - 8,- y T~ ¢,f /-,3
Real GNP (1972 Dollars) 2.2 0.7 5.4 4.1 3.7 3.7 3.6
Total Consumption 2.2 1.2 4.5 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.8
Nonres. Fixed Invest. 5.4 -1.4 5.1 7.7 5.7 4.0 2.7
Invest. in Res. Structures -4.6 -2.1 12.5 6.8 6.9 9.0 2.1
Net Exports ($bil) 18.2 25.3 25.7 24.6 24.5 27.1 31.2
Government Purchases 0.2 1.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.8
Imported Fuel Price 3.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Personal Consumption Deflator 7.7 6.6 6.9 7.1 7.0 6.9 6.5
Output per Hour -0.1 0.4 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.3 2.2
Potential GNP 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.0
Unemployment Rate (rate) 5.8 6.8 6.5 5.9 5.8 5.6 5.3
// 5 ~',6 / r . /3 I i A 3.7
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1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Core Inflation Rate 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.5 9.0 9.3 9.2
Shock Inflation Rate 2.2 1.8 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
Demand Inflation Rate -0.2 -__ -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.2
/0l ,. 5 {. - f. .~ /d. -T-,
Real GNP (1972 Dollars) 2.0 -1.3 3.3 4.6 4.3 2.8 2.4
Total Consumption 2.3 0.0 3.0 3.8 3.9 3.1 3.1
Nonres. Fixed Invest. 5.1 -4.4 1.1 8.4 8.3 3.3 0.3
Invest. in Res. Structures -6.1 -13.6 8.2 17.1 10.9 3.3 -2.1
Net Exports ($bil) 17.4 22.3 22.6 21.8 20.8 22.2 25.0
Government Purchases 0.1 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.3
Imported Fuel Price 36.6 35.9 13.0 12.7 14.6 13.8 8.6
Personal Consumption Deflator 8.9 9.1 8.6 8.1 7.8 7.8 7.4
Output per Hour -0.8 -1.5 1.6 2.4 2.3 1.5 1.6
Potential GNP 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
Unemployment Rate (rate) 5.8 7.3 7.7 7.1 6.5 6.3 6.4
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Table 7
Economic Impact of Second Round of OPEC Price Hikes:
No Energy Trouble (1979-1985)
Compared to DRI Six-Year Forecast
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Difference in rate of change
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
0.0
-0.9
0.0
-0.3 -0.5
-1.4 -0.7
0.2 0.8
Percent Difference
Real GNP (i972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports
Government Purchases
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
0.1 2.2 4.2
-0.1 1.1 2.6
0.3 3.4 7.5
1.7 15.3 19.9
4.4 13.6 13.7
0.1 1.0 2.4
3.7
2.6
6.8
9.4
12.8
3.3
3.1
2.3
4.3
5.4
17.3
3.8
4.0
2.8
5.0
11.2
21.8
4.1
5.2
3.6
7.6
16.0
24.8
4.7
-24.3 -41.2 -45.1 -48.6 -52.7 -56.1 -57.4
-1.1 -3.4 -4.9 -5.8 -6.4 -7.2 -8.0
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate*
0.6 2.6
0.0 0.2
0.0 -0.4
2.7
0.5
-1.3
2.0 1.7
1.0 1.5
-1.2 -0.7
*Difference in rate
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-0.6
-0.5
1.3
-0.7
-0.4
1.1
-0.8
-0.4
0.8
-0.8
-0.4
0.9
2.5
1.8
-0.7
3.1
2.0
-1.1
I
A simulation has also been developed which calculates the effects of the entire
energy revolution, including both OPEC shocks and domestic price decontrol.
Tables 8 through 9 summarize the results. By 1985, the cumulative effects of
the energy crisis have cost 10% of real activity and 596 of potential output, and
have added almost 15% to the price level. The core inflation rate is worsened
from 8.7% to 9.2%.
This exercise completes the review of the historical record and the account of
the technical apparatus that has been used to analyze it. The succeeding paper
takes a more elaborate look ahead and explores a few of the macro policy choices.
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Table 8
Summary of No Energy Trouble (1973-1985) Scenario(Percent change)
/ !. f /1" f o 3. 7 3. 13.
Table 9
Economic Impact of Entire Energy Revolution:
No Energy Trouble (I 973-1985)
Compared to DRI Six-Year Forecast
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 2985
Difference in rate of change
Core Inflation Rate 
-0.9 -1.0 -1.1 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.6
Shock Inflation Rate 
-1.0 -1.4 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4
Demand Inflation Rate 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.0 0.6 0.7
Percent Difference
Real GNP (1972 Dollars) 3.3 6.0 8.0 7.5 7.7 9.1 10.1
Total onsumption 3.0 4.4 5.9 5.7 5.9 6.9 7.6
Nonres. Fixed Invest. 6.3 10.2 14.5 13.4 '11.2 12.5 14.6Invest. in Res. Structures 11.1 24.7 25.3 15.3 14.8 21.0 24.3
Net Exports 
-19.6 -3.1 -0.6 4.2 22.6 32.5 33.4
Government Purchases 2.6 5.3 7.0 8.1 8.7 9.2 9.8
Imported Fuel Price 
-83.9 -87.5 -88.3 -89.1 -89.9 -90.7 -90.9
Personal Consumption Deflator -8.4 -10.7 -12.3 -13.0 -13.5 -14.1 -14.5
Output per Hour 2.6 4.8 4.7 4.2 4.2 5.1 5.6
Potential GNP 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.5 4.0 4.4 4.7
Unemployment Rate* 
-0.4 -0.9 -1.7 -1.7 -1.3 -1.5 -1.9
*Difference in rate
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1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Core Inflation Rate 7.1 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.5 8.0 8.4 8.7
Shock Inflation Rate 0.9 1.2 0.3 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6
Demand Inflation Rate -0.5 0.7 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.3
7 Fr Ie 7. r.Y 3 . 9.7 /0 .
Real GNP (1972 Dollars) 4.4 2.3 1.2 5.3 4.2 4.4 4.2 3.3
Total Consumption 4.7 2.4 1.4 4.4 3.7 4.1 4.1 3.7
Nonres. Fixed Invest. 8.0 5.9 -0.8 5.1 7.4 6.1 4.5 2.2
Invest. in Res. Structures 8.2 -2.8 -3.0 8.7 7.7 10.4 8.9 0.6
Net Exports ($bil) 9.9 13.7 21.2 22.1 22.2 24.8 28.4 32.2
Government Purchases 1.9 0.6 3.5 3.2 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8
Imported Fuel Price 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
Personal Consumption Deflator 6.2 7.5 6.3 6.8 7.2 7.1 7.2 6.9
Output per Hour 1.0 0.2 0.6 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.0
Potential GNP 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1
Unemployment Rate (rate) 5.5 5.4 6.4 6.0 5.5 5.3 4.8 4.6
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
Energy Linkages in the DRI U.S. Macro Model
The 1979-C version of the DRI U.S. Macro Model contains a significant expansion
of energy-related detail and linkages. The price disaggregation is much greater,
and more precise, than in previous versions; the role of energy quantities is
enhanced, with a modeling of domestic demand and production permitting the
calculation of imports endogenously; the modeling of energy-related consumption
categories has been altered to more accurately reflect the post-OPEC energy
world.
The macro modei now contains the following energy-relatea concepts (asterisks
cenote new variables):
The OPEC marker price for light Arabian crude oil, including the average
surcharge after 79:1 (PMCRUDE*);
. The unit value index for imported fuels and lubricants (JMENDIO);
. The domestic wellhead price for crude oil (PDOMCRUDE*);
Five components of the wholesale price index for fuels and related products
and power (WPIOS): coal (WPI051*), natural gas (WPI053*), electricity
(WPI054*), crude oil (WPI056*), and petroleum products (WPI057*);
. Price deflators for consumer purchases of gasoline and motor oil (PCNGAS),
home heating fuel (PCNFUEL), electricity (PCSHHOPE), and natural gas
(PCSHHOPG);
. Total domestic energy demand, in BTU equivalents (DTFUELSALLB*):
· Domestic oil and natural gas production (JQINDI3*);
. Imported quantity of fuels and lubricants (MEND1067).
The major exogenou6 levers are the domestic and imported crude prices
(PLOLICRUDE and PMVICRUDE), domestic production (JQINDI3), ana the non-oil
wholesale energy price components (WPI051, WPI053, and W P1054). Each of these
concepts is mocelea y a simulation rule, wherein the primary determining variable
is an exogenous counterpart. Equations derived from applicable theory rather than
regression analysis cause the answers for these variables to differ from their
exogenous counterparts when important related factors, such as the overall
economy's inflation rate, change.
Other exogenous levers include, for electricity prices, the share of coal, petroleum,
and natural gas as source fuels in electricity production (EUF%COAL, EUF96PET,
and EUF%NG); for domestic crude prices, the proportion of domestic crude oil
production which is subject to price regulation (REG%DOMOILPROD); for
petroleum product prices, the domestically-produced share of domestic oil demand
(DOM%OIL): for retail gasoline prices, the average governmental tax per gallon on
gasoline (GASTAX), and for oil imports, the share of petroleum and natural gas in
aggregate domestic energy demand (PET&NG%ENERGY).
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THE PRICE BLOCK
Determination of primary energy prices is largely exogenous. Attempts to model
their behavior through regression analysis proved problematical because a) OPEC
actions and regulatory developments are not easily captured, and b) the energy
sector is in a period of rapid structural change, which regression techniques cannot
handle aequately. Consequent, the current DRI approach uses exogenously
determined values forkcy ices. with simulation rules (non-stochastic equations)
used to capture the pact on energy prices of other prices, regulatory
developments, mix changes, and structural changes.
Petroleum Prices - Oil prices are primarily determined by appropriate weighting of
domestic (PDOMCRUDE) and imported (PviCRUDE) crude prices.
The imported price variable is the OPEC price, expressed in dollars per barrel
(PM1CRUDE). Through 1979:1 the data is set at the pre-transportation price for
Saudi Arabian marker (light) crude. The March 26, 1979 OPEC meeting effectively
changed the marker crude price from a ceiling price to a base price. Therefore,
after the first quarter of 1979, adjustments are made to PMCRUDE to reflect the
base price plus an average surcharge. The values are still meant to capture the
price of a crude of similar quality to the Saudi light for consistency with the
historical data. Since it is difficult to separate premium differentials from
surcharges, the price value becomes a best approximation and not an actually
quoted price.
This variable (PMCRUDE) is now the lever for simulating OPEC price increases.
Use of this lever, rather than JMEND10 (as in previous model versions) or
PMCRUDEEXO, will ensure that changes flow through appropriately. (Changes
made to JENDI0 will affect the trade deficit, and thus GNP, without affecting
energy prices; changes to PMCRUDEEXO will affect energy prices without
affecting the trade deficit).
PMCRUDE is determined exogenously, with a simulation rule to reflect changes in
domestic demand prices:
PMCRUDE = PMCR UDEEXO*PCIdcG/ PC&I&GEXO,
where PC&&dG is the composite implicit price deflator for domestic demand
tconsumption, investment, ana government purchases), and PCRUJDEEXO and
PC&I&GtXO are exogenized counterparts of the corresponding variables. This
formulation assumes that OPEC prices are determined partially by U.S. inflation
developments. Their prices are not assumed to respono to exchange-rate changes,
since OPEC prices are, at least in the short run, denominated in dollars.
In standard DRI solutions, PC&dlIGEXO, an exogenous variable, is set equal to the
value of PC&l&G, so that the last two terms on the right-hand side of the equation
cancel, and PMCRUDE equals PMCRUDEEXO.
A simple bridge equation is employed to translate the imported crude oil price into
the unit value index for imported fuel (JMENDIO0). This index is used in deriving
the fuel import bill in the trade sector (MENDIO). It forms no other linkages with
the macro economy, since PMCRUDE is the channel through which all other links
are defined. There are several important considerations about he nature of the
data for .%lE.NDI0 which should be clarified:
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JMENDI0 is obtained from the Bureau of the Census publication FT900,
banked in @USCEN and derived as follows:
%AJ3MEND10 = %A(MPETNS/MQPETNS)
where MPETNS = value of U.S. petroleum imports, F.A.S., $/quarter
MQPETNS = quantity of U.S. petroleum imports, mmbd/quarter
Movement in JMEND10 captures the movement in prices of all the fuels we
import. Hence quality and mix changes will be included, in contrast to
PM.RULNDt, which captures just the movement in prices of a particular grade
_ of crude oil.
The imports are valued F.A.S.; hence prices will be slightly higher than the
transaction cost reflected in PCRUDE, but lower than if valued C.I.F. or on
a refiners' acquisition basis. Recent data for MENDI0 were consistent with
the following prices per barrel:
1977 1978
$/barrel 13.31 13.31
(%) 9.4 -0.1
The import category "10" includes all fuel imports. Hence, in the future, rising
natural gas imports, with price movements that may not parallel oil price
movements, may provide another source of discontinuity between JMENDIO
and PMCRUDE.
An approach similar to that for PMCRUDE is utilized for domestic wellhead crude
prices, except that the inflation factor is separated out: the regulated portion of
domestic production can, in a simulation, change only when domestic inflation
changes, since the regulations generally set ceiling prices which are a function of a
base price and an inflation markup. The nonregulated portion, on the other hand,
moves at the world oil price (approximated by PMICRUDE). The exogenous share
variable RCG%DOMOILPRD, which represents the controlled share of domestic
production, controls how mucn the composite domestic crude oil price will change
witn respect to both domestic price inflation ana world oil prices:
PDoLQMC RUDE = PDOMhCRUDEEXO*(REG%DOMOILPROD*PC&I&G/PC&I&GEXO
+ (I -REG%DOMIOlLPROD)*PM CRUDE/PMCRUDEEXO).
Domestic wholesale crude oil prices (WPI0561) are determined by simulation rule
from the composite domestic crude oil price:
WPI0561 = WPI056 I EXO*PDOMCRUDE/PDOMCRUDEEXO.
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Domestic petroleum product prices (WPIOS7) are determined by simulation rules
from domestic wholesale crude oil prices, and the OPEC marker price for crude.
The exogenous share variable DOM%OIL determines the proportion of petroleum
product prices which reflects pass-through of OPEC prices, and the proportion
which reflects pass-through of domestic crude oil prices. The simulation rule
assumes a distributed lag adjustment of refined product prices to crude oil input
prices:
WPI057 WPIOS7EXO*
3
I a i (DOM%OIL WP561 i + (-DOM%OL PMCRUDEi 
i=O W PI*(56XO i' PMCRUDEEXOi
a. =.2, .4, .3, .1 ai = 1.0
Consumer gasoline prices (PCNGAS) are estimated net of feceral, state, and local
taxes. According to DOE, approximately 2.7% of U. S. gasoline is imported;
therefore, an input cost term is constructed by weighting wholesale refined
petroleum product prices (WPI057) and imported crude oil prices (PMCRUDE):
gascost = .973*WPI057 + .027*P.MICRUDE/1.710
where the 1.710 term converts the dollar-per-barrel PMCRUDE term to a 1967-
based index for consistency with the WPI term. The gas price equation is then
estimated as
log ( gasprice ) 0.00102 - 0.00703*DMYPRICE
gaspricel (0.002) (0.004)
- 0.731 * log ( gascost )
(0.047) gascost l
2
.7981 (normalized on PCNGAS," 2 =.9982)
O.W. = 2.05
S.E.E. = 0.016 (normalizea on PCNGAS, S.E.E. = 0.014)
with gasprice define as
gasprice = PCNGAS-GASTAX/36.130,
where 36.130 is the average price, in 1972 cents, of one gallon of
gasoline, ana GASTAX is the average tax per gallon. in cents.
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Consumer home heating fuel prices (PCNFUEL) are estimated in rate of change
form from an input cost term derived from domestic petroleum product prices,
(WPI057), imported petroleum product prices (proxied by PMCRUDE), and unit
labor costs (TEMP@JULCNF):
fuelcost = 0.8*(0.955*WPI057+0.045*PMCRUDE/1.7)+0.2*TEMP@JULCNF
The weights for domestic and imported product prices were derived from DOE, and
represent the shares of domestic and imported petroleum products in home heating
fuel supplies. The estimated equation is
log ( PCNFUEL ) 0.952 * log ( fueicost )
PCNFUEL 1 (0.028) - t
2
= .8732 (normalized on PCNFUEL,' 2 = .9988)
O.w. = 1.61
S.E.£. = 0.013 (normalized on PCNFUEL, S..E. = 0.020)
Coal Prices - Wholesale spot coal prices (WPI051) are determined exogenously, with
a simulation rule which effects a 100% feed-through of domestic inflation:
= W05i WPIOSI EXO+PClcIG/PC&I&GEXO.
The price used in construction of the index by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is the
spot price. Coal moving under contract is not considered. Coke prices (WPI052NS
in DRI's central data banks), which form a very small part of the total fuel price
index, are not explicitly modeled. In input-output calculations of fuel cost indexes
for other industries, and in the calculation of the aggregate index (WPI05), the
weights which would accrue to WPI052 were assigned instead to coal prices
(WPI051).
Natural Gas Prices - - Wholesale wellhead natural gas prices (WPI053) are
determined exogenously, with a simulation rule which effects a 100% feed-through
of domestic inflation:
WPI053 =WPI053 EXO*PC&I&cG/PC&Ic&GEXO.
This simulation rule captures the tie-in of price ceilings, established under the
Natural Gas Deregulation Act, to the inflation rate.
Consumer natural gas prices (PCSHHOPG) are determined from wholesale prices
(WPI053) and unit laoor costs (TEMP(;JULCNF):
log ( PC HOP ) -0.000396 + 0..83*log TEMP@JULCNF_ 
CHOG - 1 (0.001673) (0.146) TEMP@3ULCNF 2
3
+ I ai log WPI053_i
WPIOS3 
I=U -I-I
a i = .0996, .1133, .1012, .0635
1ai 0.378
(0.042)
-2 = 0.7545 (normalized on PCSHHOPG," 2 = .9992)
D.W. = 1.67
S.EE. = 0.0086 (normalized on PCSHHOPG, S.E.E. = 0.011)
Electricity Prices - Wholesale electricity prices (WPI054) are determined by the
costs ,f -re three primary input fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas), and the
proportions of generation fuel accounted for by each source. The exogenous weight
EUF%..OAL applies to the coal spot price WPI051; the exogenous weight EUF%NG
applies to the natural gas price WP1053; the exogenous weight EUF%PET applies to
tne petroleum product price W\PI057. The weights sum to less than one, reflecting
the remaining sources of fuel (primarily nuclear and hydro). The simulation rule
which generates wholesale electricity prices is based on a distributed lag formula:
3
W P054
W PIO54 EXO
= Z w(E U F%COAL .' 'PCPI5 -iiG '_-_I_ - i
W'. PI051 EXOA-_
+ EUF%NG -i WPI053_i
WPI053EXOi
+ E'F%PET .*
-I WPIO57 i
WP1057EXO .
,(
(lI-EUF%COAL i- EU'F%NGi-EUFPET 1 ))
w0 = 0.2, w1 =4. w =0.3, w3 = 0.1
A-6
Consumer electricity prices (PCSHHOPE) are determined by the wholesale price.
A dummy variable was used in the estimation to account for the effects of price
controls during the Nixon administration.
log ( PCSHHOPE )= 0.633 *log ( WPI054 )
PCsHH7FiP5 1 (0.080) WFi53 1
+ 0.0957 * log ( WPI054 )
(0.0779)05
-0.00345 * DMYPRICE
(0.0020)
R2 0.7295 (normalized on PCSHHOPE, R 2 = .9985)
D.W. = 1.63
S.E.E. = 0.0077 (normalized on PCSHHOPE, S.E.E. = 0.011)
Aggregate Wholesale Price Index (Fuels) - The use of variable weights by the BLS in
the construction of the wholesale price index for fuels and related products and
power (WPIO5), combined with the absence of an explicit modeling of coke prices
(WPI052) caused problems in the attempt to find a satisfactory method of modeling
the aggregate index from its components. The method adopted was the result of
experimentation. The relative importance figures of each of the five components
from BLS's wholesale price index release were translated into their base period
relative weights. Then, assigning the weight for coke prices to coal prices
(WPI051), the following equation was estimated:
W P105 = -0.020i 0.995 * weightedsum
(0.0019) (0.0038)
+ 0.00315 * log (t) * weightedsum
(0.00077)
R2 = 1.0000
D.W. = 0.52
S.E.E. = 0.0042
where weightedsum = 0.05281 *WPI051 +0. 1341 *WPI053+
0.28158 W PI054+0.09466 *W PI0561 +0.47452 *W PI057
and t = TIME-60 is a time trend.
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THE DEMAND BLOCK
The energy demand block centers on four consumption equations-gasoline, home
heating fuel, electricity, and natural gas-and a total energy demand equation.
Gasoline - Gasoline consumption is estimated on a per-capita basis in log-linear
form. The' determining variables are real per-capita disposable income, with a
four-period linear lag structure; a four-period moving average of the per-capita
automobile stock; the average miles-per-gallon achieved by new model-year cars;
and the relative price of gasoline, with a four-period linear lag structure:
3
log ( CNGAS72 ) = -1.94 + 0.485 * log ( r w. YD72
hN - (0.36) (.145) i = N
4
+ 0.733 log ( 1 * I KREGCARSi)
(.168) 4*N
-0.0769 * log (AVGMPG)
(.0537)
4
- w, log ( PCNGAS . )j=0 ! C -
PC
w. =.4,.3, .2, . w. = 1.0I t
w. = .104, .083, .062, .042, .021 v w. = 0.312 (0.069)
t2= .9802 (normalized on CNGAS72, 2 =.9882)
D.W.= 0.47
5.E£.. = 0.028 (normalized on CNGA572, S.E.E. = 0.558)
The relevant elasticities are thus .485 for income, .73 for the car stock, -.1 for
relative price in the short run, and -. 3 for relative price in tne long run.
Heating Fuel - Home heating fuel consumption is estimated on a per-housing-unit
:asis, in log-linear form. The etermining variables are real disposable income,
with a low elasticity (0.21), the relative price, with a long-run elasticity of -. 34,
and consumer sentiment. The small size of this data series, relative to the
precision to which the data are reported, and the (unmeasurable) effects of weather
on heating fuel consumption, make accurate modeling difficult and R-squarecs low;
however, the standard error is a very modest 0.25 billion.
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log (KQCNFUE72 ) = -3.77 + .209
-1 (0.23) (.036)
+ (w log (ATTCj))
j=2
- (wk * log ( PCNFUELk
k = 0
PCk
w. .101, .151, .117
Wk = .112, .090, .067, .045, .022
3
+ log( w. +*YD72 i)
i= =
I w.= 1.0
1
I: Wi = .368J
! Wk=
(.059)
.336 (0.040)
2= .7028 (normalized on CNFUEL72,- 2 = .7341)
D.W.= 1.22
S.E.E. = .046 (normalized on CNFUEL72, S.E.E. = 0.254)
Electricity-Electricity consumption is modeled as a per-housing unit function of
income, relative price, and consumer sentiment, in log-linear form. Transfer
income is separated out from non-transfer income; the resulting response of
electricity consumption is more immediate for transfer income. The estimated
price elasticity is a modest 0.21.
log ( CSHHOPE72
KQHUSTS& MH I
) =5.85 +0.394 *log (
(0.07) (0.014)
YDi VGi ))
i=O -i
VG 1
+ 0.332 * log (C-- )
(0.011) -1
4 PCSHHOP E.(Wj * log ( PC ))j= o PC
-j
5
+ Z (wk * log (JATTC k))k=1
w. = .4 .3, .2, .1 I w. = 1.0
= .071, .057, .043, .028,.01 4 1W.j .213 (.030)
wk=.03u, .031, .027, .020, .011 Iw k=.123 (.033)
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W.
J
-R2= .9896 (normalized on CSHHOPE72,- 2 = .9921)
D.W.= 1.40
S.E.E. = .022 (normalized on CSHHOPE72, S.E.E. = .290)
Natural Gas - Natural gas consumption is modeled as a per-housing unit function of
disposable income, relative price, and consumer sentiment. The income elasticity
is a modest 0.38; the long-run price elasticity is -0.34. The explanatory power of
the equation is limited, like the heating fuel equation, by the size and imprecision
of the series, and the lack of an appropriate weather variable.
CSHHOPG72log ( IKQLST5 ) = -4.9S + 0.387 * log ( I w. * YD72 .)
1 (0.23) (0.036) i= 
- W. * log ( PCSHOPGj)j=o PC 
-j
4
+ r Wk * log (JATTCk)
k=l = 1
w .4, .3, .2, .1 1w =1.0
w. =0.113, 0.090, 0.068, 0.045, 0.023 1 w = 0.339 (0.042)
Wk = 0.060, 0.054, 0.042, 0.024 Wk= 0.180 (0.063)
~2r = .6887 (normalized on CSHHOPG72, 2 = .8852)
D.W.= 1.30
S.E.E. = 0.050 (normalized on CSHHOPG72, S.E.E. = 0.295)
Total Energy Demand - Total L.S. energy demanc is modeled in BTU equivalents, as
a function of consumer energy demands, industrial activity, and relative price. The
consumer cemano term is defined as
consumercemana = CNGAS72 - CNFUEL72 - C5HHOPE72
+ CSHHOPG72 a * CSTRAN572,
wnere a is a constant representing the share of transportation services which is
energy-related. This share is estimated as a function of a linear and logarithmic
time trend. Specifying industrial demand for energy as a function of industrial
production in manufacturing (JQINDM), mining (JQIND.MI), and utilities
{(QIND49&G), and the relative price term as the ratio of the wholesale price index
for fuels and related products and power (WPIC5) to the aggregate wholesale price
index (WP). we estimate total demand for energyv in uadril!ion BT
(C TFUELS5 ALLB) as foilows:
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log (DTFUELSALLB) = 1.744
(0.252)
+ 0.613 * log (consumerdemand)
(0.066)
+ 0.101 * log (JQINDM)
(0.025)
+ 0.087 * log (JQIND49&G)
(0.050)
+ 0.114 * log (JQINDMI)
(0.055)
z w * log (relativeprice i)
i = 0.023, 0.019, 0.014, 0.009, 0.005 I wi = 0.070 (0.010)
I £
-2 = .9974 (normalized on DTFUELSALLB, R 2 = .9970)
D.W. = 1.18
S.E.E. = 0.009 (normalized on DTFUELSALLB, S.E.E. = 0.601)
The coefficients on the relative price terms cannot be directly interpreted as
elasticities, since the consumer demand term already has price elasticity effects
built in. Similarly, the full-system elasticities on the industrial production terms
are not equal to the corresponding coefficients except for movements in the
particular index which are independent of movements in the other two indexes and
in the consumer energy demand categories.
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THE SUPPLY BLOCK
The energy supply block takes domestic crude oil and natural gas production
(JQIND13) as exogenous, and calculates oil and gas imports (MEND1067) as a
residual type of energy supply. That is to say, an increase in domestic energy
demana will, in the short run, be met primarily by the importation of additional
foreign oil.
Domestic Sipply - Production of oil and natural gas is represented by the variable
JQIND13, from the Federal Reserve Board's Industrial Production series. It is a
subset of the mining composite, comprising 69.2% of all mining ana 4.4% of all
industrial production. It includes the following major components:
% of JQIND3 %6 of JQIND
Oil and Gas Extraction (JQIN0I3) 100.0 4.4
Crude Oil 66.7 2.9
Natural Gas Liquids 6.8 0.3
Natural Gas 15.2 0.7
Oil and Gas Drilling 11.3 0.5
In the model, JQINDI3 is forecast exogenously; a simulation rule allows for a small
(.0S) short-run and moderate (.44) long-run supply elasticity, based on domestic
wellhead crude oil prices:
log ( JQINDI3 ) = w + log ( iPDOMCRUE )
w =.01 for i = 0 - 4, i = 10, and i = 24
w. =.01 fori = 11, i = 23
w. = .03 for i = 12 - 22
w. =0 for i 5 - 9
1w =.44
Import Supply -Energy imports to the U.5. are captured by the Bureau of the
Census value, in 1967 collars, of all imports of fuels an( lubricants (M.IEND1067).
Although primarily crude oil and petroleum products, the series does include
natural gas, other fuel imports and lubricants. This fact must be remembered when
translating oil imports or mmbd into constant-dollar imports (MENDIG67). The
Census data are often at odds with either the levels or the movement in levels of
oil import quantities available from the Department of Energy and the American
Petroleum Institute. For reference, the following benchmark figures for the oil
import cuantities associated with MEND1067 may be helpful:
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It should be noted that the Census figures include imports for strategic storage,
whereas the API figures do not; DOE provides estimates both with and without
strategic storage. Furthermore, the sampling techniques and timing differ among
the three estimates. None of the figures includes imports to the Virgin Islands
(there appear in the statistical discrepancy to the trade accounts, STATM67).
The equation for imports of fuels and lubricants (primarily crude oil, refined
petroleum products, and natural gas) is derived from total demand and total
production. Total demand can be approximated historically by adding domestic
production and imports, scaling the two concepts so that they are in equivalent
units:
domestic (realized) demand = a * JQIND13 + b * MEND1067
JQINDI3 tI MEND1067Ct J
where a is the domestic supply in some time period t, in mmbd, and b is the
equivalent import supply. Choosing any year t, and the corresponding values for a
and b, domestic demand is defined in barrel equivalents.
A relationship is then assumed between this concept of domestic demand, and total
energy demand (DTFUELSALLB), multiplied by the petroleum and natural gas share
of total energy demand (PET&NG%ENERGY):
log (domestic demand) = a0 + a I * log(DTFUELSALLB * PET&NGC%ENERGY)
a2 + TIME + a3 * log(TIME) - a * log(relative price)
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where the relative price is the cost of oil- and natural gas-related fuels relative to
the cost of all fuels. This can be approximated by constructing a measure similar
to WPI05, but excluding coal and the nonpetroleum/natural gas share of electricity:
cost oil/ng = (.153*WP1053 + .214 + (EUF%NG + EUF%PET) * WPI054
+ .087*WPI0561 + .478*WPI057)/
(.718 + .214 ' (EUF%PET + EUFNG))
The equation was then estimated as:
log (aomestic demand) = 7.725 + 0.972 * og(DTFUELSALLB
(3.884) (0.250)
* PET&cNG%ENERGY)
+ 0.038 + TIME
(0.012)
- 3.429 * log(TIME) - wi log(relative price)(1.239)
w.= .022, .043, .061, .073, .092, .105, .115, .124, .131, .136, .139, .140, .139,
.136, .131, .124, .115, .105, .092, .078, .061, .043, .022 Iw. = 2.23 (.51)
-2 = .9411 (normalized on MEND1067, 2 = .9706)
D.'. = 1.34
S.E.E. = .0240 (normalized on NIEND1067, S.E.E. = 0.333)
Given the definition of domestic demand (above), this estimated relationship can be
rearranged to solve for MIENDI067.
The sum of the coefficients on the relative price term cannot be interpretec
Ocrectly as a price elasticity because the numerator and denominator are not
suticiently incepencent; the true price elasticity is quite small.
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1. Introduction
In less than a decade, the U.S. economy has absorbed two larqe sudden
shocks in the world Drice of oil. The first of these resulted in a severe
dislocation of the domestic economy in the form of extraordinarily high
rates of inflation and a severe recession. The full results of the second
shock still remain to be seen, but the outlook for 1980 is discouraging
according to most current forecasts.
These unhappy events have clearly demonstrated the need for economists
to pay explicit attention to enerqy rice shocks. This seems so much more
important as the models in existence before 1974 seemed unable to account
satisfactorily for the macroeconomic effects of these shocks.
In our view, a successful analysis of an energy price shock must inte-
grate two equally important aspects. On the one hand, the long term effects
of energy substitution must be incorporated. This is done in most general
equilibrium energy-economy models , but these are lono-term growth models
and not intended for analysis of short-term roblems. All the existing
large short-run macroeconomic models lack this feature to our knowledge.
On the other hand, the short run effects on orice level, financial
markets, and employment must be taken into account. As equilibrium models
of the real economy, the energy-economy growth models naturally abstract
from these phenomena. Short-term macroeconomic models include them, or
can be modified to include them. However, a fully satisfactory treatment
of the problem requires an integration of the lona- and short-run mechanisms.
We have constructed an enerny-macro model which we believe satisfies
these criteria. It has been kept deliberately at a relatively small scale,
ICf. in particular Hudson and Jorpenson (1977)
2consisting of about ten equations. Although many interesting and imnortant
aspects of the economy are necessarily overlooked this way, the compactness
of the model has the definite advantage that the effects of a shock can
be traced relatively easily through the model.
The model assumes that goods and services are roduced by labor, canital,
and energy. The demand for inputs to production is modeled according to
the modern theory of production. The macroeconomic structure of our model
includes a financial system, which enables us to study various aspects of
inflation and monetary policy. The model incorporates the hypothesis of
rational expectations, but it is also somewhat Keynesian in treating money
wages as predetermined in the short run. In a urely classical economy where
wages clear the labor market instantaneously, an unexpected energy price
increase would reduce the level of output as a way of substituting away from
energy. Because of an accelerator effect on investment, this impact would
be larger in the short than in the long run. However, there would be no
effect on employment or prices. When the price of one factor, enercgy, increases,
the price of other factors, especially the wane, would fall to offset it.
Full employment should always prevail, and the price level should be linked
directly to the money stock. In our model, on the contrary, waaes resoond
slowly to unexpected changes in energy prices (and to all other surprises
in the economy). Durinq the period following an energy price increase but
before the accommodating chance in the wage, labor is riced too hioh for
full employment. Furthermore, with wages sticky, an energy price increase
increases the price level, so that the real money sunply is lowered, which
has an additional contractionary effect on the economy. Our model deals
explicitly with these aspects of the effect of an energy price shock; invest-
3ment and interest rates play an important role in the relation between
the sticky wage rate and the resulting levels of rices, output, and
employment.
When energy is partly imported, as in the U..S. of the 1970s, another
consideration links output and employment to an unexpected increase in energy
prices -- higher prices make the '.S. poorer and so reduce the level of
consumption in real terms. Often this is compared to the imposition of a
tax on U.S. consumers with the roceeds going to foreigners. As the U.S.
is made poorer, energy-supplying nations become richer. They acquire claims
upon the U.S. and face the choice of accumulating the claims (as government
or corporate bonds, stocks, direct investments and so on! or cashing them
in for goods produced in the !'.S. Our model does not attempt to explain
the choices of oil producers in this regard, hut uses a guess that oil
producers spend a relatively small fraction of th eir new income on ''.S.
goods. This seems consistent with observations on actual behavior in recent
years.
Our work follows in the footstens of a number of innovative earlier
studies. One of the first to predict the recession as a result of the energy
shock seems to have been Robert Gordon (l74). A number of later studies
have followed. Some of these have made important theoretical contributions,
like Gordon (1975a), E. Phelps (1978), Solow (197R), and intlay and Doderiques
(1977). Others have employed quantitative models to simulate the la074- 7
experience. These include Pierce and Enzler (1n74), erner et al. (l107),
Perry (1975a, b), Eckstein (197P), air (1n7,8), Klein (1o7.), and from a
slightly different perspective Hudson and Jorgenson (1Q78,). Contributions
of the more informal type include Haberler (n76), Serot (la7n), and Okun
4(1975). Our own effort is, to our knowledge, the first attempt to
give a unified treatment of the issues associated with factor sub-
stitution on the one hand and monetary and general macroeconomic
aspects on the other.
The present paper gives a non-technical introduction to our model.
The model is outlined in some detail in the next section. Section 3
applies the model to a study of the effects of this year's increase
in oil prices. A compact mathematical statement of the model is
contained in the Appendix.
2. The Model
Our model was constructed on the basis of the one used by Hall
(1978a), but contains some important extensions and revisions. The
present model treats the economy as having two sectors, goods and
energy. Only the goods sector is fully represented in the model.
Energy is used as an input to the goods sector and is thought of as
primary energy, such as crude oil, natural gas at the wellhead, and
coal at the minemouth. For simplicity, there is a single price of
energy, though it should be recognized that this is only a rough ap-
proximation.
The goods sector combines labor, capital, and energy to produce
goods. The term "goods" covers all sorts of goods and services and
includes finished energy products such as gasoline and electricity.
Total goods production is allocated among consumption, investment in
the goods sector, government expenditures, net export of goods, and
deliveries to the energy sector. It differs from real GNP by the
amount of the last item, which is small, and net energy imports.
Input Markets and the Supply of Goods
The supply of goods is modeled as a production possibility frontier
represented in the form of a unit cost function with the following prop-
erties. The own price elasticity of energy demand is about -0.3, and
the partial elasticities of substitution are about zero for capital and
energy, unity for capital and labor, and around one half for energy and
labor. These are long-run elasticities; short-run behavior is modeled
by specifying the capital stock as predetermined. The low value for the
own elasticity of energy in the aggregate is supported by evidence by
Mork (1978) and by casual reading of post-1973 data. The unitary elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor is strongly supported by the
evidence of Berndt (1976) and many other authors. For the corresponding
elasticity between capital and energy, strikingly different estimates can
be found in various parts of the literature.l Despite new insights and
2
attempted reconciliations, the issue seems to remain a subject of contro-
versy. Our choice of a zero elasticity is partly based on the evidence
of Hudson and Jorgenson (1978). Although their model has capital-energy
complementarity for the manufacturing sector, substitutability in service
industries and interindustry shifts in final demand gives a net effect
on capital intensity of the 1973-74 energy price increase that is very
close to zero. We hope to pursue this issue at a later stage.
Under the assumption of cost minimization, the demand for labor,
energy, and capital is derived from the production possibility model.
2Cf. e.g., Berndt and Wood (1975) and Griffin and Gregory (1976).
Cf. Berndt and Wood (1979) and Field and Grebenstein (1977, 1978).
6The derivation of energy demand is straightforward. The price of
energy is viewed as exogenous, and what cannot be supplied by the domestic
energy sector is imported. The price elasticity of domestic energy supply
need not be considered for our purposes.
The demand and supply of labor is a bit more complicated. The supply
of labor is assumed inelastic and grows exponentially at a constant rate.
Wages are thought of as committed in advance as in formal labor contracts.
When wages are set, they clear the labor market, or come as close as they
can given current information about future demand for labor. When unex-
pected events occur, such as a sudden increase in the price of energy,
the wage rate is partly determined by past commitments and adjusts to the
new equilibrium only gradually as wages are renegotiated. Immediately
after the shock, the demand function for labor determines the level of
employment, which may be well below supply, so that unemployment may
occur. This can be interpreted as a characterization of the Keynesian
hypothesis of wage rigidity and is an attempt to embody the view that the
labor market achieves equality of supply and demand in the long run but
that the process takes time. It implies a kind of Phillips curve for the
economy. However, in place of the expected inflation term that has been
the source of so much instability and conceptual ambiguity in the litera-
ture on the Phillips curve, expectations of future labor demand are formed
using the model itself. In particular, feedback from prices to wages occurs
in the model to the extent that price increases signal current or future
increases in the demand for labor (as they typically do).
This formulation, set forth by Hall (1978a), has been extended in two
directions. First, a cost of living increase has been added to the pre-
7committed wage rate. Specifically, for each percentage point of unexpected
price inflation, the committed wage rate is raised by 0.25 percent in the
same year and another 0.25 percent in the year after. Roughly, this
corresponds to a 50 percent escalation clause with a six month lag,
assumed to reflect the time needed for data collection. The inclusion
of this feature is justified by the widespread occurrence of such clauses
in the U.S. labor contracts (cf. Mitchell (1978)) as well as the theoretical
argument by Hall and Lilien (1979) that efficient labor contracts will
have this feature. Furthermore, it allows for a positive feedback from
energy prices to wages in the short run. Since it turns out that an energy
price increase lowers the demand for labor permanently, however, this
positive feedback is counteracted by a tendency towards lower wages in the
longer run.
The other extension is an adjustment in the committed wage rate to
incorporate cyclical movements in labor productivity. This feature makes
the model obey Okun's law but has few other implications and thus will
not be discussed in detail here.
Cost minimization also determines the desired stock of productive
capital. Part of investment is assumed to be determined by past commit-
ments, so that the stock of capital will adjust to unexpected events with
a lag. The specific form of the investment lag in the model is discussed
below.
The Demand for Goods
Consumption in the model is determined by permanent income. Consumers
are viewed as looking into the future to evaluate their future incomes,
and then choosing a growth path of consumption that is the highest feasible
8given expected future income. The behavior of consumption has the character
described by Hall (1978b) -- consumers always plan a constant growth rate
for consumption. When new information arrives, they make an immediate
once-and-for-all adjustment to the level of consumption. We assume that
consumption is unaffected by real interest rates, in the sense that the
rate of growth of planned consumption does not depend on the interest rate.
Note that the assumption in Hall (1978a) that consumption is unresponsive
to all economic events is replaced by an explicit dependence on permanent
income. The model makes no distinction between durable and non-durable
consumption goods. We consider this an oversimplification and plan to
change it at a later stage. Stock adjustment of consumer durables are
introduced ad hoc in simulations of the present version of the model.
Investment demand is derived from the demand for capital. However,
in the short run, the model assumes that the economy's ability to adjust
the capital stock is limited. Part of the investment in the next few years
is already committed today and cannot be adjusted in response to new in-
formation. Specifically, this is modeled by treating capital as an aggre-
gate of m categories, such that the quantity of category j needs to be
determined j - 1 years in advance. Each category enters symmetrically
in the technology model; but the categories are imperfect substitutes in
production, since otherwise all investment would be concentrated in the
category with the shortest lead time. In the year of the energy shock,
investment in m - 1 categories is committed already, whereas investment
in the last category is determined by the demand for capital of that cate-
gory as determined by present and expected future prices and demand. The
next year, another category becomes "flexible" until all capital and invest-
9ment is determined by post-energy shock forces after four years. This
formulation, which is adapted from Hall (1978a), does justice to the
physical lags in the investment process without introducing arbitrary lags
for expectation formulation.
Government expenditure and net export of goods are taken to be exogenous.
Among other things this means that, rather than modeling the behavior of
petroleum exporting countries, we use an outside estimate of their demand
for U.S. goods. We are currently working on a revision which will incorpo-
rate this aspect into the model.
Financial Sector
The model has only two assets, money (supplied exogenously by the
government) and ownership of physical capital. This allows the description
of this sector to be compressed into one equation, the money demand function.
In this equation, the major issue is the specification of the variable
that measures the dollar volume of transactions. The use of nominal gross
national product for this purpose is one of the many reasons that macro-
economic models in existence in 1973 were unable to deal effectively with
the energy price shock (cf. the remarks by Pierce and Enzler, op. cit.,
p. 16) -- nominal GNP subtracts imports and so cancels out much of the
effect of higher energy prices. We use the dollar volume of output from
the goods sector as a proxy for transactions. This variable makes sense
in view of the fact that much of the money stock is in the hands of consumers,
not businesses. We neglect the small contribution to the demand for money
that might come from the energy sector (recall that all energy passes
through the goods sector on its way to final demand).
The money demand equation is supplemented by an identity relating
10
the nominal interest rate to the real return to capital. One of the terms
in this identity is the expected rate of inflation, which we take to be
the rate predicted by the model.
Price Level Determination
The price level is defined as the money price of goods. It is deter-
mined in the model by a price equation which equates price to unit cost.
For this purpose, unit cost is derived from the same function as in the
technology model, but the arguments are slightly different. First, fluc-
tuations in the unit cost of labor due to cyclical variations in produc-
tivity are excluded from the price equation whereas the technology model
includes them. Secondly, the capital price used in the price equation
is a long-run average of the real rental price of capital times the price
level rather than the current nominal capital price. When the real price
of capital changes permanently in response to a shock, the capital price
in the price equation is assumed to adjust with a lag. This formulation
corresponds to the following important findings of the price equation
literature: (1) Apart from the effect via wages, fluctuations in demand
have little or no effect on the price level;1 (2) prices show no sensi-
tivity to cyclical fluctuations in productivity;2 and (3) transitory
fluctuations in interest rates do not affect prices.3 In addition, this
specification seems to give a sensible estimate of the partial impact on
the price level of an energy price increase, namely the share of energy
in variable cost.
Cf. Gordon (1970, 1971, 1977), Nordhaus (1972), Hall (1979).
2Gordon (1975b)
3Cf. e.g. Gordon (1975b), pp. 643-44.
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This model of price level determination is compatible with the hypo-
thesis that inflation is determined by money supply in the long run. In
the short run, however, wage rigidity may allow substantial deviations
from this rule.
3. An Example: The 1979 Energy Price Shock
We have used this model to carry out an analysis of the current energy
price shock. It rests on the following assumptions:
1. The world price of crude oil increased from $12.50 in 1978 to
$21.50 in the second quarter of 1979.
2. The price will remain at $21.50 for the rest of 1979.
3. The dollar price of oil will rise another 14 percent at the
beginning of 1980, so that the average price in 1980 will
exceed the average price for all of 1979 by 25 percent.
4. In 1981 and beyond, the world price of oil will remain constant
in dollars adjusted for inflation.
5. The prices of other forms of primary energy--coal and natural
gas--will rise by half as much as the percentage increase in
the price of oil.
6. The combination of long-term contracts and regulation of utilities
and other energy markets introduces a lag in the pass-through
to the consumer of increases in primary energy prices. We
assume the pass-through to be 80% in 1979 and complete in 1980
and later years.
All these assumptions imply that, relative to the 1978 level, the
price of primary energy in the U.S. will have increased by 30 percent in
12
1979 and 63 percent in 1980. Of this, we assume that 9 percent per year
increase was expected before the shock. Our analysis treats the rest as
an unanticipated increase.
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 1 and presented
in detail in the Appendix. The effects of the energy shock on inflation
and real output will be significant, but a good deal less than in 1974-75.
Almost two percentage points are expected to be added to the inflation
rate this year (some of which has already been observed) and about 1.3
percentage points in 1980.
With respect to real economic activity, we find that the U.S. economy
is probably already in a recession, with a shortfall in real output of
15 billion 1972 dollars or one percent this year, and as high as 55 billion
or almost four percent in 1980. Again the largest decrease is in invest-
ment activity, but not until 1980 with a shortfall of 28 billion, and
reaching its bottom level in 1981 with a shortfall of 34 billion 1972
dollars. Consumption decreases by two and a half to three percent.
Government expenditure is assumed to follow its past trend, whereas net
export of non-energy goods is expected to rise by 3 billion 1972 dollars
as oil-rich nations spend part of their new wealth on U.S. goods. It is
assumed, however, that this increase does not take effect until 1981, as
the recession will slow down export demand from other countries. Unemploy-
ment is expected to increase, not so much this year, but by a little more
than a percentage point for 1980. Wages do not seem likely to change
very much in nominal terms, which means a decrease in real wages of two
to three percentage points. All of this adds up to another severe dis-
location of the U.S. economy because of an energy shock.
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Table 1
Summary of Projected Effects of Energy Shock
Year
1979 1980 1981
Extra inflation 1.8 1.3 0.1
(percentage points
per year)
Extra growth in -1.1 -2.8 0.4
real GNP
(percentage points
per year)
Extra investment 3.6 -12.6 -14.8
(percentage of level
in absence of shock)
Extra consumption -2.6 -2.9 -2.3
(percentage of level
in absence of shock)
Extra unemployment 0.4 1.2 0.9
(percentage points)
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We see the energy price shock as affecting the economy via two
principal channels. First, there is a permanent lowering of the long-run
growth path of the economy because the energy price increase induces more
labor-intensive methods of production. Since the supply of labor is largely
fixed, the substitution requires lower output. As the economy adjusts
its stock of productive capacity to the new growth path,investment drops tem-
porarily. Secondly, wages rise somewhat in response to the shock, so the com-
bined effect is a substantial jump in the price level. As money supply is not
increased in nominal terms, interest rates rise and induce a further decline
in investment. Another major component of aggregate demand, consumption,
falls because the higher energy bill depresses real income, as does the
recession itself. The decline in aggregate demand is assumed to be offset
a little by an increase in export demand as energy-rich nations spend
part of their new wealth on U.S. goods, but this is offset in the short
run by reduced export demand from energy importing countries. The net
effect is a large decline in aggregate demand for U.S. goods.
4. Concluding remarks
Our model of the U.S. economy suggests it is vulnerable in an important
way to unexpected increases in the world oil price. An oil shock drives
down investment and pushes employment below its full-employment level.
These shorter-run, business cycle responses are economically inefficient--
they involve the under-utilization of the productive capacity of the
economy. In addition, U.S. consumers have suffered a loss in real income
which makes them reduce consumption. This response is inescapable and would
occur even in an economy that was able to respond to the oil shock in a
-15-
fully efficient way.
The key feature of our model that makes it respond in a cyclical way
to the shock is the rigidity of money wages in the short run. In this
respect, our model is distinctly Keynesian. By contrast, in a fully classi-
cal model, money wages would decline in response to an increase in oil
prices, and full employment would be maintained. It is an interesting
challenge to economists to explain why money wages are so unresponsive,
in view of the very substantial cost the economy pays for the unrespon-
siveness. An even greater challenge is to find ways of reforming the
economy to make it less vulnerable to price shocks.
-16-
Appendix
Compact Mathematical Statement of the Model
Capital Accumulation:
Kt It + (1 - 6)[(bt-l/bt)Ktl
Kt It + (1 - 6)Kt-l
Demand for Capital:
Kt = (PKt/PKt) K(eY lt wt' PE
+ ((bt - bt-l )/bt)Kt-1 ]
t, PKt) Yt
Kt (PKt/ Kt) K(e - lt
bt_ l-bt
PKt -PKt PKt
Demand for Labor:
t + (e- 1t t' PEt.
PKt )Yt
: (wt/w*) el
ft t
= t w t
1-f
tL(eUlt wt'
PEt' PKt)Yt
t
t = h(-ft (M))
wt wt (w[/t) (M.9)
W* = 1 + (l Pt- Pt
Supply of Labor:
Lt = L0e
+ 1 Pt-i - t-1 
2 -~t - i ) ]-t
, n = 0.017
Demand for Energy:
Et = E (e lt Wt' PEt' PKt)Yt
Supply of Energy:
PEt exogenous
(M.1)
(M.2)
(M.3)
(M1.4)
(M.5)
Lt
0
wt
(M.6)
(M.7)
(M.8)
(M.10)
(m .l1 )
(Mi.1?)
(M.13)
Wt'j PEt' PKt )Yt
Lt ;(w t N )e I
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Consumption Function:
C t = Cegt , g = n + l' C chosen so as to attain
steady state for real economy in the long run (M.14)
Distribution of Output in goods market:
Yt = Ct + btIt + (1 - btt + t + X t (t.15)
X t, Gt exogenous
Price Equation:
(1 - r)Pt = (e-utt wt, pEt, P) (tl.16)
v long run average of PKt/Pt
Money Market Equilibrium:
Ln(PtYt/Mt) = '0 + ltt + 2t' Mt Memt m - 0.058 (M.17)
Equality of Nominal Return to Capital and Nominal Interest Rate:
rt vt/(l d - 6 - e + n(( - dt+)Pt+l) - n((l - dt)Pt),
vt PKt/Pt (M.18 )I-
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Introduction
Another round of large oil price increases has hit the U.S.
and world economies. The first large oil price increases, in 1973-74,
were in part responsible for the severity of the recession and inflation
of 1974-75. The U.S. is apparently at a weak stage in the business cycle
again, and the oil price increases w;ill almost surely slow real growth
and increase inflation. To decide on the appropriate fiscal and ronetary
policy responses to the price increase requires thorough analysis of
its macroeconomic effects.
In this paper we focus on the unique characteristics of energy
price shocks within the U.S. economy and simulate the experienced
and projected macroeconcmnic effects of OPEC price increases *iith the
MIT-PENN-SSRC (MPS) econometric model. The standard channels of trans-
mission of external inflationary shocks also operate in this instance.
These are discussed only briefly here since they have been analyzed at
length in previous MPS model studies by Pierce and Enzler [11], Berner,
1/
Clark, Enzler and Lcorey [3], and Thurman and Kwack [16].
1/ The results of these studies are broadly consistent with the empirical
studies by Eckstein [4], Klein [7], Mork and Hall [8], and Perry [10].
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In the analysis that follows we consider carefully three
types of energy prices: imported oil prices, domestic oil production
prices, and the wholesale price index for energy. Average imported
oil prices in the U.S. are calculated as a weighted average of prices
charged by OPEC and non-OPEC oil exporting countries. Domestic oil
production prices are calculated from upper tier, lower tier, marginal,
and noncontrolled oil production level prices at the wellhead. Domestic
wholesale energy prices, net of imported petroleum prices, are BTU
equivalent output weighted average prices of domestic oil, coal,
1/
natural. gas and other energy prices.
The three prices are plotted as indexes (1972 = 100.) in Graph
I where the extension beyond 1979 Q2 incorporates the announced (in June
1979) OPEC schedule for oil import prices. Beyond 1979, this schedule is
arbitrarily extended at a 10 percent annual rate of growth. The two domestic
price paths are closely linked to that for imported oil. These linkages
will be discussed in detail in what follows.
Two salient features of this graph are the discrete jumps
in the world oil price in the 1974 and 1979 periods and the paths of
domestic energy prices which are regulated below world eergy prices
in the 1974-1979 period and then phased up to world price levels in
the period 1979-1981. Domestic wholesale energy prices react slowly
to the world and domestic oil price increases due to long-term contract
lags in the domestic non-oil energy producing industries. Domestic
refined petroleum product prices, which are also a component of the
1/ The weights for average import prices are import share weights and
for domestic oil prices production share weights, both from DOE
Monthly Energy Review [18]. BTU equivalent output weights for the
domestic wholesale energy price index from the SCB [17] also are
calculated from this source.
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wholesale energy price index, rise toward world oil prices at an increasing
rate as oil price controls are removed.
We will analyze the macroeconomic effects of the announced
June 1979 OPEC price increase, as well as two possible OPEC pricing
alternatives. First, we look at the impact of denominating the dollar
price of oil per barrel in terms of a basket of currencies rather than
in dollars, and second, we analyze further discrete jumps in the OPEC
price schedule beyond 1979. Both of these alternatives would signifi-
cantly raise the OPEC price path and thus the path of domestic oil and
competing energy prices as they rise to world levels by 1981.
The organization of the analysis is as follows. Section II
discusses the features of an oil price shock that distinguish it from
the analysis of the standard transmission channels of imported inflation.
Section III will explain the methodology used to calculate the domestic
energy price changes, as well as the way these energy price changes
feed through the MPS model presented in Section IV. A concluding
Section V discusses the importance of the simulation results for monetary
and fiscal policy.
II. Transmission Channels of an Oil Price Shock
The effects of any increase in import prices is transmitted
to domestic prices through three standard channels.
First, the increase in import prices is passed through to the price of
final sales, both directly and indirectly, since imports are both
-4-
final and intermediate goods. Second, the price of import-competing
goods-in this case, coal and natural gas - rise, and-these price
increases are passed on similarily to final sales prices. Finally,
the first two effects on consumption prices result in higher wage
demands, which result in higher prices, and so on.
In addition to these standard transmission channels, the
analysis of oil price increases differs from the textbook exposition of
1/
the effects of import price increases in several ways.
(i) Dand and Supply Elasticities
While produced domestically, oil appears to be inelastically
supplied with respect to price, at least in the short run. As an inter-
mediate input or final product, it is inelastically demanded in the
short run. The OPEC Cartel, acting in its own best interest as a
quasi-monopolist, has the political and econcmic power to keep prices
high as long as the cartel retains cohesion. Finally, many of the OPEC
countries do not want to or cannot exchange anything but a small fraction
of their receipts from the sale of oil for exports from the oil-importing
countries.
Since oil demand is relatively insensitive to prices in the
short run, a rise in oil prices means that total dollar expenditures
on imported oil will increase. If there is no change in savings, the
higher oil import prices will result in a decline in expenditures on
domestic goods and services relative to what would have occurred in
_/ Cf. Berner, Clark, Enzler, Lowrey [3].
the absence of the price rise. Oil price increases have been likened
to the iposition of a sales tax, the proceeds of which are not spent
immediately (either by OPEC-countries or American oil companies) resulting
in a net contractionary effect on the economy because of a decline in
aggregate demand. The loss in real domestic income is a real income
transfer to OPEC.
Energy, labor and capital are all inputs used in production.
As the price of energy rises relative to other factor prices, producers
will tend to substitute away from energy towards the other factors.
Since factor proportions are relatively fixed once capital is installed,
most factor substitution will take place only when the capital is fully
depreciated. Additionally, if capital and energy are complementary
inputs, a rise in energy prices will tend to make producers substitute
away from both factors towards labor. More labor-intensive production
by definition involves lower productivity and less demand for new
investment. In any case the aggregate supply of output is reduced.
(ii) World Prices and Activity
An increase in world oil prices increases inflation in other
oil-importing countries. Consequently U.S. trading partner prices
will also rise and their activity levels fall as a result of the oil
price increase.. World trade as a whole will shift from non-energy
related products and services to imported oil from oil exporting
countries. The net effect of this shift in the terms of trade of oil
importing countries will be that trade volume will be lcwer among oil
importing countries and at higher prices.
1/ The unique characteristics of world oil price increases as they
affect worldwide inflation are discussed in Salant [12].
-6-
Ordinarily, large changes in relative prices between countries
would be offset by changes in exchange rates if the world operated under
a freely flexible exchange rate system. The exchange rate outcomes of
an oil price increase are complicated by the fact that they depend on
the share of unspent oil revenues which OPEC countries wish to hold in
the form of dollar denominated financial claims. A very small percentage
of OPEC revenues are used for purchases of goods and services from oil
importing countries; the remainder must be invested. If OPEC decided
to shift part of their assets frcm dollars to a foreign currency or a
basket of foreign currencies (the SDR, for example), the resultant ex-
change rate impacts on U.S. inflation could be large. It is impossible
to predict exchange rate changes following an oil price increase without
knowing the distribution of the increase in OPEC wealth. A further
complication is that the problem involves simultaneity: the willingness
of OPEC to continue to hold their assets in dollars probably depends
on their expectations of the dollar exchange rate, which in turn are
related to U.S. inflation relative to that of other countries, and to
U.S. monetary policy.
(iii) Inflationary Expectations
The .discrete nature of oil price shocks affects inflationary
expectations differently from other sources of inflation. The timing
of OPEC price hikes has been generally impossible to predict. Hence,
the variance of inflationary expectations will be larger in a world
of unpredictable oil price rises.
-7-
Domestic output and- expenditure patterns are difficult to plan when
petroleum product supply sources are erratic in behavior, as was the
case with the interruption in world oil production during the Iranian
revolution.
(iv) Energy egulation and Control
Damestic petroleum supply and prices are subject to adminis-
tered stockpiling and a complicated set of price regulations. These
price controls, and the recently announced plans for phasing them out,
introduce further complexity to the analysis of OPEC price shocks.
Under the price control regulations which existed up until April of
1979, an increase in the world price of oil widened the gap betten
imported and domestic oil price levels. The result of artificially
low domestic prices was a fall in domestic production and an increase
in oil imports.
The domestic oil price controls are gradually being phased
out through 1981 when all domestic oil prices will be allowed to attain
world levels. An analysis of the ipacts of higher imported oil prices
involves not only the increasing effects on the level of domestically
produced oil, but also consideration of competing energy product prices
and the probable domestic energy supply response.
1/ The proposed domestic production oil price decontrol plan is described
in "The White House Fact Sheet" [19].
-8-
(v) Policy Responses
The magnitude of the impacts of any price increase on
the domestic economy will depend substantially on the policy actions
taken by the monetary and fiscal authorities. If policymakers do not
understand that oil price increases involve an income transfer to
foreigners that ultimately cannot be avoided, the policy response
to such price increases may be inappropriate. We will discuss this
problem in further detail in Section V.
III. Model Methodology
Domestic Energy Price Calculations
Table 1 presents alternative energy price paths in levels and
year over year rates of change for average oil import prices, domestic
oil production prices and domestic wholesale energy prices, all of which
are exogenous to the model. The control set of price schedules include
the increase in average OPEC oil prices announced at the December
1978 OPEC meeting of 14% (annual rate) over 1979 and 1980 with the
majority of the increase occurring in 1979. Beyond 1980, imported
oil prices are assumed to grow at an annual rate of 7%. This corresponds
closely with the inflation rate for that period which was arbitrarily
built into the model control simulation, yielding constant real imported
oil prices.
The three alternative oil price scenarios in this table
represent calculations for world and domestic energy prices which result
-9-
from 1) the announced June 1979 OPEC price schedule, 2) denominating
the June 1979 schedule of prices in SDRs instead of dollars, and 3)
the oil price schedule under assumptions of an additional 1980 increase
in OPEC prices. The methodology used to calculate these price schedules
is the same as that used in calculating the control schedule, but
with different assumptions regarding oil import prices.
Average domestic oil prices in the control scenario follow
the schedule for decontrol of domestic oil production prices announced
in April 1979. This schedule allows those prices to attain world
levels y 1981 Q4. Under the decontrol plan there are four different
categories of domestic oil, each with its onm decontrol schedule:
1. Upper Tier Oil, which accounts for over 30% of domestic
production. The price will increase in equal monthly
increments to adjust to the existing world oil price
level beginning in January 1980 and attaining world
levels in 1981 Q4.
2. Lower Tier Oil, which currently amounts to approximately
30% of domestic oil production, will be decontrolled
1/
toward the upper tier price through a "decline rate"
schedule of decontrolled quantities where the rates of
decontrol are 1.5% per month through December 1979 and
3% per mOnth between January 1980 and October 1981.
1/ By "decline rate" is meant that each month, a fraction of production
will be alloc;ed to sell at the upper tier price.
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3.. Marginal Oil, comprised mainly of Alaskan North Slope and
-Naval Petroleum reserve oil with a domestic production
..weight of less than 15%, 80% of which was raised to the
upper tier price in June of 1979, with the remainder
- ,,decontrolled to upper tier prices in June of 1980.
4. -Nbncontrolled Oil, the remaining domestic category which
.already sells at about the world oil price level.
With e prices of all categories of domestic oil rising in
With the prices of all categories of domestic oil rising in
monthly increments toward existing world oil price levels in that
month, increasing imported oil prices generate an an accelerating
-path 6f domestic oil prices. Both are represented in Graph II by
- solid lines:
.GRAPH II
the
tsri (ol/,
An upward shift in the imported oil price path as represented
by the dotted lines leads to a domestic price path that accelerates
still more rapidly than previously since all controls are removed
by October 1, 1981. In either case, the impact on domestic oil prices
is small in the early phases of decontrol and larger as price controls
near expiration.
1
i..
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The assumnptions concerning domestic wholesale energy prices
take into account the direct and competing goods price effects of higher
world oil prices on domestic refined petroleum products, coal, and
natural gas. To calculate the impact, we begin by converting quantities
of domestic oil, coal, and natural gas produced to BTU equvalents.
The BTU equivalent output shares in the three energy categories in
1972 are used to weight the impacts on the domestic wholesale energy
price. The impacts are expressed in terms of percentage changes
in prices in each of the three energy categories. These percentage
changes are calculated in two steps. First, the incremental revenue
(change in price times BTU equivalent quantity) to the seller that
would result from a $1/barrel increase in OPEC prices is divided
by the projected values of expenditures for each of the three cate-
gories. Next, these unadjusted incremental revenues are adjusted
by an assumed domestic energy catergory price response to OPEC prices.
Table 2 outlines the calculations for the impact of a $1
increase in the OPEC price per barrel on each category of domestically
produced energy:
-13-
.. -6- . .i .· .1 . . .Table 2
Calculations for the Impact of a $1 Increase in OPEC Prices
on Prices of Domestic Energy Products
. .
. . ... o .. .
;.. : (1) . .-.. (2). .(3) (4) (5)
Unadjusted Elas- Adjusted
·.- .. Incremental ticity Incremental
Revenue with Revenue
... ... .--respect (x2)
to OPEC
.. ., -. Prices
Category. . -'. -
Refined: ........
Petroleum 1/
Products ' ..$ 4 B -. .0
- .2
$.4 B
.24 B
Percentage
Change
0.56
1.92
Weight Effect on
in BTU Domestic
Equivalent Wholesale
'Energy
Prices
(percent
increase)
(4x5)
.625
.238
.35 %
.46
Natural Gas.. ' . ' 1.7 B .2 .34 B 1.07 .137
1.000
*.. - . . ..
, g ,,~~~~~;
The incremental revenues that would result from a $1/barrel
increase in OPEC prices, under the assumption that the prices of
products in all three energy categories rise by the same amount,
are displayed in Column 1. These must be adjusted by the elasticity
1/ By 1981 Q4. Prior to 81 Q4, the impact is smaller. Elasticites
for prior quarters are calculated from the decontrol assumptions
in each of the four categories of oil, above.
(6)
Coal
Total
·.15 B
.96 %
-14-
of each category's price with respect to OPEC prices (Column 2);
1/
+te adjusted incremental revenues are in Column 3. These in turn
ace divided by a projected control level of nominal expenditures
i a each category to give the assumed percentage change in prices
(since quantities are assumed to be unchanged); they are given in
C.)lumn 4. Column 5 gives the BTU equivalent weights, and Column 6
gives the percentage impacts on domestic wholesale energy prices.
We adjust the whlesale energy price by the amount in the "total"
roa for each $1/barrel increase in OPEC prices.
Oil Price Shocks in the MPS Model
The standard channels of transmitting the oil price shock
through the MPS model structure were discussed in detail in the
MPPS model studies referred to above. The structure of the model
has been modified since the publication of these studies, in part
to facilitate this type of analysis. In this section, we will outline
these modifications.
The version of the PS model used in the earlier studies
were not structurally rich enough to capture all the effects of
external price shocks. Consequently, in those studies such effects
1/ The elasticity for domestic refined petroleum product prices
rises to 1.0 by 81-Q4 when controls are gone. For prior quarters,
the elasticity is a weighted average of the response in each
of the four petroleum categories described above and depends
on the decontrol assumptions.
ere modeled by judgrentally adusting relevant model equations.
The current version of the model has a disaggregated foreign sector,
incuding current and capital accounts and an exchange rate determination
.... :.... ,. _..
mechanism. It also has equations for all expenditure component price
deflators that are constructed to be homogenous in the aggregate with
respect to the aggregate price of output. Much of the structural
detail necessary to simulate external price shocks is thus currently
in the model.
Within the current account of the foreign sector, the
direct impact of higher world oil prces on demand is captured by the
domestic petroleum demand equation. Domestic petroleum consumption
(DQFL) is a function of real income (XWNP) and the exogenous wholesale
price index for energy (PWIFE) relative to the implicit GNP deflator
( "NP' '" .- ' 
(1) ln DQFL - -3.8 + .944 in - .13 in (AIIFE/PGNP).
Imports of petroleum products (EMP) are then detemined by the identity
(2) EP = (EQFL -SQFL) * VL * k,
where SQ.L is exogenous domestic production and PUVFL is the average
2/
import price of oil per barrel.
The MPS price sector determines a value added fixed weight
nonfarm business deflator (Phf%) with an average markup over minimized
long-run average cost specification:
_/X See Thurman, "The International Sector," 114].
/y In expression (2), k represents a consant. factor of adjustment
to obtain oil imports in billions of dollars at an annual rate.
(3) in Pfw = .2991 + .3039 In PL - .30406 L(7) ln OME
+ .0830 U - .0679 L(4) n Pm
+ .0400 L(5) In Pf + .6962 In Pfw-l
where L(N) is a distributed lag of 1N+1 quarters (including the current
quarter), and where long run minimized average cost is proxied by
unit labor costs-wages (PL) divided by output per manhour (MH)--
with a steady-state coefficient of unity. Arguments in the markup
function include the inverse of the unemployment rate (U) and a
foreign exchange rate adjusted foreign price index relative to domestic
prices (Pf). Raw material prices (Prm) enter the equation in differenced
log form. The negative coefficients reflect the fact that increases
in import prices reduce a value-added deflator until the increases
are fully passed through to the price of final sales.
Final demand sector prices Pj, for j=1,2,...n expenditure
categories are estimated within a system of relative prices where the
properties of the system consistently allocate the changes in value
added production prices throughout the-system. The determinants
of a typical relative price equation include those of Pfw, with effects
that add to zero to preserve homogeneity in Pfw. In addition, arguments
are included to adjust the coverage from nonfarm business (that of
Pfw) to all sectors (i.e., including farm, rest of world, and
households and institutions).
1/ The relative price system for final expenditure prices is explained
in Thurman [13], 115].
-17-
,, .. ,. -.. . . : .. ; :..
Additional Exogenous Assumptions
Most indirect effects of an oil price shock - wage-price
interaction, contraction of real aggregate demand, the income transfer
loss - are captured in the MPS model. A few of the indirect impacts
(particularly on foreign incomes and prices) are exogenous to the
model.
Competing energy product prices should have an indirect effect
on the rrdel's main price equation. The wholesale energy price is not
included in that equation, however. Thus, we have calculated estimates
of this effect such that a ten percent increase in imported energy
*.. -. - 1/
costs raises the nonfarm business markup function by 0.7%. This
.. . .................. ,  -. ..
elasticity is used to apply an adjustment to the equation for Pfw which
in turn is automatically distributed to expenditure deflators.
Foreign as well as domestic prices and activity levels enter
into the model's trade and capital sector equations. We assume that
the effects of higher world oil prices on U.S. trading partners will be
similar to the effects on the U.S. Based on other simulation experi-
ments, we assume that the elasticity of a weighted average of
foreign consumption prices with respect to oil prices is 0.3.
The impact of oil price increases on foreign real activity
is likely to be similar to that in the U.S. Hever, while we can be
1/ This calculation is derived as the sum of adjusted incremental
revenues in Column 3 of Table 2 divided by a projected base path
for nominal nonfarm business output. The actual adjustment
varies with the decontrol assumptions. The assumption is again
made that quantities are unchanged.
2/ These experiments include those simulated with the Federal Reserve
Board's Multi-country model [2], a modified version of the MPS
model 13], and an EEC trade model [1].
-18-
reasonably sure of the sign, we are less sure about the magnitude of
such real impacts, particularly for relatively energy independent
countries like Canada and the U.K. Consequently we have ignored
these real output effects. Thus, a probable reduction in foreign
demand for U.S. exports is not captured in these simulation exercises.
The weighted average exchange rate index (taken as exogenous in this
exercise) is also left unchanged since, in our opinion, the impact of
· . . ...
oil price changes on the exchange rate is indeterminate.
We have experimented with several alternative methods of
calculating the government tax revenue and expenditure consequences of
the administration's windfall profits tax proposal. The net result of
the proposals seemed to be a modest redistribution of nominal income
from domestic oil refiners to consumers without significantly altering
the multiplier results. Given the current uncertainty of the final
form of the windfall tax scheme as it will emerge from Congress, we
did not incorporate it into the simulations below.
Estimates of the supply elasticity of domestically produced
oil vary widely and have become more difficult to ascertain with the
onset of the decontrol program. Combined with the recent and anticipated
further increases in world oil prices, there exist substantial incentives
in the domestic oil production industry to delay further new discovery
until after 1981 when controls are completely gone. Additionally it
can be assumed that discovery capacity is limited within the five-year
horizon of our experiments. Under assumptions of scme type of windfall
-19-
profits tax, industry incentives and hence domestic oil supply would
be reduced. In vie.; of this uncertainty, we assume no domestic supply
response to increased world oil prices.
There is a variety of monetary policy assumptions that can
be simulated in the MPS model structure. However the results of the
simulations are virtually invariant to the specification of mnetary
policy because the domestic price and output effects of the oil price
increase offset each other. The demand for money is therefore little
changed by the shock. Consequently it makes almost no difference
whether monetary aggregates, interest rates, or bank reserves is used
as the exogenous policy variable in simulation. Unless otherwise
specified, we have held unborrowed member bank reserves exogenous.
The fiscal policy assumptions in the simulations are that
most nominal Federal government expenditures are exogenous -(so that
real expenditures are endogenous), and all tax rates are similarly
fixed. Federal Unemployment transfers and all receipts are endogenous.
Mork and all [8] allow substitution between energy and
other factor inputs in the production function which is part of
their model and hence are able to analyze the likely effects of
such substitution. The MPS model uses a two-factor production
function that does not include energy and, thus, has no way of
capturing the effect of changed energy prices on output per unit
of capital and labor input. Any such effect would have to be added
by assumption, and our simulations include no such adjustments.
We recognize this as an area for future model developrent.
1/ For this reason the correction to the money demand function made
by Pierce and Enzler in their study is not made here.
-
s
-20-
IV. Model Simulation .sults
The methodology of this exercise is standard multiplier
analysis: disturbed simulations are compared to a control simu-
lation. First, a simulation was run which replicates the projected
impacts of the OPEC June 1979 announcement of oil prices. The purpose
of the second and third simulations is to highlight the continuing
vulnerability of the U.S. economy to not unlikely further adverse oil
price shocks. These come in the form of dencminating OPEC oil prices
in. SDRs rather than dollars (under assumptions of a ten percent average
depreciation of the dollar against major currencies) in the second
simulation, and yet another OPEC price shock occurring in 1980 in the
1/
third simulation.
The Impacts of the June 1979 Oil Price Increase
· From Table 1 in the preceding section we interpret the effect
of the June 1979 OPEC oil price schedule to increase average imported
oil prices in the U.S. by 28% over what they would have been by the end
of 1979 and increase both imported and domestic oil prices by 48% of
what they would have been by 1983. This implies an extension of the
announced OPEC schedule that grcxis at 10% per annum. This is higher
than in the control scenario (7%), taking into account higher U.S.
inflation rates. The domestic wholesale price index for energy is
g/ We contrast these second two simulations with the OPEC June 1979
scenario such that the multipliers represent the additional impacts
which could result over and above those presently anticipated.
-21-
calculated to be 34.8% above control levels by 1983. Using the method-
ology presented in the section above, the MPS mdel multiplier results
are sunmarized in Table 3.
The simulated effects of the oil price rise are quite large.
Real domestic economic activity, as measured by GNP in constant 1972
dollars, is off $12.4 B by the end of 1980 and is $48.6 B lower by
1983 as a result of the oil price increase. This represents roughly a
3.0% decline in the level of real economic output from base projections.
The impact of the higher oil prices on domestic consumption
prices (part of the relative price system summarized above) is to add
1.3% to the price level by 1979 Q4 and 2.2% by the end of 1983. The
effects on unemployment build up gradually with the unemployment rate
increased by 0.4 percentage points higher by the end of the simulation
as the depressing effects of the oil price shock continue to drive
domestic activity lower.
Given the large domestic price increase, it may seem surprising
at first that nominal GNP is lowered. If the price increase were
confined to domestically produced oil, nominal G(P would indeed be'
higher and real GNP lower. However, through 1981 the price increases
are mostly confined to imported oil due to the slow phasing out of
domestic oil price controls. Both nominal and real GNP are consequently
lower as a result of the income transfer to foreigners and the fact
that the dollar increase in imports (as indicated by nominal NIA Net
Exports) offsets the dollar increase in final sales. Hence the early
part of this exercise is dominated by the income transfer effects
of higher world oil prices.
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The fall in nominal GNP explains two other results. Treasury
bill rates initially fall, and then rise only as the proportion of prices
rises in (the roughly constant) nominal GP. Also corporate profits
fall in absolute terms although their share in GNP grcrs over time as
reduced output more than offsets the effect of increased domestic
energy prices.
The OPEC SR Based Pricing Scenario
The inability of the U.S. to cope with the rising oil import
bill often has been cited as a continuing source of weakness in the
value of the U.S. dollar. This weakness in foreign currency mairkets
would be larger still if OPEC decided to denominate world oil prices
not in dollars but in terms of a basket of currencies -- say the SDR.
We arbitrarily assume in this exercise that the result-of
such a shift would cause the dollar to depreciate'by 10 percent (on a
multilateral trade-weighted basis). We approximate such a scenario by
shocking the model's endogenous exchange rate determining process
sufficiently to cause a gradual 10% depreciation of the exchange rate
index. Feedbacks from the rest of the model on the exchange rate
2/
attenuate the depreciation as the trade balance improves.
_/ The elasticity of money demand in the MS model is one with respect
to prices but :less than one with respect to real output, so that
with respect to nominal GNP, the elasticity depends on the mix of
output and price changes.
2/ For a theoretical description of the MPS model exchange rate deter-
mination, see Urdang [191. The importance of feedback effects is
discussed in Hooper and Lorey [6].
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The U.S. dollar represents approximately a third of a multi-
lateral trade weighted SDR exchange rate index. Hence an weighted
average dollar depreciation of ten percent will roughly increase
the average value of the SDR index by 6 2/3 percent. If there is no
additional change in SDR-based OPEC prices, this would eventually add
an additional $1.00 per average imported oil barrel cost to U.S. residents
over the June 1979 OPEC dollar-based price. We contrast the additional
macroeconomic effects of this assumption with those incorporated in
the June 1979 OPEC price increase scenario in Table 4.
By the end of the simulation period, real GNP is dwn $10 B,
the consumption price level is up 2 percent, and the unemployment rate
is .4 percentage points higher than in the June 1979 scenario, as a
result of the combined oil price increase and exchange rate depreciation.
Exchange rate impact simulations we have done with the MPS model [6]
indicate that of the combined exchange rate - OPEC SDR based simulation
effects in this scenario, the oil price increase effects represent a
$12 B decline in real GNP, a 0.5 percent increase in the level of
consumption prices and most of the rise in thes unemployment rate.
Thermultiplier difference between these two experiments
involves the usual effects of a decline in the value of the dollar
together with the induced exchange rate increase in the dollar price
per barrel of imported oil. The exchange rate impact on the economy
has a longer lag than does that of an oil price increase. This is due
in part to the price lags in the non-oil trade equations, and in part
to the lags in transmitting exchange rate changes into prices. Thus,
a depreciation of the dollar alone would increase real GNP as the
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trade balance improved (although eventually these effects would be
offset by the increase in the price level), whereas in the present
case, GNP is reduced. A depreciation of the dollar increases both
output and the price level, unlike an oil price increase alone, so
that this scenario is not insensitive to the monetary policy instrument.
In particular, holding the bill rate fixed (as this scenario does)
gives an extreme impression of the inflationary and output effects,
since the Federal.Reserve accomodates all of the rise in income and
prices.
Additional OPEC Price Increase Scenario
In the first scenario, world oil price levels beyond the
schedule announced by OPEC in June 1979 were projected to grow at a
nominal 10% annual.rate. This extension is based on an assumed desire
by OPEC to keep real prices roughly constant after the large 1979
increase as.was the case after 1974. It may well be, however, that
this assumption is optimistic. Recent events suggest that such is the
case.
Hence, we postulate further discrete OPEC price increases and
we assume the worst case; that they come quickly. In this experiment
we add an additional world oil price increase beginning in 1979 H2
which raises imported oil prices 21.7% by 1980 Q4 above those assumed
in the June 1979 scenario. Domestic oil production prices, under the
phased decontrol scheme, are 17.3% higher than the June 1979 scenario
levels by 1980 Q4 and more rapidly catch up to world price levels,
both of which attain levels 22.1% higher than the June 1979 scenario
-27-
prices by 1983 04. Domestic wholesale energy prices, which include
competing energy prices of coal and natural gas, are 20.% higher by
1983 4 than those assumed in the June 1979 OPEC scenario.
Here again we contrast the simulated effects of this experi-
nent with those of the June 1979 scenario. The multiplier results are
summarized in Table 5. These results indicate that in addition to the
oil price shodcks absorbed within the June 1979 experiment a further
$32.6 billion reduction in real GNP, a 1.8% increase in consumption
price levels, and a further 1.4 increase in the uneployent rate
would result by the end of the simulation period as a result of the
further oil price increase.
V. Policy Responses to the Oil Price Increase
It is unlikely that policy authorities would not attempt to
offset recessionary and inflationary impacts of oil price increases
such as those reported above. In this section we briefly outline some
of the anticipated problems with policy responses to the effects of
oil price shocks.
Fiscal policy can do much in the short-run to offset the income
tranfer to OPEC countries, provided that monetary policy is accomodating,
and provided the OPEC countries are willing to hold U.S. government debt.
Suppose that OPEC buys no U.S. goods with the incremental revenue it
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obtains by raising oil prices. Instead, it is willing to hold financial
claims on the U.S. Suppose further that the fiscal authorities cut
taxes so as to exactly restore the income lost through the oil price
induced transfer. The increased government deficit must be financed,
say by issuing securities. If, even indirectly, OPEC buys all the
government securities issued, the fiscal authorities have passed the
income effects of the oil price increase on to future generations-
the current costs being interest on the debt.
However, the price level is still increased so that'the stance
of monetary policy is crucially important to the effects of the fiscal
offset. Even though foreign residents are holding the increase in
public debt, so that it is not competing with and crowding out private
debt in capital markets, non-accomdating monetary policy would result
in higher interest rates and eventually no real effect of the fiscal
action - complete crowding out. If, however, the Federal Reserve is
willing to tolerate the increase in the price level, the fiscal action
will effectively pass on to future generations the costs of the oil
price increase. Hence, the choice for policymakers is whether to pay
now or later.
Suppose, however, that OPEC does buy goods and services from
the U.S. with the revenues generated by the oil price increase. In
this case, there is no way - even in the short-run - of avoiding the
part of the real income transfer associated with the decline in U.S.
terms of trade. That is, the U.S. must give up more real resources to
1/ Assuming it is short-term debt that is rolled over or long-term
coupon debt..
I-30-
import a barrel of oil. It is true that the aggregate demand loss
will be partially offset by the increase in U.S. exports. This demand
offset does not reduce the loss in real income, however.
Tax policy can have microeconomic effects by changing relative
:?rices, perhaps to offset the effects of an oil price rise. If energy,
capital and labor are all gross substitute inputs to production, an oil
price increase, like a tax on energy, lowers the prices of capital and
labor relative to energy; and producers will shift towards more labor
and capital-intensive technologies.
Unfortunately, energy is likely complementary to the capital
equipment it powers, so that an increase in energy prices lowers the
factor demand f6r both capital and energy. Tax policy designed to
stimulate investment as a response to an oil price rise will lower the
cost of capital. In the short run, investment embodying new technology
which is more energy-saving will likely be made, resulting in increases
in both actual and potential output. Hever, the revenue loss to the
Treasury from the tax cuts must be financed somehow. If it is financed
by raising other taxes, the short-run increases in output will likely
be offset by reductions in aggregate demand. It is financed by borrowing,
the increased investment will eventually be crowded out by the reduction
in government saving, unless OPEC is again willing to do the increase
in saving required to finance the increase in investment.
Ad I t
In both the short and longer runs, there can be no-increase
in aggregate investment without an increase in aggregate saving. This
fundamental principle of economics is frequently overlooked in discus-
sions of the effects of tax policy on investment. It may be that a
cut in personal taxes, particularly capital gains taxes, and elimination
of the double taxation of dividends, would elicit more saving.. The
empirical and theoretical evidence on this is mixed, however.
There is no one "correct" monetary policy response to the
effects of the increased world oil prices. The monetary authorities
can respond in two opposite directions: either they accomodate the
inflationary impulse or they attempt to offset the resulting increase
in prices. In the Pierce-Enzler analysis of external 'sources of domestic
inflation, the monetary response to such a shock was dubbed a "slippery"
2/
concept at best. The direction of monetary policy response rests
on the specification of the policy maker's objective function which must
include, inter alia, paths of both expected inflation and unemployment
over time. The nature of the short term external inflationary impulse
is such that no choice of monetary policy can lead to the unambiguously
better situation of lower paths for both inflation and unemployment.
The policy dilemna is even more unattractive due to the current situation
of both high inflation and slow real grcwth. The important fact is
that as with fiscal policy, monetary policy faces a pay now or later
situation - in the long run it cannot offset the income transfer to OPEC.
1/ For a thorough discussion of this issue, see von Furstenberg and
Malkiel [5].
2/ [11], p.15 .
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The core inflation analysis discussed in the previous paper can be used to explore
the policy terrain open to macro policy in an era of energy price shocks. If we
assume as a policy imperative that core inflation must flatten out over the next
few years and begin to turn downwards, then the model can be used to identify
the degree of demand restraint and the resulting level of unemployment that is
necessary to offset the effects of the shock Inflation. Of course, there are other
ways to deal with the core inflation rate. They include various measures designed
to stimulate productivity, including a resumption of an improving capital-labor
ratio through tax incentive measures. But these are subjects beyond the scope
of this conference and I shall limit this paper to the question of overall demand
management.
1
"Macroeconomic Analysis of Price Shocks.' by Otto Eckstein, presented at the
Conference on Energy Prices, Inflation and Economic Activity, November 9, 1979.
o 1979. Otto Ecksteln
There is one other critical model analysis that must be performed as a background
to policy. Energy Is not only a problem of price, but also of quantity. While world
oil supplies may be very ample as a geological matter, OPEC has discovered the
secret of a well functioning cartel, and is holding down production to keep the
world oil market near the optimal monopoly price.
It has become evident that the strong phase of the business cycle of the industrial
countries creates a level of oil demand which Is highly inflationary for world oil
prices, given OPEC's perception of the world oil market and its attitude toward
the development of the industrial countries. Indeed, if one accepts the more
pessimistic estimates of Saudi Arabian oil potential, the world need for oil in
periods of rapid industrial growth approaches the limits of supplies and would
lead to' turbulent world oil markets even in the absence of cartel or political
considerations.
To explore this range of issues, the DRI macro model, with its energy sector for
estimating demands, has been simulated in a series of exercises in order to Identify
the energy supply constraint on macroeconomic growth. The President's 8IY mil-
lion-barrel-a-day oil limit was taken as the effective constraint for our growth,
assuming that neither an effective quota system nor gasoline rationing was used
to dramatically shift the GNP-energy relationships. Model simulations reported
elsewhere 2 suggest that a growth rate of 2Yt% is the maximum feasible path within
that energy constraint.
Energy Shocks, Demand Management and Core Inflation
In the DRI intermediate term forecast, the average rate of shock inflation for
the years 1980-85 is 1.2%. The shock rate is composed of a 0.9% energy com-
ponent, where the forecast assumes a real rate of increase in OPEC prices of
4% a year, or a nominal rate of 13.2%, and where the current domestic price
controls policies for oil and gas are assumed to be allowed to become effective.
Other elements in the predicted shock inflation include sizeable payroll tax increases
2Supply Constraints and the 1980-1981 Recovery," by Stephen Brooks, September
1979 DRI Review.
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scheduled for 1980 and 1981 and further increases in these rates assumed in the
first quarter of each year through 1985. Food price increases are assumed to
average out to a no-net shock contribution. The exchange rate is assumed to
drop at 0.5% a year, given the United States' policies of rising outlays for oil
imports and the disparity between our core inflation rate and those of the strong
currency countries, Japan and West Germany.
Of course, he shock rate could be substantially worse, or even somewhat better.
There s the possibility of a change in the world energy market for much the
better or much the worse. The average experience on agricultural prices could
be worse, and the government's ability to create other kinds of cost-raising shocks
always remains considerable.
For the sake of illustration, we assume that the projected shock rate is a reason-
able estimate, and then proceed to analyze the level of aggregate demand which
would be required to produce the negative demand inflation effects required to
offset the projected positive shock inflation. This exercise has to be conducted
over a time span of at least five or six years because the persistence in core
inflation derived from the inflation expectations of workers and investors will
dominate the results in the near term.
Tables I through 6 show the results of this demand-management exercise. The
demand levers used were nonborrowed bank reserves, the principal tool of monetary
policy, Federal government defense and nondefense purchases, and Federal govern-
ment grants-n-aid to state and local governments. It can be seen that to hold
the core inflation at a plateau level of 8% in the years 1982-85, unemployment
must reach as high as 9.2% and the utilization rate of the materials industries
must average below 79%. To bring the core inflation rate down to 5.4% by 1985,
the unemployment rate must reach as high as 13.4% and the corresponding utilization
rate of the materials industries as low as 65%. Should the shock inflation rate
be even worse, then the requisite demand management policies needed to hold
the core inflation rate from steadily rising become truly prohibitive. An OPEC
price Increase of 10% a year in real terms would produce a shock inflation rate
that would average 1.5% for the years 1980-85, sharply lifting the base from which
any demand management policy must begin. The core inflation rate would accel-
erate to 9.7% by 1985, 0.5% higher than the already high DRI projection.
3
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Table I
Summary of DRI Six-Year Forecast of the U.S. Economy(Percent change)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 '1984 1985
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports ($bil)
Government Purchases
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
36.6 35.9
8.9 9.1
13.0 12.7 14.6 13.8 8.6
8.6 8.1 7.8 -7.8 7.4
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate (rate)
Capacity Utilization (level)
8.3
2.2
-0.2
2.0
2.3
5.1
-6.1
17.4
0.1
8.4
1.8
-0.7
-1.3
0.0
-4.4
-13.6
22.3
0.9
8.3
1.5
-0.9
3.3
3.0
1.1
8.2
22.6
1.5
8.5
1.2
-0.5
4.6
3.8
8.4
17.1
21.8
2.0
9.0
1.0
-0.5
4.3
3.9
8.3
10.9
20.8
2.3
9.3
1.0
-0.3
2.8
3.1
3.3
3.3
22.2
2.4
9.2
1.0
0.2
2.4
3.1
0.3
-2.1
25.0
2.3
-0.8
2.7
5.8
0.869
-1.5
2.8
7.3
0.789
1.6
2.8
7.7
0.811
2.4
2.8
7.1
0.857
2.3
2.8
6.5
0.881
1.5
2.8
6.3
0.859
1.6
2.8
6.4
0.822
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Table 2
Summary of Reduced Demand Scenario
Producing 8% Core Inflation(Percent change)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 .1985
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports ($bil)
Government Purchases
8.3
2.2
-0.2
2.0
2.2
5.1
-6.4
17.4
0.1
8.4
1.8
-0.9
-3.5
-1.7
-5.9
-22.5
24.5
-2.2
8.1
1.4
-1.5
1.2
0.8
-2.7
0.1
29.3
0.0
8.0
1.1
-1.7
3.2
2.1
8.1
30.1
32.8
-2.7
8.0
0.8
-2.1
4.0
3.2
9.7
15.2
35.2
0.3
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate (rate)
Capacity Utilization (level)
36.6 35.8 12.7 12.3 13.7 12.6 7.4
8.9 9.2 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.8 '6.3
-0.8
2.9
5.8
0.869
-2.5
2.8
7.8
0.752
0.9
2.7
9.2
0.744
2.2
2.5
9.1
0.792
2.5
2.5
8.7
0.830
1.7
2.5
8.3
0.818
Table 3
Economic Impact of Lowering Core Inflation to 8%
Through Demand Management: Reduced Demand Scenario
Compared to DRI Six-Year Forecast
1979 1980 .'1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Difference in rate of change
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
0.0 0.1
0.0 0.0
0.0 -0.1
Percent Difference
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports
Government Purchases
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate*
Capacity Utilization*
0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.7 -1.4 -2.5 -3.6
0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.4 -1.0 -2.0 -3.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.00
-1.0
0.0
0.5
-0.04
-1.6
-0.1
1.5
-0.07
-1.8
-0.4
2.0
-0.07
-1.7
-0.8
2.1
-0.05
-1.5
-1.0
2.0
-0.04
-1.3
-1.1
1.9
-0.03
*Differrence in level
8.0
0.8
-2.0
2.8
2.9
4.2
1.3
37.3
2.3
8.0
0.8
-1.3
. 2.7
3.3
1.3
0.3
38.0
2.7
NI
1.8
2.7
8.3
0.793
-0.2
0.0
-0.7
-0.5
-0.1
-1.2
-1.0
-0.1
-1.5
-1.3
-0.2
-1.7
-1.2
-0.2
-1.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
-2.2
-1.7
-1.7
-10.5
9.6
-3.1
-4.3
-3.7
-5.4
-17.2
29.7
-4.6
-5.6
-5.3
-5.7
-7.9
50.4
-8.9
-5.8
-6.0
-4.5
-4.4
68.9
-10.7
-5.8
-6.2
-3.6
-6.3
67.7
-10.7
-5.6
-6.1
-2.6
-4.0
51.9
-10.3
_ -
Table 4
Summary of Reduced Demand Scenario
Producing 5.4% Core Inflation
(Percent change)
_ _ i . =
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports ($bil)
Government Purchases
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate (rate)
Capacity Utilization (level)
36.6 35.7 12.2 11.3 12.0 10.2 4.6
8.9 9.2 8.3 7.0 5.6 5.0 3.9
-0.8
2.9
5.8
0.869 .
-2.9
2.8
8.0
0.736
-0.6
2.6
10.9
0.659
2.1
2.3
12.2
0.692
3.1
2.1
11.8
0.770
1.0
2.3
11.9
0.733
Table 5
Economic Impact of Lowering Core Inflation to 5.4%
Through Demand Management: Reduced Demand Scenario
Compared to DRI Six-Year Forecast
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Difference in rate of change
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
0.0 . 0.1
0.0 0.0
0.0 -0.2
Percent Difference
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports
Government Purchases
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate*
Capacity Utili zation*
0.0 -0.1 -0.8 -2.0 -4.2 -7.3 -10.7
0.0 0.0 -0.2 -1.2 -3.2 -5.8 -8.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.00
-1.4
0.0
0.7
-0.05
-3.6
-0.2
3.2
-0.15
-3.9
-0.6
5.1
-0.17
-3.2
-1.3
5.2
-0.11
-3.6
-1.7
5.6
-0.13
-4.2
-2.0
7.0
-0.17
d'
8.3
2.2
-0.2
2.0
2.2
5.1
-6.4
17.4
0.1
8.4
1.8
-0.9
-4.7
-2.8
-6.5
-25.1
25.4
-4.0
8.0
1.4
-2.0
-3.3
-2.8
-7.5
-19.6
36.4
-5.7
7.3
1.0
-2.9
1.2
0.1
4.4
33.5
44.8
-5.7
6.6
0.6
-3.6
4.1
2.3
14.4
32.3
50.0
-4.6
6.2
0.4
-3.7
0.3
0.2
5.5
-5.5
58.0
-3.0
5.4
0.4
-3.4
-1.0
-0.5
-2.1
-3.6
63.4
-2.6
1.0
2.5
13.4
0.654
-0.2
-0.1
-1.2
-1.2
-0.2
-2.4
-2.3
-0.4
-3.1
-3.1
-0.5
-3.4
-3.8
-0.7
-3.6
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
-3.4
-2.8
-2.3
-13.5
13.9
-4.8
-9.6
-8.2
-10.6
-35.7
61.2
-11.6
-12.5
-11.5
-13.9
-26.6
105.2
-18.2
-12.7
-12.9
-9.1
-12.5
139.7
-23.8
-14.8
-15.4
-7.2
-19.9
160.7
-27.8
-17.7
-18.3
-9.4
-21.1
153.4
-31.2
Table 6
Impoct of 10% Real Energy Price Inflation
(Percent change)
i . _ , , , ,, 1 1 , i , ii
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Core Inflation Rate
Shock Inflation Rate
Demand Inflation Rate
Real GNP (1972 Dollars)
Total Consumption
Nonres. Fixed Invest.
Invest. in Res. Structures
Net Exports ($bil)
Government. Purchases
8.3
2.2
-0.2
2.0
2.3
5.1
-6.1
17.4
0.1
8.4
1.8
-0.7
-1.4
0.0
-4.4
-13.7
22.3
0.9
8.3
1.7
-0.9
3.1
2.9
0.8
6.6
22.6
1.4
8.7 9.2
1.5 1.2
-0.7 -0.8
4.1 3.9
3.5 3.6
7.3 7.4
14.0 . 10.0
22.1 21.9
1.7' 1.9
9.6 9.7
1.2 . 1.4
-0.7 -0.1
2.9 2.3 ·
3.1 3.0
3.5 0.2
5.1 *-3.6
24.0 27.1
2.0 1.9
Imported Fuel Price
Personal Consumption Deflator
Output per Hour
Potential GNP
Unemployment Rate (rate)
Capacity Utilization (level)
36.6 39.1 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20,0
8.9 9.2 9.1 8.8 8.5 8.4 8.4
-0.8
2.9
5.8
0.869
-1.6
2.8
7.3
0.788
1.3
2.8
7.8
0.806
2.0
2.8
7.3
0.841
2.2
2.7
6.9
0.860
1.7
2.6
6.6
0.845
'1.3
2.7
6.7
0.807
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These results show that the core inflation problem cannot be solved by aggregate
demand policies. The unemployment paths that are required are both politically
unlikely and economically very dangerous. The unemployment rates of disadvantaged
groups and of disadvantaged regions (including our central cities) would be drama-
tically higher. The economy would cease to be an engine of opportunity and pro-
gress and the political process would probably opt for worsening inflation rather
than for its cure.
Policy must turn to other techniques to lower the core inflation rate. DRI is
conducting various studies to explore the other possibilities, particularly various
forms of tax incentives to Investment for acceleration of capital formation and
for restoration of a more normal productivity advance. Even with good, strong
policies, the road ahead will not be easy.
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Introduction
Most analysts agree that large and unanticipated increases in the
price of energy are likely to cause severe dislocations in the economy.l
The problem of selecting the best policy response to this kind of shocks
seems yet unresolved. A whole range of measures have been discussed in
the public debate, including policies as different as synthetic fuel
programs and monetary contraction. The present paper reviews macroeconomic
policy responses to the oil price shock. Policies operating directly
on energy supply or demand, important as they are, will not be discussed
in this paper.
Our analysis is done within a model constructed by the authors for
the specific purpose of studying the macroeconomic effects of energy
price shocks. This model permits computation of numerical estimates of
the effects of policy measures on key macroeconomic variables, including
inflation, real economic growth, and employment. The policies studied
are monetary expansion and contraction, fiscal expenditure policy, invest-
ment stimulus via changes in the corporate income tax, and a payroll tax
cut. Personal income tax cuts are discussed as well, although some funda-
mental difficulties are involved in studying this policy. The policies
are discussed in the context of the current economic situation, but the
analysis applies to energy price shocks in general.
The analysis suggests that attempts to offset the energy-induced
inflation by contractionary monetary policy may have severe consequences
for employment and economic growth. Monetary expansion is preferred to
1See Hall and Mork, "Macroeconomic Analysis Energy Policy Shocks: The
M.I.T. Energy Lab Energy-Macro Model" and their survey of the literature.
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increases in public spending because of the negative side effects of the
latter on inflation and capital formation. As a pro-investment policy,
an increase in the investment tax credit seems attractive and is not found
to be very inflationary. A payroll tax cut seems a possiblity for cutting
inflation in the short run and aiding employment and economic growth at
the same time.
Monetary and Fiscal Expenditure Policy
Macroeconomic policies to offset energy price shocks face two impor-
tant conflicts. The first is the dilemma of inflation against employment.
The recent history of severe inflation in the U.S. has made national
economic policy as concerned about offsetting the inflationary impact of
an energy price shock as in shoring up employment and output. A policy
to limit inflation--specifically, through monetary contraction--could
worsen the adverse effects of the energy shock on real economic activity.
Fiscal expansion to maintain employment and output might push inflation
even beyond the current high levels attributable to the direct effects of
the energy shock. Our analysis does suggest a way out of this dilemma,
though, at it traces the indirect effects of alternative policies through
capital formation. Policies with favorable effects on investment have
a significant advantage in cushioning the real shock without too high a
price in added inflation. A limited monetary accommodation of the energy
shock is attractive for this reason. The opposite response--monetary
contraction--is the only effective instrument for restraining inflation
in the long run, but it works with a long lag and is unsuitable as a res-
ponse to an energy shock because of its depressing effect on investment
-3-
in the short run. Similarly, we find that fiscal stimulus, through income
tax cuts or increases in government expenditures, is even less suitable
because of its unfavorable effect on investment. Furthermore, we find
that a sufficiently expansionary fiscal policy to offset the employment
effects of the new energy shock would bring about unacceptable rates of
inflation.
The other problem is the issue of timing. For accommodative monetary
policy, we find it essential that the monetary authority acts quickly to
expand money supply immediately after the shock. Usually this means that
monetary action is needed several months before the economy reaches the
bottom of the recession. A belated monetary response will have to be so
much stronger and runs a larger risk of overheating the economy.
For fiscal policy, the main timing problem comes from the long
decision process. We find fiscal action to be much more powerful when
the government makes swift, surprising moves. Thus, although a public
policy debate is necessary in a democratic system, a dragged out dis-
cussion about details of a policy package is likely to weaken its impact
substantially. We consider this a major weakness of fiscal policy.
Table 1 shows a summary of the estimated effects of alternative
monetary and fiscal policies as they would have been if introduced im-
mediately after the 1979 energy price shock. For the sake of comparision,
the two policies are assumed to operate at levels sufficient to stabilize
unemployment at around 6 percent. The monetary expansion is assumed to
take the form of increasing money growth from 5 to 6 percent in 1979,
from 6 to 8 percent in 1980, and from 6 to 7 percent thereafter. For
fiscal expenditure policy we study the effect of an exogenous increase in
-4-
spending of 17 billion 1972 dollars in 1979, 69 billion in 1980, and 94
billion in 1981. Obviously these are far in excess of any likely fiscal
response, but they are the magnitudes required to stabilize employment.
Fiscal expenditure policy would have been by far the more inflationary
alternative, increasing the inflation rate by one percentage point this
year and two percentage points next year. Furthermore, although it stabil-
izes employment, it has a severe negative impact on economic growth. Of
course, our projections overstate the likely inflationary and anti-growth
effects of expenditure policy because we study an expenditure response that
is far larger than any remotely likely to be entertained by national eco-
nomic policy-makers.
Our results are much more favorable for a monetary response to the
employment effects of the energy shock. The magnitude of the necessary
response is quite small if done in time--one percent extra monetary growth
in 1979, two percent extra in 1980, and one percent extra in later years.
Monetary stimulus achieves most of its effects by raising investment; the
resulting additional capital formation enlarges the productive capacity
of the economy and moderates the effect on inflation. Ultimately, higher
money growth means higher inflation, but in the first few years after the
energy shock and monetary offset, the favorable effect on capital formation
and the unresponsiveness of wages assumed in our analysis combine to hold
total inflation to a reasonable level.
The actual conduct of monetary and fiscal policy have not followed
any of these paths in 1979. Rather, monetary policy was accommodative
earlier in the year, and has recently turned toward lower money growth.
No commitment has been made for fiscal policy, although a tax cut for
-5-
Table 1
Estimates of what the Effects of Monetary and
Fiscal Policies to Stabilize Employment would
have been if Introduced in early 1979.
Year
1979
Monetary response
Extra Inflation
(per cent per year)
Extra real GNP growth
(per cent per year)
Extra money growth
(per cent per year)
Fiscal response
Extra inflation
(per cent per year)
Extra real GNP growth
(per cent per year)
Extra government expen-
diture required (billions
of 1972 dollars)
-0.7
1.6
1.0
0.9
1.7
17
1980
-0.2
2.3
2.0
2.0
1.1
69
1981
0.4
1.1
1.0
1.7
-2.7
100
-6-
1980 is discussed seriously. We have serious misgivings about the Federal
Reserve Board's recent tightening.Though moderation of monetary growth is
a necessity over the next several years to slow down inflation, a sudden
sharply contractionary move at this time is unwise. It suggests a neglect
of the central goals of maintaining capital formation and real growth.
Estimated effects of fiscal and monetary policy alternatives for
1980 are listed in Table 2. The necessary increase in money growth to
stabilize employment in 1980 is much larger than what would have been
needed if action were taken immediately. Again, the favorable effect on
capital formation holds inflation to a reasonable level in the first few
years. We anticipate, however, that the jump in money growth needed in
1980 will create expectations of increased future growth rates of the
money supply, so that this policy may increase inflation by a couple of
percentage points in the long run.
The effects of a fiscal expenditure policy depends crucially on
whether or not the economy already expects such a program. If it does,
the necessary outlay for stabilizing employment is almost twice as large
in 1980 and fifty percent higher in 1981. The effects on inflation and
economic growth are also much less favorable in this case. And even if
the fiscal stimulus comes as a surprise, it is more inflationary than
monetary policy and is much more harmful to capital formation and economic
growth.
Rather than rely entirely on raising government expenditures, policy
is likely to try to stimulate private consumption expenditures by cutting
personal income taxes temporarily. The economic impacts of a successful
policy to raise consumption would be very similar to those of an increase
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Table 2
Estimates of the likely Effects of Monetary and
Fiscal Policies to Stabilize Employment if Intro-
duced in 1980.
Year
1980 1981 1982
Monetary response
Extra inflation -1.2 -0.6 0.8
(per cent per year)
Extra real GNP growth 1.4 3.5 2.4
(per cent; per year)
Extra money growth 3.0 2.0 2.0
(per cent per year)
Unanticipated fiscal response
Extra inflation 0.9 1,0 -0.0
(per cent per year)
Extra real GNP growth 4.4 -1.8 -2.1
(per cent per year)
Extra government expenditure
required (billions of 1972 63 70 0
dollars)
Anticipated fiscal response
Extra inflation 2.3 1.7 -0.0
(per cent per year)
Extra real GNP growth -1.7 -3.0 -2.0
(per cent per year)
Extra government expenditure
required (billions of 1972 106 100 0
dollars)
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in government expenditure--in particular, part of the increase would come
at the expense of capital formation and subsequent real growth. However,
we do not pursue the analysis of a personal tax cut because we, like many
other economists, are skeptical of the ability of a temporary tax cut to
stimulate consumption in any substantial way. If fiscal policy is to off-
set the adverse effects of the energy shock on real output, it will have
to rely mainly on very large increases in government expenditures, with
highly unfavorable side-effects on growth and inflation, in our analysis.
Concern about inflation is certain to limit the magnitude of the res-
ponse of both fiscal and monetary policy compared to the figures of Table 2.
National economic policy will probably let a recession occur, in spite of
the availability of tools that could prevent the recession. In fact, we
seem to see a repeat of the experience of 1973-75, when monetary policy
was slightly contractionary in response to the energy shock and succeeding
recession, and fiscal policy slightly expansionary, through both tax cuts
and expenditure increases, but by no means enough to offset the decline in
employment caused by the energy shock. Policy seems to be biased toward
a moderate anti-capital-formation response to the shock.
Tax Cuts for Inputs to Production
Fiscal expenditure and income tax cuts are only two of many possible
options for the makers of fiscal policy. Two other types of response to
the energy shock are now under consideration, namely, stimulating invest-
ment by changing the rules of corporate taxation, and stimulating employ-
ment by cutting payroll taxes. Our results for such policies are quite
-9-
favorable. Both policies stimulate investment, like monetary expansion,
but have less adverse effects on inflation in the longer run. Also, when
administrated properly, they contribute less to the federal deficit than
woulda fiscal expenditure policy.
The estimated effects of change in the investment tax credit for
1980 and 1981 is summarized in Table 3. The tax credit is taken at a
level sufficient to stabilize employment at around 6 percent in 1980 and
1981, so that the results are comparable to those of monetary and fiscal
expenditure policy. The policy is assumed to be announced and take effect
as well at the beginning of 1980. The moderate increase in inflation for
the first two years contrasts sharply with fiscal expenditure policy.
The reduction in inflation in the third year accompanies the decline in
real growth as policy returns to normal in 1982. This decline in growth
can be avoided by making the increased credit permanent or by a smoother
return to normal. The effect on long run growth (after ten years in the
model) is, however, positive, whereas fiscal expenditure policy lowers
the long term growth path of the economy. The revenue loss for the in-
vestment tax credit seems well within the limits of realistic policy
making.
Table 4 shows the estimated outcome of a cut in payroll taxes. Our
model hypothesizes that much of the economic dislocation of an energy
price increase is attributable to the unresponsiveness of wages. When
energy prices rise, either the overall price level must rise or wage
costs must fall. A cut in payroll taxes makes it possible for employers'
wage costs to fall without a corresponding decline in wages received by
workers. We find that a cut of 4.5 percentage points in payroll taxes
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Table 3
Estimated Effects of a Fiscal Policy Aimed
Specifically at Stimulating Investment:
Temporary Increase in the Investment Tax
Credit
Year
1980
Extra inflation
(per cent per year)
Extra real GNP growth
(per cent per year)
Increase in investment
tax credit
(percentage points)
Revenue loss
(billions of 1972 dollars)
1981
0.1
-0.0
4.9
14.0
0.2
3.8
6.9
18.5
1982
-2.5
-4.5
0.0
0.4
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Table 4
Estimated Effects of Payroll Tax Cut
Year
1980 1981
Extra inflation
(per cent per year)
Extra real GNP growth
(per cent per year)
Reduction in payroll tax
(percentage points)
rate
Revenue loss
(billions of 1972 dollars)
-6.0
3.9
4.5
44.3
1982
1.4 2.1
-0.1 -4.2
3.2 0.0
2.026.0
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in 1980 and 3.2 percentage points in 1981 would largely eliminate the
impact of the energy price shock on employment. Inflation in 1980 would
be as much as 6 percentage points lower with this cut than in the base
case of Table 1 with no policy response. Because the policy would con-
centrate all of its effect of lowering costs in 1980, it would increase
inflation somewhat in 1981, and, in 1982 when payroll taxes returned to
their original level, inflation would be about two percentage points
worse than in the base case. The net effect on the price level through
1982 would be favorable because the policy would stimulate capital form-
ation.1 The extremely favorable effect on inflation in 1980 depends on
a direct linkage between prices and labor cost, which is assumed in our
analysis and in most other macroeconomic models. This point may be
worth further investigation, but the results so far seem very promising
for this kind of policy. It is somewhat more expensive than a direct
investment stimulus, but is substantially cheaper than fiscal expendi-
ture policy, and promises a far more favorable effect on inflation than
either of the latter two. Perhaps this is the right time to try an experi-
ment along these lines.
1In a previous paper (Mork and Hall, "Energy Prices and the U.S.Economy
in 1979-81," M.I.T. Energy Laboratory Working Paper No. MIT-EL 79-043WP,
August 1979) we reported somewhat different results for a payroll tax cut.
The discrepancy is due to a difference in perspective: the policy studied
in that paper was assumed to be announced in 1979 and take effect in 1980.
Similar differences can be found for the investment tax credit. Also note
an error in that paper. The revenue loss of 55 and 52 billion should be
current dollars, corresponding to 30 and 25 billion 1972 dollars in 1980
and 1981, respectively.
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Concluding comments
Our review of the options open to policy makers to deal with an
energy price increase has called attention to the role of capital forma-
tion in the alternative effects of different policies. Some policies
may be classified as pro-investment: monetary accommodation, investment
credit, and payroll tax credit. Because they favor capital formation,
they help offset inflation. Other policies are anti-investment: mone-
tary tightness and increases in federal spending. Unfortunately, the
present movements of macroeconomic policy seem to be in exactly this
second direction. We favor as an alternative the following combination:
Monetary policy aiming to achieve growth rates of monetary aggregates at
approximately their averages over the past 5 years, without any sudden
reduction in growth but with a committment to gradual reductions in money
growth over the forthcoming five years. Second, temporary increase in
the investment tax credit of 2 or 3 percentage points. Third, a permanent
reduction in payroll taxes of several percentage points (with the necessary
revenue for financing social security benefits coming from general federal
revenues). This package would help put the U.S. back on the path of
higher capital accumulation and growth from which it was deflected by the
first energy shock in 1974 and from which a further deflection is threatening.
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1. Introduction
A rising world price of energy imposes a macroeconomic cost on the
United Sates in two different ways. First, to the extent that energy is an
important production input and consumption good with limited substitution
elasticities, as it becomes more scarce the economy's production and con-
sumption possibilities are necessarily reduced. Thus, even if an expansionary
monetary and fiscal policy were successful in pushing the economy close to
its full capacity level, the resulting GNP would be lower than if energy prices
had not increased. The cost corresponding to this reduction in potential
GNP might be thought of as a "direct" cost of higher energy prices.
Second, rising energy prices contribute directly to general inflation,
and, by increasing the marginal cost of production may, if wages are rigid,
further reduce GNP and employment. Depending on the macroeconomic policy
response to this added inflation and unemployment - i.e. whether we accommo-
date the inflation and try to move back to full employment quickly, or accept
the additional unemployment for some time - and depending on the effectiveness
of that policy response, there will be an added cost, namely 'the cost of the
increased inflation and/or the still further reduction in GNP. This might
be thought of as an "indirect" cost of higher energy prices.
When I first began thinking about this paper I thought I would try to
estimate these two costs for, say, a 10% increase in world oil prices. In-
tuitively it seemed to me that the "indirect" cost of an energy price shock,
i.e. the cost of inflation and the re-establishment of full-capacity output
and employment, would be quite large and might even outweigh the direct cost.
In any case it seemed worthwhile to try to get an idea of just how large these
costs are.
Furthermore as I first thought about it the task seemed fairly straight-
forward, and would involve the following steps:
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1. First I would try to roughly estimate the loss in the productive
capacity of the economy resulting from a given increase in the world price
of oil. This would require certain assumptions about the impact of higher
oil prices on the overall aggregate price of energy in the United States.
However a story about this already exists in the form of the MIT World Oil
Model, a large simulation model that translates Persian Gulf prices into,
among other things, product prices for various fuels. Assumptions are also
needed about the elasticity of substitution between energy and other factors
of production for the industrial sector, and demand elasticities for the
residential and transportation sectors. Here I could draw from my own re-
cent econometric estimates (1979). I could also try to say something about
the sensitivity of the estimated potential GNP loss to these assumptions.
2. My first inclination was that the proper macro policy response to
an energy price shock would be one of full accommodation, i.e. the immediate
inflationary impact would be accepted, and the nominal money supply increased
proportionally - or perhaps more than proportionally to compensate for the
depressing effect on investment resulting from short-run capital-energy
complementarity. I found initial support for this intuitive feeling by reading
Gramlich (1979), and it is also constant with the story told by Mork and Hall
(1979).
3. I could then go on and use Gramlich's statistical results on the
relative perceived costs of inflation and unemployment to attach a dollar cost
to the policy of accommodation. In other words a dollar measure could be
attached to the added inflation (based on an estimated perceived equivalence
with some amount of unemployment and thus implicit GNP loss) under the
assumption of full and instantaneous accommodation.
While this is a neat plan, I soon realized that the choice of the correct
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policy response to an energy price shock is not so clearcut, and that it may
not necessarily be desirable after all to quickly accommodate the shock by
expanding demand. It is not that I believe in Fellner's view of an implicit
social contract with the government that would be overturned once firms and
labor unions began to doubt the commitment to fighting inflation. Rather the
issue seems to be whether prices and real wages will adjust (quickly enough)
for demand stimulation to be effective, and even if they do adjust, whether
the original Phillip's curve is re-established quickly enough after a price
shock to warrant a rapid accommodation.
There are essentially three possible reasons why it might not be desirable
to accommodate an energy price increase, at least quickly:
1. Suppose price and real wages adjust quickly enough sothat the goods
market always clears, but money wages are rigid downwards so that a higher
price of energy reduces the supply of output (at any particular price). This
is basically the story told by the neoclassical models of the sort developed
by Phelps (1978) and Gordon (1975). Gramlich (1979) uses such a model to
argue that immediate accommodation is the optimal policy, but seems to brush
over the issue of adjustment lags in the re-establishment of the long-run
Phillip's curve. Would accounting for these lags, or the use of an objective
function different from the linear one Gramlich uses, lead us to conclude that
any accommodation should be gradual?
2. One might believe that there is rigidity in the real wage rate.
(Sachs (1979) argues that this has indeed been the case in Europe.) This would
mean modifying the neoclassical model so that the supply of output is perfectly
inelastic, and implies that accommodation will not change employment, but will
only increase inflation. The only policies that can reduce unemployment are
those that stimulate supply.
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3. If one believes that prices are rigid or that real wages are fixed
given any particular level of output, one is led to a model or the sort de-
veloped by Solow and Stiglitz (1968), Malinvaud (1977), and Solow (1978).
Here the goods market need not clear, and might be characterized by excess
supply and Keynesian unemployment) or excess demand (and "classical" unem-
ployment). If an energy price increase leads to a situation of excess demand
and "classical" unemployment (or occurs when the economy is already in that
state), accommodation is of no use and once again will only increase the rate
of inflation.
There are thus three alternative frameworks that can be used to analyze
macro policy response, each of which might (and for different reasons) lead
to the conclusion that full and rapid accommodation is not desirable. I
will begin by briefly reviewing these alternative frameworks and trying to
reconcile their differences. It seems to me that the differences boil down
to assertions about how long rigid real wages, money wages, or prices remain
rigid, so that the comparative statics of one model can be made to dynamically
shift to that of another model by allowing one or more key parameters (that
define a particular rigidity) to adjust (perhaps slowly) over time.
We next turn to the problem of optimal policy response. By letting cer-
tain parameters adjust slowly over time we can force any of the alternative
models to lead us to the conclusion that macro policy should eventually accommo-
date price shocks. However, "eventually" might be a rather long time, and
is not very useful as a guide for monetary policy over the next several months.
Unfortunately the empirical evidence for the United States in 1979 is mixed
and ambiguous, and the policy implications are likewise ambiguous. However
the limited evidence seems to favor a neoclassical model where the goods market
clears and real wages can adjust. I will use such a model to examine the op-
timal policy response.
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2. Alternative Frameworks for Analyzing Macro Policy Response
If both prices and the real wage rate can adjust, we can look at the
problem in the context of a neoclassical model of the sort used by Gordon,
Phelps, and Gramlich. The story is illustrated in Figure 1, where aggregate
demand for output is a decreasing function of price, aggregate supply is an
increasing function (essentially the marginal cost curve), and the intersection
(just before the energy price shock) is at full employment output, yf. An
increase in the price of energy raises the marginal cost of production (as
well as the cost of imported fuels consumed directly) and shifts the aggregate
supply curve to the left, so that output falls below the (new) full employment
level, and there is a one-shot increase in the price level. The economy will
remain in this position as long as the money wage is rigid downwards. A possible
policy response is to accommodate the energy price increase through monetary
or fiscal expansion, shifting the demand curve to the right, causing a further
increase in the price level but also a movement to the new full employment
output level. (Note that full employment output has dropped from yf to yf.)
At issue, however, is how quickly the expansion should take place. Gram-
lich argues that it should occur very quickly, and supports the argument by
specifying a simple model of price-wage inflation, and then choosing a set of
unemployment rates to minimize a weighted sum of present and future discounted
rates of inflation and unemployment. However, we will come back to this issue
later and see that the result depends on the linearity of the objective function.
If the objective function is convex, the rate of accommodation should be gradual.
The use of accommodation, even if it is gradual, is ruled out in the neo-
classical model if the real wage rate is fixed. If we write the supply (mar-
ginal cost) curve as P = wo(pe,y), where w is the money wage rate and pe the
nominal price of energy, if the real wage v = w/P is fixed, q (p ,y) = v,
and y is fixed given Pe. As can be seen in Figure 2, increasing demand will
-6-
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only increase the price level, and will do nothing to increase output and
employment. One could argue that this picture might apply to Europe and
Japan, where, as Sachs (1979) points out, real wage rates have increased
rapidly over the past several years, and where there is a high degree of
price indexation in the setting of wage contracts. We will discuss its
applicability to the United States later.
One can also reach the conclusion that accommodation will be ineffective
using a model of the sort developed by Solow and Stiglitz (1968) and Malinvaud
(1977), and applied recently by Solow (1978) to the analysis of macro policy
response to energy price shocks. Here the supply of output is a declining
function of real factor prices, i.e. the real wage v and the real price of
energy z = Pe/P. The demand for output is an increasing function of the
real wage, but a decreasing function of the real price of energy. Potential
output yf is determined by the supply of labor and thus independent of v,
but will fall if the real price of energy rises. Finally, actual output
will be the smallest of demand, supply, and potential output, so that given
a particular real wage (see Figure 3), there could exist excess supply and
Keynesian unemployment (v < vl), or excess demand and "classical" unemployment,
i.e. stagflation (v > v2).
To determine the equilibrium real wage a model of price-wage inflation
is needed. Solow uses the following:
/p = g(yd/yS) + j /w , g' > O, 0< j < 1 (1)
;/w = h(n/ns) + k /p , h' > 0, 0 < k < 1 (2)
so that price inflation is determined (in part) by excess demand and wage
inflation by unemployment. We can thus get the rate of change of the real wage
from the reduced form of (1) and (2):
v/v = /w - p/p = -g(yd/yS) + Y2 h(n/ns) = f(y,v) (3)
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where Y1 = (1 - k)/(l - jk) and Y2 = (1 - j)/(l - jk). This defines the
locus of constant real wage f(y,v) = 0, and, as shown in Figure 3, determines
the equilibrium value of v.
Four things occur as a result of an energy price increase. Full employ-
ment output yf falls to y. The demand curve shifts down and to the right.
The supply curve shifts down and to the left. And finally, depending on the
extent of the demand and supply shifts, the f(y,v) = 0 schedule will shift,
since both yd/yS and n/ns will now be different for any particular v. If the
demand curve does most of the shifting so that for any v, yd/yS is now smaller
(but, with the drop in yf, n/nS is about the same), the f(y,v) = 0 schedule
will shift to the right, if the supply curve does most of the shifting the
schedule will shift to the left.
Depending on the state of the economy before the energy price shock, and
depending on the-relative effects of the shock on demand and supply, the new
equilibrium after the shock might be one of excess supply as in Figure 4a, or
excess demand as in Figure 4b. Should it be excess demand and "classical"
unemployment, accommodation through demand expansion would only increase the
rate of inflation (by increasing excess demand) but would not reduce unemploy-
ment. Only a policy that expanded supply would help, and unfortunately the
instruments available to effect such a policy are quite limited.
One might ask whether an equilibrium such as that in Figure 4b could
actually be sustained for any significant length of time.l We might expect
that after high unemployment persisted for any length of time, unions would
soften their wage demands and be willing to accept a smaller degree of
1 - We might also ask whether we could expect to sea such an equilibrium at
all. Its existence requires that the function g(y /yS) in eqn. (1) not be
terribly elastic. If g(yd/ys) is a highly elastic function (so that it doesn't
take much excess demand to increase the rate of inflation or much excess sup-
ply to reduce it), the locus f(y,v) = 0 will always lie close to the inter-
section of y and yS, and any shift in that intersection (from a shift in de-
mand or supply) would shift the locus accordingly.
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indexation. This would mean a reduction in the parameter k in eqn. (2),
so that the f(y,v) = 0 curve would shift to the left towards the inter-
section of yd and yS. Letting the parameter k be dynamic is thus one way
of forcing this model to tell a neoclassical story in the long run. For
example, we could write k as
k(t) = k e (ns/n - )(t-t) (4)
where to is the time at which a price shock occurs, reducing supply. We
could then argue about the size of , i.e. how long it takes for markets to
clear.2
Alternatively we could make the function g(yd/ys) or the parameter j in
eqn. (1) dynamic, adjusting over time according to the duration of.excess
demand (or excess supply). If j increased as excess demand persisted (so
that wage increases were passed through more quickly), or g(yd/y) became
more elastic, the f(y,v) = 0 locus would again shift toward the supply-
demand intersection. As shown in Figure 5, demand stimulation would now be
an effective policy, although it would take some time to work (leaving open
the question, as in the neoclassical model, of whether accommodation should
be rapid or gradual).
3. The Optimal Policy Responses for the United States
This brings us to the question of which view of the world seems most
appropriate for the U.S. economy in 1979-80, and what are the policy implications
2 - The parameter k describes the degree of price indexation, while h(nS/n)
describes the process of wage increase more broadly. We could also (or
instead) let h be dynamic (falling with the duration of unemployment). For
example, the function
h = AnS ea(nS/n - l)(t-to )
(ns - n)
would let markets clear in the long run.
-1.-
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of that view. As I mentioned earlier, the evidence is limited and mixed, but
I tend to doubt that the recession that is just beginning (or is about to be-
gin shortly.) can be charaterized by excess demand as in Figure 4b, or that
real wages are perfectly rigid as in Figure 2. (Downward rigidity in real
wages may indeed exist in some of the European countries, but we are talking
now about the United States.) The following points support this view:
(1) First and perhaps most important is the fact that the
real wage rate fell by about 4 percent over the past
year, with most of the droo occurring after world oil
prices started rising again in January 1979. This is
even more than the 3 percent drop in the real wage rate
that occurred while oil prices rose in 1974, and seems
too large to be consistent with a rigid real wage model.
(2) Excess demand is costly to firms that have an incentive to
keep servicing customers and maintain market shares. Thus
even if real wages were rigid we would expect to see firms
ib
-V
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maintain output at least over the short run, at the ex-
pense of lower profits. Indeed from 1978-IV to 1979-II
profits (with the inventory valuation adjustment) fell
by about 4 percent in nominal terms. (At the same time
inventory investment in 1972 dollars rose from $12
Billion to $18 Billion in 1979-II.)
(3) As I mentioned before, if workers and their unions have a
low tolerance for long-lasting unemployment, the parameters
of the wage equation will. change, with the degree of price
indexation falling and the responsiveness of money wage
growth to employment rising. As a result the constant real
wage locus would shift so that the goods market cleared,
and any "classical" unemployment would be temporary. It
seems to me that this shift would occur relatively quickly
in the United States. Unlike the Germans or the Swiss,
we cannot send a significant fraction of our unemployed back
to Turkey or Italy.
(4) Finally, there are a number of reasons why we might expect
an energy price increase to shift aggregate demand signifi-
cantly, perhaps even as much as it shifts aggregate supply.
First, there is evidence (and it is reasonable to expect)
that energy and capital are net complements in the short
run, so that a higher price of energy will reduce the de-
sired capital stock and, through the stock adjustment ef-
fect, cause a drop in investment demand.3 Second, a growing
fraction of our energy is imported from countries with a
relatively low propensity to consume. Third, energy price
increases in 1979 have resulted in more than proportional
increases in the retail prices faced by consumers. (This
3 - This was probably quite significant in 1974-75, but is likely to be less
significant in 1979-80, since the capital stock is still adjusting to the energy
price increases that occurred in 1974 and that have been expected to continue
to occur over the next decade. Also, in the long run energy and capital are
probably net substitutes, and this would reverse the stock adjustment effect
and raise investment demand.
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is due in large part to regulatory change.) And fourth, price
increases in 1979 were accompanied by real and threatened short-
ages (notably gasoline), which reduced the demand for such
things as autos, travel, etc. more than the price increase
alone would have.
It therefore seems that the impact of energy price increases on the U.S.
economy in 1979-80 can be best represented by Figure 2 or Figure 4a. In
either case, the prescription calls for expansionary monetary and fiscal policy,
i.e. accommodate the energy price increase and eliminate its impact on em-
ployment by increasing demand to the extent necessary.
However, as I mentioned at the beginning of this paper, there is still
the question of how quickly to accommodate. This problem is interesting
only if there is some kind of dynamic adjustment in the wage-price inflation
model, so that after a disturbance the Phillip's curve returns to its original
position only slowly. Referring to Figure 6 where the Phillip's curve is
shifted vertically upwards by a price shock, and where point A is the pre-
shock (socially optimal) trade-off, we can ask whether the old unemployment rate
should be maintained so that the return to equilibrium is via path BA, or
whether some increased unemployment should be tolerated for a while, with a
return to equilibrium through gradual accommodation via path CA.
O _
C
-tJ?
-14-
In the Appendix I modify equations (1) and (2) for the Phillip's curve
by adding a lag adjustment, and by assuming that the goods market always clears
so that g(yd/ys) can be replaced by a constant. I then solve the optimal con-
trol problem for two different objective functions, and find the optimal un-
employment rate path for each.
As one might expect, if the objective function is linear in the rates
of inflation and unemployment, path BA in Figure 6 is optimal and accommodation
should be complete and instantaneous (since the locus of tangencies with the
Phillip's curve in each period must be a vertical line, i.e. constant unem-
ployment). On the other hand, if we minimize a convex function of the rates
of inflation and unemployment (I used a quadratic function), accommodation
should be gradual (since the locus of tangencies is upwards sloping). In
summary, and assuming that the inflation-unemployment trade-off was optimal
just before the price shock:
(1) If the objective of policy is to minimize a linear function of
inflation and unemployment, then accommodation should be in-
stantaneous and complete. That is, increase aggregate demand
to bring the unemployment rate immediately back to its pre-
shock value, and keep it there while inflation slowly subsides
to its pre-shock rate.
(2) If the objective of policy is to minimize a convex function of
inflation and unemployment, then the optimal policy calls for
an immediate partial accommodation, but only a gradual full
accommodation. In particular, the unemployment rate should
be brought part of the way down towards its pre-shock value
immediately, but then brought the rest of the way down only
gradually as the rate of inflation subsides. The extent of
the initial partial accommodation, and the rate of full
accommodation will depend on the particular objective func-
tion and the speed of recovery for the Phillip's curve.
I should stress again that this result assumes that the goods market al-
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ways clears. If there is excess supply in the goods market the optimal
rate of accommodation is determined by re-inserting the function g(yd/ys)
in eqn. (1), and relating y to employment through a production function. If
there is temporary excess demand it may still be optimal to begin accommodating
immediately (even before the market clears), since that will speed up the
rate at which the constant real wage locus will shift. In any case, these
are problems that still need to be solved.
As far as current economic policy is concerned, I think we can assume
(for reasons given earlier) that the goods market clears.. Unfortunately I
do not know what kind of objective function is most in favor in Washington
these days. Based on recent monetary policy, however, I can only surmise that
it is not a linear one.
4. Postscript: The Macroeconomic Cost of an Energy Price Increase
I began this paper by saying that my original intention had been to
to estimate the direct and indirect macroeconomic costs of an OPEC oil price
increase. I therefore feel duty-bound to provide at least a quick and dirty
back of the envelope calculation of those costs. I make the calculation for
a 10% increase in the average Persion Gulf price of crude oil, I assume no
substitution possibilities, but that energy-saving technological change limits
the impact on potential GNP to an average of 5 years, and I assume a linear
social cost function so that accommodation is complete and instantaneous (and there-
fore optimal). Finally I assume a value of 0.7 for c2' the parameter that deter-
mines the speed of response of the Phillip's curve. The steps are as follows:
(1) I use the MIT World Oil Model to translate the 10% increase
in the Persian Gulf price into corresponding increases in
sectoral energy price indices, under the assumption that prices
of non-liquid fuels increase by 50% as much as liquid fuels.
I find that the aggregate energy price index rises 4.0%
in the residential sector, 4.8% in the industrial sector,
-16-
5.3% in the transportation sector, and 8.0% in the "remaining
use" sector. To aggregate across sectors I weight these fi-
gures by consumption shares (23%, 43%, 30%, and 4% respectively),
and obtain a 4.9% increase in the overall price of energy.
(2) Energy as a share of GNP is approximately,5%. Assuming no
substitution possibilities, we therefore get a 0.25% drop in
potential GNP, or about a $6 Billion loss, as a result of
the 15% increase in the Persian Gulf price. I carry this over
5 years, discounting at 10%, to get a direct cost of $25 Billion.
(3) In 1974 the price of energy in the U.S. increased by 30% in
real terms, and this resulted in about 2% of added inflation.
We might thus expect the 4.9% increase in the real price of
energy to add about 0.4% to the rate of inflation in the first
year. But this will also result in added inflation in future
years. In the Appendix, we show that (with a linear social
cost function) an extra 1% of inflation in the first year
would imply - in discounted cost terms - an accumulated total
of (1 + 6)/(1 - a2 + 6) = 2.75% of added inflation. For our
first-year increases of 0.49% in the rate of inflation, this
means the equivalent of 1.1% of total added inflation.
(3) I use Gramlich's survey results for the perceived relative
costs of inflation and unemployment. These results indicate
that the public perceives 1 extra percentage point of unem-
ployment to be equivalent to between 2 and 4 extra percentage
points of inflation. Using the middle of this range, I trans-
late the 1.1% of added inflation into a perceived equivalent
cost of 0.37% of added unemployment. Using Okun's Law I get
an equivalent loss of 1% of potential GNP, or an indirect cost
of $22 Billion. The direct and indirect costs of an energy
price increase thus seem to be roughly comparable in magnitude,
and much larger than a cost estimate obtained by multiplying
the increase in the cost of imported oil by the annual volume
of imports.
-17-
Appendix - The Optimal Rate of Accommodation
In this Appendix we calculate the optimal unemployment rate trajectories
corresponding to two different objective functions, and thereby determine the
optimal rate of accommodation to an energy price shock. We base this on the
neoclassical model in which the goods market clears and the real wage rate
can shift, and on a Phillip's curve that returns to its pre-shock position
only slowly.
Since yd/yS = 1 always, we can re-write eqns. (1) and (2) for the rates
of price and wage inflation as:
-1
Wt = ao + alUt-l + a2Pt-l (A.1)
t a3 + at + Pet (A.2)
where a bar indicates a percentage rate of change, U is the unemployment rate,
and a2, a4, and a5 are all less than 1. Now combine these two to obtain the
Phillip's curve equation, which we write in differenced form:
-1
t+l - Pt (a2 - 1) Pt + a + alUt + a3Pe,t+l (A.3)
where = a + a 1 a a4, a2 = a2 a4, and a3 = a
We now minimize two social cost functions subject to eqn. (A.3), the
first of which is linear:
Min C Tt but[ t +
t C1 0 (A.4)Ut 1 t ( + 6)t EPt + bUt],
and the second is quadratic:
MinC = Pt + b (A.5)
Min C2 = 1 [t + = (A.5)
UM t ) cbU
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In the first case the Hamiltonian is
H - I _ 1(1 6+ t-' t but] + t+l [(:2 i)P t + 3e,t+l]
(A.6)
Minimizing H with respect to Ut gives:
* t 1
Ut a [(l/b)(1 + 6) X+l (A.7)
and the dynamics of the co-state variable is given by
X 1- X = -aH/af t = (1 - 2)Xt+l (1 + )t (A.8)
O + 6) )h y i ~(1~6)t(A.8)
It is convenient to introduce t = (1 + 6)tXt , i.e. t is the undiscounted in-
crease in the cost-to-go from an extra 1 percent of inflation lasting 1
period. Then
Xt+l - t AX= (A.9)(1 + 6) (1 + 6)
and eqns. (A.7) and (A.8) can be replaced by:
* = : l/t+ 2 (AlO
Ut [tb(l + /2 (A.10)
- 2 + 6
and = a2+ (1-t + 6)/a 2 (A.11)
2
We can determine the optimal trajectories for Pt and t from eqns. (A.3) and
(A.11). As can be seen from the phase diagram in Figure Al, the optimal Pt is
constant (and as expected larger whan 2 is larger so that the speed of adjustment
of the Phillip's curve is slower). Thus from (A.10) we know that the optimal
-19-
Figure Al - Linear Cost Function
S
k = G
Figure A2 - Quadratic Cost Function
a.=,
I-cc -+ S.1
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unemployment rate is constant, so that the optimal policy is to immediately
bring the unemployment rate back to its pre-shock value and keep it at that
value.
If the social cost function is instead quadratic as in (A.5), then the
solution of the optimal control problem yields the following for Ut and t:
1/3
U [ 2 ut1 (A.12)
1 - + 6
and A = 2 P 2(1 + 6)Pt/a2 (A.13)
t2 2
as can be seen from the phase diagram in Figure A2, the optimal t is now falling
over time, so that Ut is also falling. Furthermore the slope of the [i = 0]
isocline is (1 - a2 + 6)/2(1 + 6), so that if a2 is larger (and the rate of
recovery of the Phillip's curve slower), U t will fall from a larger initial
value, ad, as can be seen from (A.13), will fall more slowly. The optimal policy
is therefore an immediate partial accommodation (since the optimal Pt is falling,
so that some additional inflation is acceptable in return for an initially
lower unemployment rate), and then a gradual reduction in unemployment to its
pre-shock value as the rate of inflation subsides to its pre-shock rate.
-21-
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1I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments affecting the price, availability, and safety
of conventional energy supplies have provided anew the motivation for a
strategic review of domestic energy policy and the opportunity to define
and clarify the future direction of that policy. By design and formulation,
the Strategic Cost-Benefit Analysis of Energy Policies is intended to
serve informationally this process of evaluation. Specifically, the study
defines available directions for future energy policy and compares and
evaluates each in terms of its energy, economic, and environmental conse-
quences.
Three major strategies are considered as possible directions for
future energy policy. The first is to introduce no new policies beyond
those presently in effect. Operationally, this strategy is represented by
a policy that presumes the implementation of only those policies currently
enacted or currently announced and under direct control of the Executive
Branch. The second strategy involves a redirection of policy toward demand
reduction, i.e., energy conservation. The policy equivalent of this strategy
is provided by a set of conservation initiatives, constructed by the Offeice
of Assistant Secretary of Conservation and Solar Applications (CSA), that are
proposed for introduction beginning in FY 1981. The third strategic option
is to promote increased domestic supply, primarily through an accelerated
commercial development of the so-called synthetic and unconventional fuels.
This policy direction is analyzed in terms of the development program that
was proposed by President Carter on 15 July 1979.
The consequences of these policy alternatives are examined for the
2period 1980 to 2000 using the combined Brookhaven National Laboratorvy/ale
W. Jorgenson Associates (BNL/DJA) energy-economy model system (TESOM-LITMI).
The DJA economic model (LITM) depicts production and spending throughout the
economy within a flexible interindustry framework. The model provides for
substitutions in the final spending on the goods and services that comprise
the Gross National Product. Further, it permits substitutions among the capital,
labor, energy, and materials inputs into the production of these goods and
services. The BNL component of the system (TE.SnI) is a technological model
of energy extraction, conversion, and end use. It represents the economic,
technical, and environmental characteristics of the future substitution
possibilities among new and conventional energy technologies and energy
sources. The combined models give a comprehensive long-run representation
of the nation's energy and economic systems, energy-economy interactions,
and the environmental consequences of these. Using this integrated system,
the method of analysis is, first, to project developments under the no new
policy strategy and, then, to perform alternate projections corresponding
to each of the more active policies. The three cases then are compared to
estimate:
* the relative merits of the strategies as measured by national energy
security objectives;
the costs imposed on (or, benefits realized by) the U.S. economy for
each strategy;
* the environmental consequences arising from the energy system under
each strategy.
Focusing on the economic results, the purpose of this paper is to
report the major findings of this comparison and, from these, develop
implications for the future direction of national energy policy.
3II. ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY
A. The Reference Projection
The LITM economic model requires input assumptions on future popu-
lation, government expenditure and revenue policies, and the unemployment
rate. The Census Bureau's Series II population projections (fertility
rate of 2.1) were used to derive figures on the future population. Labor
force participation rates are endogenous to the model and are not speci-
fied as assumptions. The unemployment rate is assumed to follow a cyclical
rate from 6.0% in 1978 to 5.6% in 1985 and -then to decline slightly over
the rest of the forecast period. Government purchases increase slightly
relative to the rest of the economy (from 19.4% of real GNP in 1980 to 19.9%
by 2000) reflecting current trends of government programs including new
developments in the health, services, energy, and defense areas. Govern-
ment transfers and tax revenues rise approximately in line with the economy
as a whole. Most of the productivity effects in the model are endogenous
and are not specified as assumptions, while the energy supply and productiv-
ity information is obtained from the TESOM model.
The reference projection incorporates a variety of energy system assump-
tions: prices and availabilities of energy resources; capital and operating
costs for electricity generation, synthetic fuel production, and end-use
devices; market penetration rates for new energy technologies; and changes
in efficiencies of fuel conversion over the 1980 to 2000 time horizon. The
energy assumptions include the impacts of policy initiatives or actions al-
ready legislated or already announced and under control of the Executive
Branch. In particular, the oil import quotas announced by President Carter
in his energy initiatives speech of 15 July 1979 are incorporated. These
4quotas require hat future, annual levels of oil imports never exceed the
1977 level, and that they be reduced to one-half the 1977 level by the year
1990.
Domestic pricing assumptions are based on the phased decontrol of
domestic oil prices by the year 1981. A windfall profits tax (proposed, but
not enacted) is not included. The NEP II High Price Trajectory (U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy. National Energy Plan II. Washington, D.C.: May 1979) is
assumed for world oil prices. This has the world oil price rising at an
average annual rate of 3.3 percent, from $20 per barrel in 1980 to $38 by
the year 2000 (in constant 1978 dollars). Domestic natural gas prices are
assumed to be deregulated by 1985 and then to increase rapidly, approach-
ing the crude oil price; this takes the price of $0.99 per million Btu in
1980 to $5.50 by the year 2000.
Domestic oil and gas production possibilities are determined by apply-
ing a Hubbert Curve analysis to the U.S.G.S. mean geology estimates of
1 January 1978. Nuclear electric generating capacity is assumed to reach
155 gigawatts during the 1985 to 1990 period, and increase to a range of
225 to 240 gigawatts by the year 2000.
A set of measures of environmental effects is generated from each
TESOM solution using emission and conversion factors associated with each
activity. The impacts measured include air contaminants, water contaminants,
solid waste materials, and items such as radiation exposure levels, and
occupational injuries. The emission and conversion factors assume that best
available control technologies are used in each process in the system, and
that the effectiveness of these control technologies does not change over
time.
The BNL/TESOM and DJA/LTM models are coupled so that in each year
5there is a consistency between the energy and economic information obtain-
able from each model. This coupling is achieved through an iterative pro-
cess in which the principal points of interaction are:
· the economic activities of each sector and the aggregate energy
inputs to the producing sectors, household sectors, and other final
demands;
* The relationship between the aggregate energy inputs to the
producing and consuming sectors and the levels of the nonsubstitut-
able, functional energy services;
* The details of energy prices, technology production functions,
quantities, imports, and the levels of new and conventional energy
technologies;
* The relationship among the energy sector details, aggregate energy
and nonenergy input substitutions, product substitutions and compos-
itional changes in final demand and the growth of the economy from
both demand and supply points of view.
The two models interface at the point of energy demand, with LIT
linking aggregate energy demand to the general economv and with TESOM linking
primary resources to energy demand. The linked system extends the cover-
age and applicability of each model and provides a framework for the con-
sistent analysis of the role of energy technologies, energy supply and con-
version and their environmental consequences, energy-economy interactions,
and economic effects.
The model coupling operates through sevural stages. Initially, aver-
age supply price indices are projected using, as weights, the energy quanti-
ties from a previous BNL/DJA reference projection. The price changes from
the reference projection are related to price-quantity elasticities of
6demand to yield initial estimates of primary energy consumption and, through
average system efficiencies, the corresponding levels of energy service
demands. These elasticities summarize the equilibrated degree of respons-
iveness of energy quantity changes to energy price changes from previous
solutions of the combined system. TESOM is then solved, constrained by
the supply, import, and conversion limitations and subject to the satis-
faction of these initially determined levels of energy services.
The solution values of energy prices, and quantities technology pro-
duction functions, energy imports, and the levels of new energy technologies
from TESOM are entered into the LITM model which is solved to yield esti-
mates of the level and composition of production and spending throughout the
economy. Economic sector outputs and the energy input per unit of output
are transformed into a restructured set of demands for energy services in
physical units. This mapping occurs through a "reduced form" version of
the BNL/University of Illinois Input-Output Model. Mathematically, these
adjustments to the level and structure of energy service demands are deter-
mined by accounting for changes in service levels due to changes in the
level and structure of economic activity and changes in the energy require-
ments per dollar of output or consumption for each sector. These account
for the substitution of nonenergy inputs in production and consumption.
The final adjustment in the mapping process accounts for changes in
demand levels resulting from efficiency improvements for each service
category. The resultant vector of energy service demands changes in
energy prices, the level and composition of economic activity, energy
and nonenergy inputs in production, and energy system efficiencies.
These energy demands are inserted into TESOM and produce a new simulation
of the configuration of the energy system. This iterative procedure
continues until consistency between the energy and economic systems in
the two models is attained.
* . . - * ..-
7B. The Conservation Projection
Beginning with Fiscal Year 1981, the conservation policy represents
the programmatic and induced, i.e., private sector, expenditures and the
associated energy savings of the combined Minimum and Current programs of
the Office of Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Solar Applications
(CSA). The expenditure and energy information is provided by the Consoli-
dated Ranking of FY 1980 Decision Packages and supporting materials that
were prepared by CSA personnel. The incremental energy savings reported
for these programs are solely attributable to the post-FY 1980 levels of
effort, irrespective of their continuing nature. Thus, the introduction of this
policy into -the reference projection affords the direct determination of the
energy, economic, and environmental consequences of the demand reduction
strategy.
The conservation policy, as described in the CSA materials, incorpor-
ates subprograms into major program areas as follows:
*Buildings and Community Systems
*Transportation
'Industrial
State and Local Programs
*Appropriate Technology
The supporting documentation for the conservation policy contains
information for each subprogram as to the direct benefits and costs of the
particular initiative. The direct policy benefits are represented by the
levels of annual energy savings (1985, 1990, and 2000); the direct costs
are reflected in the cumulative public and private expenditures, discounted
to the present (FY 1981), that are required to achieve the ultimate levels
of energy savings.
The energy displacements induced by the CSA programs are introduced
directly into the reference projection. These energy reductions permit
the annual release of those resources associated with the production and/or
importation of petroleum, natural gas, and electricity. However, these
benefits are not costless. They result from a temporally phased diversion
of productive resources, public and private alike, into those activities
implied for each of the conservation initiatives. The annual benefits
from conservation policy are measured against the annual claims on the inputs
available to the economy. These claims are implicit in the CSA discounted
eXpenditure information and are represented by a reallocation of capital
and labor services from other productive uses to energy conservation activi-
ties.
The total cost information for each subprogram, shown in Table 1, results
from the discounting of an annual series of expenditures. In order to determine
the capital and labor services claims due to this policy, it is necessary to:
develop the annual expenditures series for each subprogram;
allocate annual expenditures between investment purchases and
labor services expenditures;
* convert the investment expenditures series into a capital services
series.
Rules that are specific to each subprogram are required for converting the
total discounted costs into an undiscounted expenditure stream. Three types
of distribution mechanisms are used to annualize and undiscount the total
cost. These are denoted the uniform, constant rate of growth, and trapezoidal
distribution patterns. They are depicted graphically with their parameter
requirements in Figure 1.
9TABLE 1
Total Discounted Costs: Conservation Policy
Program Discounted Public and Private Cost
(Millions of 1972 Dollars)
Buildings/Community Systems 55857
Buildings Systems 20271
Appliance Standards 5619
Community Systems 5152
Urban Waste 6264
Technology and Consumer Products 4401
Analysis and Technology Transfer 6343
Residential Conservation Service 2711
FEMP 4453
Small Business 643
Transportation 40074
Vehicle Propulsion D&D 13681
Electric Vehicle RD&D 3940
Transportation System Utilization 4495
Alternative Fuels Utilization 17958
Industrial 14798
Waste Energy Reduction 5299
Industrial Cogeneration 6243
Industrial Process Efficiency 3253
Implementation and Deployment 3
State and Local 471
Schools and Hospitals 6
Local Government Buildings 0.1
Weatherization Assistance 409
EMPA 56
Appropriate Technology 4554
Small Scale Technology 4554
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FIGURE 1
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Distribution Type
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The uniform distribution is chosen for subprograms in which all costs
are incurred in the first year, e.g., EMPA, and those that require a series
of constant annual expenditures for some number of years, e.g., Weatherization
Assistance. The costs for these subprograms have virtually no private sector
content and, hence, the uniform distribution conforms closely to the public
outlay patterns reported in the CSA documentation.
In subprograms where initial R, D, and D costs are followed by costs that
grow in proportion to annual energy savings, a constant rate of growth dis-
tribution is the appropriate rule. These subprograms are characterized by
initial outlays that lead, relatively quickly, to commercially successful end-
use technologies promoting energy efficiency or fuel switching. From this,
additional energy savings are obtained only by increasing the penetrations
and, consequently, the purchases of these products. Examples of these sub-
programs include Appliance Standards, Technology and Consumer Products, and
Alternative Fuels Utilization. The growth parameters for these distributions
are determined from the growth of energy savings over the period 1980-2000
with an allowance for economies of scale, i.e., the diminution of cost per
million Btu, resulting from increased market penetrations.
The trapezoidal distribution is selected for subprograms that initially
require increasing R, D, and D expenditures which level off for some length
of time as the product or service provided by the program increases its pene-
tration or effectiveness, or nears commercialization. These periods are fol-
lowed by a period of decreasing unit costs resulting from the influences of
12
increased market penetration and information diffusion. In essence, this
distribution mechanism is applicable to subprograms for which the most likely
expenditures pattern is concentrated toward the earlier years. Thus, the
realization of the direct net benefits that accompany increased market pene-
tration in the longer run is conditional on the incurrence of direct net
costs for the nearer term.
The annual expenditures associated with each subprogram next are divided
into investment and labor services purchases in accordance with the type
of expenditure implied by the success of that subprogram. For example, the
commercial successes of the Vehicle Propulsion R, D, and D and Alternative
Fuels Utilization subprograms imply that incremental conservation expenditures
are directed toward purchases from industries not unlike motor vehicles and
petroleum refining, respectively. Similarly, efficiency improvements induced
by the Appliance Standards and Technology and Consumer Products subprograms
result in incremental purchases, in part, from the household appliances
industry. Thus, the allocation between investment and labor is determined
from the corresponding expenditure shares of the total sectoral output
most closely resembling the purchases implied for a successful CSA
program. The information for this allocation is provided by "The Input-
Output Structure of the U.S. Economy, 1972" as reported in the February, 1979
Survey of Current Business.
Finally, the stream of annual investment expenditures for each sub-
program is converted into a capital services series that reflects the perma-
nency of the services available from the undepreciated capital stock.
13
The resulting series for capital and labor services represent the
annual resource claims, i.e., the direct policy costs, associated with the
annual energy savings provided by each of the CSA initiatives. For the
years 1990 and 2000, summaries of the costs and energy savings re provided,
by major program area, in Table 2.
The introduction of the conservation policy into the reference pro-
jectionfrom the BNL/DJA model system is accomplished in two stages. The
first establishes the initial conditions for the projection by accounting for
reductions in energy use, releases of real resources originally devoted to
energy production in absence of conservation, and claims on total available
resources associated with conservation activities. In the second stage,
the model system is iterated as usual.
In the BNL energy model, conservation is represented as a new source
of the delivered energy required to satisfy particular end uses, e.g., space
heat, process heat, motive power, etc. Conservation in the CSA documentation
is specified as primary energy savings in the residential, commercial, indus-
trial, and transportation sectors. The primary energy savings in each program
area are allocated to specific end uses in accordance with the relative im-
portance of the end use in the consuming sector to which the conservation
subprograms are directed. Then, for each end use, the delivered energy in-
puts in the reference projection are converted to their primary energy equi-
valents and an average conversion efficiency (delivered Btu per Btu of
primary energy) is determined. This, when multiplied by the primary energy
savings in each end-use category, determines the delivered energy savings
resulting from conservation activities. For each end-use demand, a con-
straint is introduced into the energy model. These restrict total delivered
14
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energy inputs to a particular end use to be no greater than the total from
the reference projection less the delivered energy savings as determined above.
The energy model then is solved. In the solution, the excess of end-use
demand over the sum of delivered energy inputs times their respective end-
use device efficiencies is the amount of conservation expressed as delivered
energy equivalent. In subsequent iterations of the energy model the conserv-
ation amounts determined by this procedure are fixed and the constraints on
total delivered energy to each end-use are removed. In this manner, the
energy benefits from conservation policy are maintained in the solution in
isolation from other energy changes.
A comparison of the reference projection with the initial solution
from above provides information on the amounts of refined petroleum, natural
gas, and electricity that are displaced as a result of conservation policy.
When valued at their respective prices, these displacements represent the
direct economic benefits of energy conservation against which the direct
policy costs are measured. The new energy solution is incorporated into the
DJA economic model sequentially with the net direct claims on capital and
labor services. The net direct claims are determined as the differences
between capital and labor claims induced by the conservation policy and those
resources released through energy displacements.
From this point, the usual solution process for the combined model
system is followed. The economic solution contains information on the new
level and pattern of production and spending throughout the economy. Ad-
justments to the level and structure of energy service demands are deter-
mined by accounting for energy changes due to changes in the level and
structure of economic activity and the substitution of nonenergy inputs into
production and consumption. The resultant vector of end-use demands is
16
inserted into the energy model producing a new configuration of the energy
system. The solution values of energy prices and quantities, energy imports,
and the output levels and input structures for new energy technologies are
entered into the economic model. This iterative procedure continues until
consistency between the energy and economic systems in the two models is
achieved.
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C. The Synfuels Projection
The synfuels policy is represented by the program that was proposed
by President Carter on :5 July 1979. This program provides for the accel-
erated commercial devel r.ent of synthetic and unconventional fuels. The
policy objective is stated as an incremental production target of 2.5 mil-
lion barrels (crude oil equivalent) daily from these technologies by the
year 1990. The allocation of this increment, in millions of barrels per
day (mmbd), is: coal liquefaction and coal methanol, 1.25 mmbd; high-Btu
coal gas, 0.25 mmbd; shale oil, 0.40 mmbd; biomass, 0.10 mmbd; unconven-
tional gas, 0.50 mmbd. Reflecting this acceleration, growth in the output
of these fuels is projected to continue over the post-1990 period. This
growth occurs at a more moderate rate than that in the reference projec-
tion, though it originates from a significantly higher 1990 base. The
annual, incremental costs and production amounts for the synfuels policy
are presented in Table 3.
The synfuels policy is introduced into the reference projection
in the following manner. Constraints, establishing minimum production
levels for the outputs of the synfuels technologies,are incorporated into
the TESOM model. In effect, these override the competitive behavior of
synfuels as evidenced in the market penetrations of the reference projection
and determined by the TESOMI solution algorithm. From here, the combined
model system is iterated as usual. The solution values of energy prices
and quantities, energy imports, and the output levels and input structures
for new energy technologies are introduced into the economic model. LIT.M,
then, is solved to yield information on the new level and pattern of pro-
duction and spending throughout the economy. Adjustments to the level and
structure of energy service demands are determined by accounting for energy
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changes due to changes in the input and output compositions of production
and consumption, i.e., the level and structure of economic activity. The
adjusted vector of end-use energy demands is inserted into TESOM which, when
solved, provides another reconfiguration of the energy system under the
synfuels policy. This iterative process continues until the sequence *of
energy-economy interactions indicates that consistency between the systems
is attained.
20
III. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY POLICIES
Introducing policies to encourage the curtailment of the growth
in energy demand or to promote the accelerated expansion of domestic energy
supply has a significant effect on the growth and structure of the nation's
economy. In general, the conservation policy is economically superior to
the synfuels policy in achieving energy reductions consistent with national
objectives. However, from the perspective of the reference projection,
there is an economic cost that results from the introduction of either of
the more active policies.
Comparative final output and productivity measures for the policy al-
ternatives are shown in Table 4. Through 1990, real GNP is lower than
that for the reference projection under both the conservation and the synfuels
policies. In the case of conservation, the $(1972) 2.2 bn reduction in
economic activity is the net consequence of equilibrated supply and demand
responses to changes in spending and production patterns throughout the
economy. The conservation programs, to be successful, require significant
commitments of the capital and labor resources available within the economy.
These additional claims are measured against the release of resources per-
mitted by conservation, i.e., reductions in the required levels of energy
production. To the extent that resource claims exceed releases, additional
resources must be diverted from other productive uses because of their
strictly limited availabilities. This reallocation is not costless in terms
of economic efficiency. Thus, in 1990, the small net diversion of available
resources to conservation activities leads to a 0.1 percent decline in
real GNP.
For the synfuels policy, the causes of the $(1972) 12.4 bn reduction
in the 1990 level of real GNP are similar. Expanding domestic supply by
means of synthetic and unconventional fuels requires the deployment of tech-
V . . -
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TABLE 4
Output and Productivity
Reference Conservation Synfuels
1990
Real GNP 1901.3 1899.1 1888.9
Real GNP Per Capita 7.808 7.799 7.757
Gross Labor Productivity 16.885 16.881 16.805
2000
Real GNP 2469.3 2473.7 2413.3
Real GNP Per Capita 9.483 9.500 9.268
Gross Labor Productivity 19.834 19.869 19.462
Average Annual Growth Rates
1980-1990
Real GNP 2.98 2.97 2.92
Real GNP Per Capita 2.04 2.03 1.98
Gross Labor Productivity 1.54 1.54 1.49
1990-20b00
Real GNP 2.65 2.68 2.48
Real GNP Per Capita 1.96 1.99 1.80
Gross Labor Productivity 1.62 1.64 1.48
Units: Real GNP in $(1972) billion;
Real GNP Per Capita in $(1972) thousand/person
Gross Labor Productivity in $(1972) thousand/person
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nologies that provide energy at a cost not yet competitive with the energy
from the conventional sources they displace. As there is a substantial
drain on the resources available for other productive activities, the syn-
fuels policy imposes a significant cost in terms of income and production
foregone. This cost is greater than that caused by the conservation policy
and, consequently, has a more permanent effect on future economic performance.
By the year 2000, the synfuels policy has resulted in additional
penalties to economic growth. Even though the synfuels technologies have
become increasingly more competitive with conventional energy supplies, their
accelerated commercial application has had a cumulative, adverse impact of
sufficient magnitude to preclude economic recovery. In 2000, the level of
real GNP under the synfuels policy is 2.3 percent or $(1972) 56.0 bn below
that in the reference projection.
However, the conservation policy provides net economic benefits in this
period. Here, the total resource claims of the conservation activities are
more than equally compensated by the benefits of energy displacements and
reduced energy production. The gains in economic efficiency from providing
lower cost energy through conservation permit an increase in net output. That
is, real GNP is increased to $(1972) 2473.7 bn, 0.2 percent above the refer-
ence case level.
With annual rates of labor force expansion approximately equal for the
three cases, the macroeconomic impacts of the alternative policies translate
directly into productivity effects. For the period 1980 to 1990, the rates
of advance in gross labor productivity for the reference and conservation
projections are almost identical. Moreover, they lie above the rate deter-
mined for the economy under the synfuels policy. To the end of the century,
the productivity advance associated with conservation dominates those of the
23
other cases.
The implications for the aggregate economic efficiency of energy use
under these policies are of sufficient clarity to warrant little elaboration.
The energy-GNP ratio and its components are shown in Table 5. Conservation
provides a dramatic acceleration of the gains realized for this measure over
the projection horizon. Conversely, the synfuels policy slows the rate of
improvement relative to the reference case. For conservation, the annual
rate of decline in the energy-GNP ratio is 2.4 percent for the period 1980
to 1990 and 2.5 percent to the year 2000. These are slightly more and less
than double the rates of improvement observed for the synfuels and reference
projections, respectively.
The changes in the pattern of economic growth are illustrated further by
the division of total final output into consumption and investment purchases.
These are presented in Table 6. In 1990, consumption absorbs 89.0 percent
of the decline in real GNP under the synfuels policy. Investment accounts for
the remaining 11.0 percent of the GNP decline. In 2000 under this policy, the
fractions of the total decline in real economic activity attributable to con-
sumption and investment are 85.0 and 15.0 percent, respectively. In these situ-
ations, the losses in overall economic efficiency due to the synfuels policy
reduce the net output and corresponding incomes that are achievable within the
economy. In the static sense, investment, as a component of aggregate demand,
is reduced because of the reduction in real income and the associated decline
in saving. In each year that investment falls, there is a corresponding reduc-
tion in the available stock. Over time, the slower growth of capital stock
slows the growth of the productive potential of the economy and, so, reduces
the incentive for saving and investment, i.e., the prospective rate of return
to capital. In the earlier years, the expenditure reductions are concentrated
24
TABLE 5
E;ERGY AND COCNCMIC GR0'O7RH
Real GNP
(Billions of
1.972 Dollars)
Primary Energy
(Quadrillion Btu)
Energv-GNP Ratio
(Thousand Btu per
1972 Dollar)
Reference
Conservation
Synfuels
Reference
Conservation
2813.3 112.4
Year Policy
1990 96.9 51.0
86.6
1901.3
1899.1
1888.9
2469.3
2473.7
2000
45.6
98.9 52.4
109.5 44.3
87.2 35.3
46.6Synfuels
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TABLE 6
Economic Output and Expenditure
Reference Conservation Synfuels
Real GNP Components
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
1990 Consumption 1235.2 1233.1 1224.2
Investment 283.7 283.6 282.3
GNP 1901.3 1899.1 1888.9
2000 Consumption 1605.6 1607.7 1557.8
Investment 368.0 370.3 359.8
GNP 2469.3 2473.7 2413.3
Composition of Real GNP
(Percent)
1990 Consumption 65.0 64.9 64.8
Investment 14.9 14.9 14.9
GNP 100.0 100.0 100.0
2000 Consumption 65.0 65.0 64.6
Investment 14.9 15.0 14.9
GNP 100.0 100.0 100.0
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on consumption rather than investment, since the price impacts of the synfuels
policy primarily affect consumption and as there is a partially offsetting
boost to investment due to the capital requirements of these technologies.
Later, however, the situation is altered. The proportionate decline in in-
vestment increases under the dynamic influences of the saving and rate of
return effects. The consequent slowing of capital growth accentuates the re-
ductions in real GNP due to the efficiency effects.
For the conservation case, there is again evidence that the burden of
economic losses falls relatively more heavily on consumption. Under the
conservation policy in 1990, consumption absorbs 95.0 percent of the decline
in real GNP with investment accounting for the remainder. However, in the
nineties, the economy realizes efficiency gains from this policy, so that
economic growth over the final decade of the century is slightly higher than
that in the reference case. The recovery, relative to 1990 and the reference
projection, results from the excess of direct policy benefits over the policy
costs. This excess permits the increase in net output and; since capital
formation is one of the main stimulants promoting the increase, investment
necessarily grows in a manner consistent with the expansion in real G.
In comparing macroeconomic performance among the alternative projections,
two of the three possible policy comparisons are straightforward. Over the
entire projection horizon, real GNP is higher under the conservation and
reference case policies than it is with the implementation of the synfuels
programs. The synfuels policy clearly imposes an economic cost in terms of
income and production foregone. Not so obvious, however, is whether the
conservation policy shows overall net economic costs or benefits in comparison
to the reference projection. Therefore, it becomes useful to develop a
measure that represents the policy costs or benefits throughout the entire
27
period 1980 to 2000.
For any two policy cases, a common measure for such representations is
provided by the present value of the differences between indicators of economic
performance. Computationally, this value accumulates annual differences in
economic variables where these are discounted to a near-term reference period
through weights that reflect a social rate of time preference. At a zero
social rate of discount, the present value simply measures the total cumulative
differences. For positive discount rates, the differences occurring in earlier
periods are weighted more heavily than those in later ones. Thus, at selected
discount rates, the present value formulation permits the determination of
overall net policy benefits or costs.
Applying the present value formulation to differences in real GNP yields
the results shown in Table 7. These figures support the conclusion that
the policies underlying the reference and conservation cases are more beneficial
economically than those for the synfuels projection. However, at reasonable
social rates of discount, the conservation policy also involves an economic
cost when viewed from the perspective of the reference projection. Only at
extremely low discount rates does the conservation policy produce net economic
benefits.
The national income accounts give another basis for measuring economic
performance that is, perhaps, a better indicator of economic welfare than is
real GNP. This measure is the sum of real personal consumption and govern-
ment purchases or real private and public consumption. This indicator reflects
the volume of goods and services that society extracts from the economy for
its current use. As the benefit from investment is future consumption and
since this is included in the measure of economic performance, investment is
excluded. Its purpose is to provide output in the future, rather than to
sustain current use. On the other hand, real personal consumption is a direct
28
TABLE 7
The Discounted Net Benefits
of Alternative Energy Policies: GNP Effects*
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
Cases
O'
m 11
Reference vs. Conservation
Reference vs. Synfuels
synfuels vs. Conservation
0.4
-410.0
410.4
Social Discount Rate
5%
-3.7
-200.7
197.0
-106.7
102.4
* Determined as changes between cases in the present value of
real GNP.
10%
-4.3
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use of output for the satisfaction of individual preferences. Government
purchases are a similar use of output except that preferences are revealed
through the political process and are satisfied collectively.
The information in Table 8 was determined by applying the present
value formulation to the differences in real public and private consumption
between the policy cases. The results here are more decisive; neither of the
more active policies is costless when compared to the reference projection.
Under this criterion alone, the conservation policy again is preferred to
the synfuels programs, but the policies of the reference projection are
preferable to both.
The policies also differ in their impact on the. sectoral patterns of
final spending and, hence, the output mix of the economy. Table 9 sum-
marizes the sectoral composition of aggregate demand expenditures for the
policy alternatives. The most noticeable feature of this is energy's share
of final spending. Conservation both promotes and permits traditional energy
expenditures to be redirected toward spending on nonenergy goods and services.
These are concentrated, for the most part, on additional purchases from the
manufacturing and trade and services sectors. Thus, relative to the structures
of final demand for the other projections, energy's share is the smallest and
the shares of manufacturing and trade and services are the largest under the
conservation policy. The synfuels policy, however, substitutes energy from
high cost technologies for that available from lower cost, conventional sources.
The absolute and relative importance of energy in final demand spending is,
therefore, larger for this projection. The imposition of more expensive energy
requires a redirection of expenditures on nonenergy goods and services toward
energy purchases; this is diametric to the impact of the conservation policy.
The mix of inputs into production provides the final basis for comparing
-C c CIIIIPIC
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TABLE 8
The Discounted Net Benefits
of Alternative Energy Policies: Consumption Effects*
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
Cases Social Discount Rate
0%
Reference vs. Conservation
Reference vs. Synfuels
Synfuels vs. Conservation
-10.3
-353.7
343.4
5%/m 10%
-8.2
-173.6
-6.2
-92.5
165.4 86.3
* Determined as changes between cases in the present value of real
consumption plus government expenditures.
I
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TABLE 9
Aggregate Final Demand Expenditures
Reference Conservation Synfuels
Purchases
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
1990 Agriculture, Non-fuel
Mining, Construction 173.0 172.5 i Z1.6
Manufacturing 522.0 522.4 517.0
Transportation 66.1 66.0 65.0
Services 1157.2 1167.0 1146.8
Energy 77.8 59.6 83.0
2000 Agriculture, Non-Fuel
Mining, Construction 213.6 212.6 208.8
Manufacturing 704.1 706.4 687.8
Transportation 102.1 99.6 99.6
Services 1540.7 1559.0 1509.7
Energy 81.9 63.0 83.0
Composition of Purchases
(Percent)
1990 Agriculture, Non-Fuel
Mining, Construction 8.67 8.68 8.65
Manufacturing 26.15 26.28 26.07
Transportation 3.31 3.32 3.28
Services 57.97. 58.72 57.82
Energy 3.90 3.00 4.18
2000 Agriculture, Non-Fuel
Mining, Construction 8.08 8.05 8.07
Manufacturing 26.65 26.75 26.57
Transportation 3.86 3.77 3.85
Services 58.31 59.04 58.31
Energy 3.10 2.39 3.21
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the three cases. The input-output coefficients for capital, labor, energy,
and intermediate materials are presented and compared in Tables 10 through
12. In all cases, the general trend is for the economy to grow continually
more capital intensive and less intensive in the use of labor and energy.
However, the magnitude of the changes differs significantly, depending an
the policy being considered. According to these results, the common percep-
tion that conservation stimulates employment is contradicted. By the end of
the century, the conservation case is the least labor intensive, whereas it
is the synfuels policy that leads to the greatest labor intensity of aggre-
gate output. Also, the rate of increase in the amount of capital per worker
is largest in the conservation case, followed next by the reference projection.
Since this is an important factor contributing to the advance of gross labor
productivity, it follows that the greatest benefits in this area arise from
the conservation policy. The synfuels policy, given this measure, is the
least favorable to the rate of advance of gross labor productivity. Finally,
the rate of improvement in the energy efficiency of capital is largest for
the conservation case and smallest for the synfuels policy.
These influences of the policies on the input structure of the economy
result from several considerations. First, the policies require a withdrawal
of productive resources from other activities within the economy. Simultaneous-
ly, they promote the substitution of new energy production techniques so that
resources originally dedicated to producing conventional supplies are released.
As indicated, the net withdrawals under the synfuels policy are substantially
larger than those associated with the conservation policy. Finally, the new
levels and structures of final spending under the policies are consistent only
with reconfigured input patterns. With equilibrium a requirement in each factor
market, these changes influence the relative price structure and, so, further
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TABLE 10
Input-Output Coefficients for Aggregate Output
Factor
Capital, K
Labor, L
Energy, E
Materials, M.
Reference Case
.1789
.2077
.0289
.5844
Conservation
.1794
.2072
.0272
.5862
Case Percent Change
0.28
-0.24
-5.88
0.31
Percent Change
(1980-1990)
2000
Percent Change
(1990-2000)
-m
Capital, K 18.87 19.20
Labor, L -8.62 -8.84
Energy, E -7.96 -13.38
Materials, M -1.08 -0.78
Capital, K .2044 .2041 -0.15
Labor, L .1829 .1815 -0.77-
Energy, E .0279 .0267 -4.30
Materials, M .5848 .5876 0.48
Capital, K
Labor, L
Energy, E
Materials, M
14.25
-11.94
-3.46
0.07
13.77
-12.40
-1.84
0.24
Year
1990
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TABLE 11
Coefficients for Aggregate Output
Factor
Capitla, K
Labor, L
Energy, E
Materials, M
Reference Case
.1789
.2077
.0289
.5844
Synfuels Case
.1793
.2080
.0298
.5829
Percent Case
0.22
0.14
3.11
-0.26
.Percent Change
(1980-1990)
2000
Percent Change
(1990-2000)
Capital, K 18.87 19.14
Labor, L -8.62 . -8.49
Energy, E -7.96 -5.10
Materials, M -1.08 -1.34
Capital, K .2044 .2052 0.39
Labor, L .1829 .1845 0.87
Energy, E .0279 .0283 1.43
Materials, M .5848 .5819 -0.50
Capital, K
Labor, L
Energy, E
Materials, M
14.25
-11.94
-3.46
0.07
14.45
-11.30
-5.03
-0.17
Year
1990
35
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TABLE 12
Coefficients for Agaregate Output
Factor
Capital, K
Labor, L
Energy, E
Materials, M
Synfuels Case
.1793
.2080
.0298
.5829
Conservation Case Percent Chane
.1794
.2072
.0272
.5862
0.06
-0.38
-8.72
0.57
Percent Change
(1980-1990)
2000
Percent Change
(1990-2000)
Capital, K 19.14 19.20
Labor, L -8.49 -8.84
Energy, E -5.10 -13.38
Materials, M -1.34 -0.78
Capital, K .2052 .2041 -0.54
Labor, L. .1845 .1815 -1.63
Energy, E .0283 .0267 -5.65
Materials, M .5819 .5876 0.98
Capital, K
Labor, L
Energy, E
Materials, M
14.45
-11.30
-5.03
-0.17
13.77
-12.40
-1.84
0.24
Year
1990
_ yy y
__
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affect input decisions. The interactions, however, continue from these
adjustments, insofar as the pattern of input choices has an impact on macro-
economic performance.
The reciprocals of the input-output coefficients, i.e., total output per
unit of input, represent measures of net productivity. Over the entire-pro-
jection horizon, the productivities of labor and energy rise the most in the
conservation case and the least in the snfuels case. Also, the conservation
policy causes the slowest rate of decline in capital productivity, while the
synfuels policy imposes the largest decrease. These differences in factor
productivities contribute materially to the macroeconomic impacts that result
from the introduction of these policies.
For the alternative energy policies, the principal comparative conclusions
regarding the growth and structure of the U.S. economy are su=arized as
follows:
· the policies have a significant effect on the output and input structures
of the economy with energy changes being both the motivating force and
the dominant impact;
* positive economic growth at steadily declining rates continues under
either the synfuels or the conservation policies;
* both policies when compared to the reference projection are seen to
impose an economic cost in terms of income and production foregone.
However, conservation's impact on macroeconomic performance is neither
large nor permanent and is significantly less than that imposed by
the synfuels policy;
* over the long run, the conservation policy has a favorable effect on
both gross labor and net factor productivities, whereas the reverse
is true for the synfuels policy.
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IV. THE INFLUENCE OF ENERGY POLICY REPRESENTATIONS
ON ECONOMIC PERFORmaNCE: A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The measured economic impacts from the synfuels and conservation policies
a- are conditional on the specific policy representations introduced into the
reference projection. The importance of this dependency is bidirectional.
First, for policies of this scale, the interdependencies of the energy, economic,
and environmental systems are such that factors affecting one system lead to
reciprocating interactions among all systems. Second, variations in the
economic effects associated with alternative policy representations and their
repercussions alter the comparative advantages of policies with respect to
their success in attaining national energy, economic, and environmental ob-
jectives. Thus, it is important to examine the sensitivity of the impacts on
economic performance to variations in the policy representations.
The macroeconomic results in the subsequent assessments are determined
from the application of only the DJA economic model to alternative policy
specifications. In performing these analyses, energy-economy interactions
were not considered. The results are indicative of only the direction
of change (partial equilibrium) rather than the absolute magnitude of change
(general equilibrium), since the fully integrated BNL/DJA model system was
not employed. The information determined in this manner is sufficient for
approximating the sensitivity of the economic effects to policy variations.
But, for the design and evaluation of energy policy, the completeness of
detail (energy, economy, and environmental) afforded by the integrated
BNL/DJA methodology is necessary.
The economic effects of conservation depend on the timing of conservation
expenditures, the pattern of energy savings by fuel type, and the effectiveness
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of conservation policy.
The first of these refers to the annualization schemes applied to the
cost information from the CSA program documentation. The annualized policy
costs for conservation were developed from the total discounted public and
private expenditures associated with each subprogram. This process involved
three steps. First, the undiscounted conservation expenditures were determined
for each subprogram in each of the years, 1981-2000. These then were allocated
between investment goods purchases and labor services expenditures. Finally,
the stream of annual investment purchases was converted into a capital services
series to reflect the permanency of services available from undepreciated capital.
The annual expenditures for capital and labor services constitute the
direct policy costs of energy conservation. These claims are measured against
the release of those productive inputs that formerly were required for energy
production. For the conservation analysis just presented, resource claims
exceeded releases through the early nineties whereas the converse was true
thereafter. The effects of this were to lower and raise the level of real
economic activity (relative to the reference case) in the years 1990 and
2000, respectively.
The step most critical to the above determination is the annualization
of the total discounted cost information. Given the nature of discounting,
a greater concentration of annual expenditures in the earlier years implies
a smaller cumulative cost, i.e., the sum of the annual, undiscounted costs
over the life of the policy. Conversely, the cumulative policy cost of
conservation increases the more the annual costs are deferred into the future.
There are additional implications associated with the timing of the energy
savings. If annual expenditures are concentrated in the nearer term, then
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the direct policy costs substantially exceed the direct benefits, i.e.,
the valuation of energy savings, in those years. However, in later periods,
this situation is reversed because of lower cumulative and annual policy
costs. If the annual expenditures are deferred, then there is relatively
more congruence between the incidence of cost and the realization of bene-
fits. There even exists the possibility of positive net direct benefits in
the earlier years, though this is at the expense of potentially significant
net costs in the future. Thus, with no modifications to either the discounted
policy costs or the energy savings, changes in the time pattern and, hence,
the magnitude of conservation expenditures affect whether the policy imposes
a net economic cost or leads to a net economic benefit. These variations
also affect the time horizon over which net costs are incurred or net benefits
are realized. That is, they affect the timing of benefits and costs as
measured by increases and decreases from the reference case levels of real
GNP in 1990 and 2000.
For each subprogram, one of three distributional rules or patterns was
selected to annualize the total expenditure data: the uniform, the constant
rate of growth, and the trapezoidal. Of these, only the latter two are im-
portant to the sensitivity analyses. The programs to which the uniform dis-
tribution was applied have virtually no private sector content. Consequently,
a reliable time pattern of expenditure is provided in the CSA program
materials.
The pattern characterizing the constant rate of growth subprograms is
one in which expenditures grow approximately in proportion to energy savings.
In applying this rule, an allowance is made for unit cost reductions from
increased market penetrations and economies of scale in consumption.
Table 13 shows the effects on the total annual resource claims of doubling
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TABLE 13
Effects on Total Annual Policy Costs
of Varying the Expenditure Growth Rates
for the Constant Rate of Growth Subprograms
Total Resource Claims
Case Number Policy Variation Due to Conservation Policy
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
1990 2000
Original Specification 14.2 24.2
I Double Growth Rates 12.7 40.6
II Halve Growth Rates 14.7 16.6
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and halving the expenditure growth rates for these conservation subprograms.
A doubling of the growth rates implies that the unit costs of energy from
these conservation activities rises over time. Thus, total annual conserv-
ation expenditures are moved forward in time and increased with the result
that the levels of real GNP would be higher in 1990 and lower in 2000 than
those obtained for the original specification. It is possible that, at
reasonable social discount rates, policy variations of this type lead to
net economic benefits when compared to the reference projection. A halving
of the growth rates has the opposite effect. Here, annual conservation ex-
penditures are lowered and biased toward the nearer term, thereby further
lowering real GNP in 1990 and raising it in 2000. The effect of this type
of policy variation could be to exacerbate the net economic cost originally
observed.
The trapezoidal distribution is selected for subprograms that initially
require increasing R, D, and D expenditures which level off for some length
of time as the product or service provided by the program increases its
penetration or effectiveness, or nears commercialization. These intervals
are followed by a period of decreasing unit costs resulting from productiv-
ity advances in the provision of energy services from conservation. This
distribution mechanism is applicable to subprograms for which the most likely
expenditure pattern is concentrated toward the earlier years.
There are several parameters for the trapezoidal distributions that
can be varied to affect the time pattern and levels of conservation out-
lays. These include the lengths of the growth, uniform, and decline inter-
vals and the rates of expenditure growth and decline occurring in the first
and last of these periods.
Table 14 shows the impacts on the total annual conservation expendi-
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TABLE 14
Effects on Total Annual Policy Costs
of Varying the Time Intervals for
the Trapezoidal Subprograms
Total Resource Claims
Policy Variation Due to Conservation Policy
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
1990 2000
Original Specification 14.2 24.2
Shorten Growth Period,
Lengthen Decline Period 12.4 22.6
Shorten Uniform Period,
Lengthen Growth Period 16.1 25.8
Shorten Decline Period,
Lengthen Growth Period 15.5 26.8
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tures that result from varying the lengths of the periods. In the first
of these variants, the growth and decline periods were shortened and
lengthened, respectively. The effect of this is to spread a reduced level
of. total expenditures more evenly over time. As the total annual policy costs
for 1990 and 2000 are lower than those for the original specification the
resultant levels of GNP would be higher. For the second of these cases,
the period of increasing expenditures was lengthened at the expense of the
uniform period. This enlarges the original level and fraction of total
conservation expenditures that occur over the decline period and, so, leads
to higher unit costs in the future. Expenditures are, therefore, higher in
both 1990 and 2000 and these increased annual claims would serve to increase
the net economic costs of conservation policy. In-the finalvariation of
this type, the growth period was lengthened and the decline period was
shortened. This has the same impact as the previous case, though to lesser
and greater degrees in 1990 and 2000, respectively.
In Table 15 , the effects of changes in the growth and decline parameters
of the trapezoidal distributions are illustrated. Here four cases are
considered: doubling the growth and decline rates; halving the growth and
decline rates; doubling the growth rates and halving the decline rates; halving
the growth rates and doubling the decline rates. Doubling or halving both the
growth and decline rates has the effect of biasing the expenditures toward
the nearer or longer term, respectively. In addition, the respective cumulative
costs for these policy cases are smaller and larger. Compared to the original
analysis, the doubling case could worsen the macroeconomic cost of conserva-
tion whereas the reverse could be true in the case of halving the
rates. Doubling the growth rates and halving the decline rates moves more
of the increased total expenditures into the future with the effect of
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TABLE 15
Effects on Total Annual Policy Costs
of Varying the Expenditure Growth and
Decline Rates for the Trapezoidal Subprograms
Total Resource Claims
Policy Variation Due to Conservation Policy
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
1990 2000
Original Specification 14.2 24.2
Double Growth and Decline Rates 15.8 22.4
Halve Growth and Decline Rates 13.2 25.4
Double Growth Rates,
Halve Decline Rates 14.7 27.0
Halve Growth Rates,
Double Decline Rates 13.9 21.7
-- - --- 
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increasing the claims of conservation in 1990 and 2000. In this instance,
real GP would be lower than originally determined and the net economic cost
of the policy would be higher. Finally, halving the growth rate and doubling
the decline rate has precisely the opposite effect.
However, for the trapezoidal distributions, it is combinations of these
variations that are of interest. In comparing the cost implications of the
possible combinations of cases, three variations are identified as capable
of providing relatively larger deviations from the pattern of economic growth
in the original conservation projection. Two of these variations are extreme
points in that they produce the largest changes in the original policy costs
for both 1990 and 2000. Other combinations of interest are those for which
the policy variation exerts a strong influence on the cost in one period
without producing offsetting effects in the other period. Of these, only
one provides more extreme policy cost effects in any period than those for
the other two specifications. The annual policy cost information for these
three variations is summarized in Table 16. For the first and last of these
cases, the net economic cost of conservation would be lower and higher, respec-
tively, than that for the original projection. In the instance of the
second policy variation, the adverse macroeconomic impact would be larger
as the annual policy cost for 1990 is significantly higher and that for
2000 is virtually unchanged. It is interesting to note that, for the year
2000, none of these variations lead to more significant changes in policy
costs than do the parametric modifications to the constant rate of growth
subprograms.
The previous assessments established the sensitivity of the total annual
costs of conservation policy to sequential changes in the annualization para-
meters of the constant rate of growth and trapezoidal distributions. In
I . ... .
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TABLE 16
Effects on Total Annual Policy Costs
of Combined Variations
for the Trapezoidal Subprograms
Total Resource Claims
Case Number Policy Variation Due to Conservation Policy
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
1990 2000
Original Specification ' 14.2 24.2
III Halve Growth Rate,
Double Decline Rate,
Shorten Growth Period,
Lengthen Decline Period 11.6 20.7
IV Double Growth and
Decline Rates,
Shorten Uniform Period,
Lenghten Growth Period 20.1 24.1
V Double Growth Rate,
Halve Decline Rate,
Shorten Decline Period,
Lengthen Growth Period 16.8 30.8
4 V
.t
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addition, indications were given as to the directional influence of these
isolated changes on economic performance. As the logical final step of this
analysis, therefore, it is important again to combine policy cases and to
examine more explicitly the economic effects associated with these recon-
figurations. Table 17 shows the effects on real GNP and the total resource
claims of conservation from alternative policy representations. These re-
flect the simultaneous introduction of changes to the parameters of both
distributional schemes. It can be seen that, with no modifications to
either the total discounted policy costs or the energy savings, there are
wide variations in the pattern of economic growth. Equally significant
are the cumulative economic effects of temporal variations in the expendi-
ture levels and patterns. The discounted net benefits of conservation
policy are presented in Table 18. From this, the policy can be seen to
impose a macroeconomic cost as large as $(1972) 193 bn or lead to an over-
all net economic benefit of $(1972) 114 bn. Again, these are conditional
only on variations in the timing and annual levels of the policy costs.
The purpose of the preceding analysis was to investigate the sensi-
tivity of the economic consequences of conservation policy to the assumptions
that most influence the representation of that policy. Variations in the
annualization parameters for the conservation subprograms affected the
timing and annual levels of conservation outlays and the cumulative policy
cost incurred over the entire projection horizon. These changes, in turn,
were seen to have a significant impact on the pattern of economic growth
and, hence, on the relative economic merits of the conservation strategy.
However, even the case least advantageous to conservation is significantly
less damaging to the economy in view of the $(1972) 410 bn cumulative net
cost determined for the ynfuels policy.
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TABLE 18
The Discounted Net Benefits
of Conservation Policy*
(Billions of 1972 Dollars)
Case Number**
0%
Original Conservation
Specification
VI
VII
VIII
X
XI
0.4
-39.3
-185.2
-192.8
113.5
-30.1
-37.2
Social Discount Rate
5X
-3.7
-12.4
-93.8
-89.9
49.5
-30.6
-26.6
* Determined as changes in the present value of real GNP measured
from the reference projection.
**Numbers refer to policy variations on Table
10%
-4.3
-2.5
-51.7
-45.2
22.7
-25.6
-19.1
I I I I
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The second major area of sensitivity for the conservation policy con-
cerns the division of energy savings among petroleum, natural gas, and
electricity. Variations in the pattern of these savings can affect signifi-
cantly the timing and magnitude of net benefits or costs. In terms of their
real input claims on the economy, electricity, petroleum, and natural gas
are the most, second most, and least expensive, respectively. Consequently,
the more electricity that is displaced through conservation, the larger
(smaller) are the net economic benefits (costs) from conservation policy.
To illustrate this, three alternatives to the original conservation projec-
tion were specified. The total amount of primary energy savings is the
same for all cases. Further, the displacement of petroleum and, hence,
the value of this displacement is the same for the three alternatives.
The differences among them center on the allocation of nonpetroleum savings
to crude natural gas and electricity inputs. These differences lead to dif-
ferences in the total quantity and mix of the delivered energy that is con-
served. More importantly, the configurations are different with respect
to the total value and input composition of the resources released from energy
production. In the first of these cases, the nonpetroleum energy savings
are biased toward the conservation of inputs to electricity. In the second
case, the nonpetroleum primary energy savings are divided equally between
natural gas and electricity. In the third alternative, the gas-electricity
split of the first case was reversed so that most of the conservation was
allocated to the savings of utility gas. The macroeconomic impacts and net
policy benefits for these alternatives are shown in Table 19 . The policy
implication of these results is clear. In designing conservation policies
that promote jointly national energy, economic, and environmental objec-
tives, the net economic benefits are greatest (or, the costs are least) for
r
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strategies that place relative emphasis on substitutions away from petroleum
and electricity.
Finally, for conservation, there is the issue of policy effectiveness.
The controllable instrument for this policy is represented by the government
outlays associated with each conservation subprogram. The desired effect of
the public expenditure and programs is to motivate the private sector to
redirect its purchases toward conservation activities. This ultimately
provides the energy savings and, hence, the direct and indirect economic
benefits (or, costs) from conservation policy. However, the levels of
private expenditure and the resultant energy savings that are realized from
the government incentives are the outputs of the policy. As such, they are,
to some extent, uncontrollable. For the given levels of public and private
expenditure, the energy savings could be significantly less than anticipated;
conversely, the anticipated energy savings might be attained only at a sub-
stantially higher cost. To examine the economic consequences of these, two
cases are considered. In the first, the energy savings achieved for the
given levels of total expenditure were taken to be half those obtained in the
original assessment. The mix of these savings, however, was unaffected. For
the second case, the original levels and mix of energy savings were presumed
to be attained at double the original cost. Both of these cases have the
effect of increasing by twofold the unit cost of energy from conservation.
But, their economic impacts will differ as each case implies a different
structural mix and level of resource claims and releases due to conservation
policy. The effects on real GNP and the discounted net benefits of these
variations are presented in Table 20. Doubling the policy cost has approxi-
mately twice the impact as does halving the energy savings. As indicated,
this difference is attributable to the level and compositional implications
of these changes. More important, however, is the comparison of the effects
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of these variations to the results for the synfuels policy. For the net
economic costs of the two policies to be equal requires either a doubling of
the unit cost of energy from conservation or the virtual elimination of any
energy savings for the given levels of effort.
However, this issue of effectiveness also extends to the synfuels
policy. In developing the synfuels projection, the input requirements for
each technology were time invariant. No consideration was given to cost
reductions due to learning effects, technical improvements, economies of
scale, or other types of productivity advance. Changes in the costs of
fuels from the synthetic and unconventional sources can affect significantly
the net economic cost associated with this policy. Three variations are
considered: a doubling of the synfuels costs, a halving of these costs, and
the situation in which synfuels are competitive with the energy from con-
servation. Table 21 presents the impacts on economic performance and net
policy benefits resulting from these changes. These results clearly demon-
strate the benefit potential of directing the synfuel programs toward the
promotion of accelerated cost reduction rather than accelerated commercial
deployment. Reducing the costs of these fuels to the point at which they
are competitive with the energy from conservation more than halves the adverse
macroeconomic impact of the synfuels policy.
That there still is a significant economic cost, as compared to conserv-
ation, results from two considerations. First, the mix of energy displace-
ments and its valuation are substantially different between the two policies.
The synfuels policy is not directed toward the displacement of energy, in
general, or electricity, in particular. Rather, its focus is the production
of petroleum and gas products by means other than importation. The effect
of this can be inferred from the analysis of the pattern of energy savings,
by fuel type, from conservation. As little electricity is displaced,
r - -
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the synfuels policy imposes a net cost on the economy that is direc-
tionally the same as was observed for conservation with a natural gas bias
(Table 19 ). Second, and more important, there are large differences in the
composition of the resource claims, i.e., policy costs, between the two
policies. For the same unit cost of energy, the synfuels policy is
relatively more capital and less labor intensive than the conservation policy.
The process of capital formation is crucial to economic growth and, thus,
factors that affect relatively more have a relatively larger impact on
economic performance. Since the synfuels policy involves a relatively
larger diversion of capital service inputs from other productive uses, its
economic consequence is larger than that for conservation, even though the
unit costs of energy are the same.
These assessments show that there are reasonable circumstances under
which the comparative economic advantage of the conservation policy over the
synfuels policy begins to erode. However, for the synfuels policy to be
judged economically superior to conservation requires relatively extreme
combinations of policy assumptions biased against demand reduction and in
favor of supply expansion. Overall, there is strong analytical evidence that
supports active programs for energy conservation and continued R, D, and D
efforts for synthetic and unconventional fuels.
.*
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V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The results from this analysis yield important implications for
the focus and direction of U.S. energy policy. Each strategy succeeds in
reducing the nation's import dependence and slowing the growth in energy
demand. In the reference projection, the influences of import quotas and
domestic oil and gas price decontrol result in a halving of oil imports
relative to the current levels of approximately 8 million barrels per day.
These influences also serve to slow the rate of growth of primary energy
consumption to well under 2.0 percent per annum and promote a shift in
energy use patterns toward a greater utilization of coal. The introduction
of the conservation or the synfuels policy reduces further U.S. import
requirements with the conservation policy being slightly more effective.
Under the conservation policy, oil imports are reduced from the reference
case levels by 3.5 and 8.4 quads for the years 1990 and 2000, respectively.
The corresponding reductions for the synfuels policy are 3.2 and 7.0 quads.
Either of these policies permit the almost total elimination of imports by
the year 2000. From conservation, there is the additional benefit that
the growth in aggregate primary energy demand is virtually halted. For the
years 1990 and 2000, total primary energy savings from conservation are 10.3
and 22.3 quads, respectively. However, even the large-scale introduction
of synthetic fuels results in only marginally higher primary energy consump-
tion than in the reference case, being only 2.0 and 2.9quads higher in the
respective years. Thus, to different degrees, energy conservation is evident
under all three of the strategies.
It is in the environmental and economic areas that the strategies most
differ. For the environment, an ordering of the strategies indicates that
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substantial environmental benefits are obtainable from energy conservation.
In addition to the emissions reductions associated with the decreased use
of petroleum and natural gas, there are significant improvements in environ-
mental quality attributable to the slower growth of total coal consumption
and nuclear inputs into electric generation. Relative to the reference
projection, future nuclear power requirements are decreased by 30.0 to 40.0
percent due to the successes of the conservation programs. Also, by 2000,
conservation has led to a 9.1 quad reduction in annual coal use, down almost
20.0 percent from the reference case amount. The energy reductions from
conservation provide important benefits in the forms of less damage to land,
improvements in air and water quality, and increased public health and
safety. However, these benefits are increasingly lost in moving to the
policies that characterize the reference and synfuels projections, respec-
tively.
For the economy, the introduction of the synfuels policy imposes a
significant net economic cost. Real GNP is projected to be $(1972) 1888.9
bn and $(1972) 2413.3 bn for the years 1990 and 200 respectively. The
growth in real GNP is lower for this case than for either the reference or
or the conservation projections. Relative to the former, the synfuels
policy results in a cumulative macroeconomic cost between $(1972) 410.0 bn
and 107.0, depending on the choice of discount rate.
The conservation results are mixed. Relative to the reference pro-
jection, the conservation policy leads to lower [$(1972) 199.1 bn versus
1901.3] and higher [$C1972) 2473.7 bn versus 2469.3] levels of economic
activity in the years 1990 and 2000, respectively. When discounting these
annual real GNP differences, the conservation policy provides cumulative
net economic benefits only at extremely low social rates of discount, e.g.,
* 1 b
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$(1972) 0.4 bn at a zero discount rate. At more reasonable discount rates,
e.g., 5.0 or 10.0 percent, conservation results in a cumulative net economic
cost of less than $(1972) 5.0 bn.
From these comparisons, it is clear that conservation, even in isola-
tion from other policies, can play a major role in alleviating the liquids
problem and slowing the growth of energy demand. These are achieved at only
a small macroeconomic cost and with substantial environmental benefits.
Further, conservation compares favorably to the synfuels policy. It is
slightly more successful in reducing imports and provides the only mechanism
for reducing demand growth. Relative to the reference projection, there
are environmental costs from the synfuels policy whereas, with conservation,
there are significant improvements in environmental quality. Finally, the
relative impacts on economic performance are much less severe from conserva-
tion policy than from the synfuels program.
These conclusions do not deny a benefit potential from current synfuels
policies. Nor should they be interpreted as advocating a de-escalation of
supply expansion programs. The favorable economic results for conservation
policy as compared to synfuels are directly attributable to the policy costs
of each program. In terms of only the program costs, the conservation policy
provides energy at a lower cost than that of the fuels it displaces. The
converse is true for the synfuels policy. For example, the 1990, cost of
energy from conservation is $(1978) 2.10 per million Btu while the cost of
energy from synfuels is $(1978) 5.25 per million Btu. This suggests that
synfuels programs directed toward cost reduction and the resolution of
environmental issues are more appropriate than those that promote the ac-
celerated commercial deployment of current technologies.
I t .I
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The measured impacts on economic performance that were determined for
the policy cases are sensitive to, inter alia, the actual policy representa-
tions introduced into the reference projection. The economic effects of
conservation depend on the timing of conservation expenditures, the pattern
of energy savings by fuel type, and the effectiveness of conservation policy.
The first of these refers to the annualization schemes applied to the
cost information from the CSA program documentation. Changes in the time
pattern and, hence, the cumulative and annual magnitudes of conservation
expenditures affect whether the policy imposes a net economic cost or leads
to a net economic.benefit. These variations also affect the time horizons
over which net costs are incurred or net benefits are realized, i.e., the
timing of benefits and costs as measured by increases and decreases from
the reference case levels of real GNP in 1990 and 2000. However, in vary-
ing the annualization parameters, even the case that is least advantageous
to the conservation policy imposes a significantly more moderate cost on the
economy than does the synfuels policy. In fact for this case, the cumulative
macroeconomic cost is less than half of that for the synfuels policy [$(1972)
193.0 bn versus 410.0].
The second area of sensitivity for the conservation policy concerns the
division of energy savings among petroleum, natural gas, and electricity.
Variations in the pattern of these savings can affect the timing and magni-
tude of net economic benefits or costs. As electricity is relatively more
expensive in terms of its input claims on the economy, the more electricity
that is displaced through conservation, the greater the net economic
benefits from conservation policy. Cimulative economic benefits were deter-
mined to be as high as $(1972) 96.0 bn when the nonpetroleum energy savings
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were directed toward the conservation of electricity inputs. Alternatively,
an economic cost of $(1972) 28.0 bn was observed for the situation in which
natural gas dominated the nonpetroleun energy savings. Thus, in designing
conservation policies that promote jointly national energy, economic, and
environmental objectives, the net economic benefits are greatest (or, the
costs are least) from strategies that place relative emphasis on substitutions
away from petroleum and electricity.
Finally, there is the issue of the effectiveness of conservation policy.
The controllable instrument for conservation policy is represented by the
programmed expenditure of public funds. The public expenditures and pro-
grams, in turn, motivate the private sector to redirect expenditure patterns
toward conservation activities. These ultimately provide the energy savings
from conservation. However, the levels of private expenditure and the
resultant energy savings are outputs of the policy and, to some extent, are
uncontrollable. For the given expenditures, the energy savings could be
significantly less than anticipated; conversely, the anticipated energy
savings might be attained only at a substantially higher cost. An analysis
of this suggests that only extreme increases in conservation costs or
reductions in anticipated energy savings lead to a macroeconomic cost of
similar magnitude to that incurred with the synfuels program. More specific-
ally, for the economic damages from conservation policy to equal those from
the synfuels policy requires either a doubling of the costs of conservation
programs or the virtual elimination of any energy savings.
However, the issue of policy effectiveness also extends to the synfuels
policy. In developing this projection, the capital and labor costs for each
synfuels technology were assumed to be invariant over time. No consideration
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was given to cost reductions due to learning effects, technical improvement,
economies of scale, or other types of productivity advance. Cost reductions
for the synthetic and unconventional fuels technologies can reduce dramatic-
ally the net economic cost associated with this policy. In fact, reducing
the costs of these fuels to the point at which they are competitive with the
energy provided from conservation more than halves the adverse macroeconomic
impact from the synfuels policy. In this situation, the remaining
differences in the economic consequences of the two policies are attributable
to the different mixes of energy displacements and structural differences in
the capital and labor composition of policy costs.
Thus, there are reasonable circumstances under which the conservation
and synfuels policies become less and more favorable, respectively. In
these cases and in terms of macroeconomic effects, the decisive comparative
advantage of conservation over synfuels begins to erode. However, for syn-
fuels to be judged economically superior to conservation requires relatively
extreme combinations of policy assumptions biased against demand reduction
and for supply expansion.
As the principal implication evidenced by these analytical results,
active programs for energy conservation and continued R, D, and D support
for synthetic and unconventional fuels belong as integral components of
future U.S. energy policy.
, . .
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Introduction
President Carter has proposed an ambitious plan to reduce our
dependence on imported oil by 4.5 million barrels per day by 1990.
Assuming that the price of imported crude oil is $50 per barrel in
1990, which is a conservative estimate, this oil import reduction
would reduce our import bill by $82 billion. This large'a potential
swing in our nominal trade balance would reverse the downward pressure
on the dollar and could return the international value of the dollar
to its 1973 levels.
To'accomplish the 4.5 million barrel per day (MSBD0) reduction
in U.S. dependence on foreign oil by 1990, the President has proposed
spending $117 billion dollars of government funds over the next
decade. Since the proposed windfall profit tax on deregulated U.S.
oil production is expected to yield in excess of 140 billion during
the same period, this spending can be financed without other tax
increases. Although energy experts.are uncertain that the President's
objectives can be attained by 1990, they have indicated that the
objectives are at least feasible.
The major issue, however, is not whether the President's objectives
can be accomplished, but whether we should pursue these objectives.
The arguments in favor of subsidizing new energy supplies and/or
energy conservation and conversion stress economic security and
international balance of payments improvement while the arguments
against stress losses in economic efficiency if these subsidies are
employed.
!
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Given the potential for political instability in the Persian
Gulf states over the next decade, the likelihood of oil supply dis-
ruptions even worse than our 1974 and 1979 experiences is quite
high. The current situation in Iran could produce such a disrupt-
tion and, over the next decade, political upheaval'in even
Saudi Arabia is not implausible. We have recently.completed
a study for Department of Energy in which we examined the effects
of supply disruptions on the U.S. economy under the polar assumptions
the Carter energy plan was implemented and successful versus no
energy plan (a net difference in oil demand of 4.5 MMBD). While
the study is still incomplete, the percentage reduction in real GNP
as a result of a given interruption is signicantly less under the
Carter energy plan scenario.
Most of this paper is devoted to a consideration of the imple-
mentation of the Carter energy plan and the implications for the
U.S. balance of payments is a major result. A marked improvement
in the U.S. balance of payments position removes the current constraints
dn monetary policy (permits an easier money policy) and-results in
appreciation of the dollar which, in turn, contributes significantly
to bringing the inflation rate down.
The efficiency arguments against subsidizing the production
of synthetic fuels imply that such a program would lead to a misalloca-
tion of resources, lower growth, and higher inflation. This argument
usually starts with the assumption of efficient allocation of resources
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in the absence of subsidies. Given that crude oil supplies and
prices are determined by a monopoly (OPEC) and that the conclusion
that resources will be efficiently allocated by the market requires
the assumption of a perfectly competitive market, the extent of
the negative effect of subsidies or efficiency is uncertain.
In the remainder of this paper, I address the macroeconomic
impacts of implementing the Carter energy plan. The Wharton Annual
Model is used to perform this analysis. The results are contrasted
to a baseline (Control Solution) which incorporates domestic oil
price decontrol (by October 1981) and natural gas price decontrol
(by the end of 1985).
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Energy Plan Details -and Implied Scenario AssumDtions
By 1990, the new energy plan calls for an increase in domestic
oil and natural gas production (from conventional and synthetic
sources) of the equivalent of 3.0 million barrels per day (MMBD)
and a reduction n oil consumption (through conservation and con-
version to coal and natural gas) of 1.5 million barrels per day
(MMBD).
The composition of the incremental supply is as follows:
1) 2.0 to 3.0 MMBD resulting from subsidies, loan
guarantees, product price guarantees, etc. of
the Energy Security Corporation.
a) Natural gas from tight sands, shale, and
coal seams: 0.5 to 1.0 MMBD
b) Natural gas from biomass: 0.1 MMBD
c) Shale oil: 0.4 MMBD
d) Synthetic crude oil, natural gas, and
methane from coal and/or alcohol from
grains: 1.0 to 1.5 MMBD
2) Eliminate price controls on hard-to-get crude oil
(heavy oil) with no windfall profits tax: 0.5
MMBD
3) Tax credit of 50 cents per thousand cubic feet
of natural gas produced from tight sands and other
hard-to-get sources (excluding that produced with
a subsidy from the Energy Security Corporation):
no estimate given for potential supply response;
assumed to be 0.5 MMBD.
Our interpretation of the total potential supply increase by 1990 by
type of fuel (in MMBD equivalents) is as follows:
!
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Low High
1) Natural Gas 1.0 1.5
2)- Heavy Oil (California) 0.5 0.5
3) Shale Oil 0.4 0.4
4) Biomass (Natural Gas) 0.1 0.1
.5) Synthetic Fuels 1.0 1.5
3.0 4.0
In the analysis below, we have taken the low estimates for all
energy supplies. Further, we have assumed all synthetic fuels are
produced from coal and are liquid fuels. Introducing alcohol from
grains would complicate the scenario substantially but assuming that
natural gas (methanol) is produced from coal, in addition to liquids,
would not alter the results.
The oil demand reduction of 1.5 ;'iBoD is to be accomplished as
follows:
.1) 0.5 MBD resulting from residential and commer-
cial conservation and conversion to natural gas
heating. This is to be aided by a direct federal
subsidy and by loans from utilities to customers.
2) 0.25 MMBD resulting from greater use of mass
transit and more efficient automobile engines.
This is to be aided by direct federal aid for
local transit systems and subsidized auto engine
research.
3) 0.75 MMBD resulting from electric utility conver-
sion from oil to coal and/or nuclear. We have
assumed conversion to coal only. This is to be
aided by loan subsidies and/or guarantees by the
federal government.
The President proposed spending $142.1 billion dollars allocated
as follows:
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1) $88 billion by the Energy Security Corporation
2) $10 billion for mass transit
3) $6.5 billion for improved auto efficiency
4) $5.0 billion for utility loans
5) $3.5 billion for the Solar Bank (solar energy
research)
6) $2.0 billion tax credit for hard-to-get natural
gas
7) $2.0 billion for residential/commercial conserva-
--.. tion and conversion to natural gas
8) $24 billion for aid to the poor
__-- ? _I . z bti lion for administrative exnenses
Other Scenario Assumptions
The new domestic supply assumptions, energy conservation/conver-
sion assumptions and dollar spending changes are discussed above. We
have assumed that the Energy Security Corporation dispenses all of its
funds in the form of subsidies to the private sector (either as
direct sudsidies or as price guarantees). The subsidies for research
on auto engine efficiency are assumed to result in more rapid increases
in MPG during the second half of the 1980 decade. Since the windfall
profit tax was included in the Control Solution and was rebated to
persons, personal taxes were increased to reflect the elimination of
this form of rebate (transfers to persons were left unchanged since
aid to the poor remains in the new energy plan).
The above changes resulted in a reduction of net oil imports
by 1990 of 4.5 MMBO. Given that the OPEC countries would face a
loss of revenues as a result, we have assumed that the OPEC cartel
would accelerate world oil price increases in an attempt to recap-
ture part of these lost revenues (the annual rate of increase in
world oil prices is assumed to increase from 7 percent in 1981 to
10 .percent in 1990). Despite this more rapid increase in world
oil prices, the U.S. positive trade balance would be very large
by 1990. As a result, we have assumed a steady appreciation of
the dollar from 1982 to 1990 (by 1990, the German Mark is worth 35
cents - versus 55 cents today - while the Japanese Yen is worth .34
cents - versus .46 cents today). Given the assumed more rapid
increase in world oil prices and the strong appreciation of the
dollar, the U.S. trade balance returns to a value of about zero
(from a large positive value) by 1990.
Analysis of the Scenario Results
Implemenation of the energy plan results in a slight reduction
in the level of economic activity during the 1980's decade. By
1990, real GNP is $16.2 billion dollars less than in the Control
Solution. The difference in activity levels is illustrated by the
comparison of the unemployment rate projections shown in Figure 1.
To attain the desired reduction in oil imports and to sustain a
growth rate near that in the Control Solution, the federal government
budget is in deficit from 1986 to 1990 (see Figure 2). The trade
balance, however, is more strongly positive than in the Control
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Solution from 1984 through 1989 (see Figure 3).
Net imports of oil in millions of barrels per day (IMBSO) under
the Control Solution and Energy Plan Alternative are as follows (see
also Figure 4).
Control Energy Plan
Year Solution Alternative Reduction
1979 8.176 8.176 --
-' 1980 8.540 8.509 0.031
1981 9.381 9;265 0.116
1982 9.353 9.068 0.285
1983 9.168 8.441 0.727
1984 9.118 7.963 1.155
1985 9.271 7.668 1.603
1986 9.531 7.550 1.981
1987 9.996 7.435 2.561
1988 ' .417 7.335 3.082
1989 10.995 7.129 3.866
1990 11.495 6.741 4.754
The overachievement of the net oil import reduction target in 1990
results primarily from the assumption of higher world oil price growth.
Net oil imports decline from 1981 through 1984 under the Control
Solution in response to the sharp world oil price increases during
1979-80 and the decontrol of domestic oil prices during the 1979-81
period. After 1984, however, net oil imports in the Control Solution
increase steadily to 11.5 MMBD in 1990. Under the Energy Plan Alter-
native, net oil imports decline steadily after 1981 falling to 6.7
MMBD in 1990.
A large share of the reduction in net oil imports is due to
the substitution of alternative fuels. The share of petroleum in
-10-
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total U.S. energy supply declined steadily under the Control
Solution after 1981, but the decline is substantially more rapid
under the Energy Plan Alternative (see Figure 5). Natural gas
provides some of the offset to the reduction in petroleum's share
of total energy supply, but the natural gas share of total energy
supply declines after 1981 in both the Control and Energy Alter-
native solutions (see Figure 6). The coal share of total energy
supply increases substantially due to the utility conversion to
coal and to the production of 1.0 MMBD of synthetic crude from
coal by 1990 (see Figure 7). While the share of coal in total energ
supply increased under the Control Solution, the increase in the-
coal share is significantly greater under the Energy Plan Alternative.
The non-fossil fuel electricity share (nuclear, hydro, geothermal,
and other) increases by only a modest amount under the Energy Plan
Alternative vis-a-vis the Control Solution (see Figure 8). However,
the non-fossil fuel electricity share increased substantially under
the Control Solution. The percentage shares of energy supply under
the Control and Energy Plan Alternative solutions in 1981 and 1990
are as follows:
Control Solution Energy Plan Alternative
1981 1990 1981 1990
Petroleum 48.6% 42.2% 48.4% 34.5%
Natural Gas 24.3% 18.1% 24.5% 20.8%
Coal 20.9% 26.4% 20.9% 29.5S 
Non-fossil electricity 8.4% 13.2% 8.4% 13.5.'
Note: Percentage shares do not sum to 100% due to the omission of
net exports of electricity and coke, energy inventory changes,
and statistical discrepancy.
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The ratio of energy consumption to real GNP declines signifi-
cantly in both the Control and Energy Plan Alternative Solutions (see
Figure 9). The energy/GNP ratio is 1.4 percent lower in 1990 under
the Energy Plan Alternative due to the energy conservation assumptions
and to the assumed higher world oil prices. The higher annual world
oil price growth is reflected in the composite crude oil price defla-
tor growth (see Figure 10).
The new energy plan, if successful, as assumed in this analysis,
would substantially strengthen the U.S. dollar at a very minor cost
in terms of slower growth and higher prices. Further, the U.S. would
be in a position to rapidly increase the production of synthetic
fuels during the.1990's if world oil prices dictated such a move.
If synthetic fuel costs were still significantly above world crude
oil prices, expansion of synthetic capacity could be delayed. However,
unless the U.S. develops the capacity to commercially produce synthetic
fuels, the U.S. economic growth potential for the 1990's could be
determined by OPEC pricing and supply decisions.
. . ~~~~~~~~~~..
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With the considerable momentum of modern economies, and the "long and
variable lags," macroeconomic analysis is seldom identified with an event.
This month (October) is the fiftieth anniversary of one, and the sixth of
another, the Yom Kippur War and the associated oil embargo. As a result
of American support for Israel in the war and the decision to supply arms,'
the oil producers, with Saudi Arabian leadership, declared an embargo on
oil exports to the United States, and a 10% reduction in oil production
with further monthly reductions to follow. A few days later the Netherlands
was also placed under embargo. A second conference in Kuwait refined the
boycott; November production was to be reduced to 75% of the September
level. In December production was raised to 85% of the September level,
and in March the oil ministers agreed to end the embargo of shipments to
the United States and restore production to pre-October levels.
The reduction in Arab oil production was offset only slightly by
increases in other producing areas, and world crude oil availability has
been estimated to have been reduced by about 14% in December 1973 from
October 19732. Despite the direction of the embargo against the United
States, the U.S. fared reasonably well during the October to March period.
At first there was little effect on the volume of imports as tankers at
sea continued to land at U.S. ports. Later, the oil companies were able
to redirect supplies from non-Arab producing countries to the United States.
A reduction in crude oil imports began to be felt in December, and the
volume of crude oil imports reached a low in February of 60% of its
October level. U.S. imports of petroleum products (mainly heavy fuel oil)
were of roughly the same magnitude as crude oil imports and were scarcely
affected by the embargo.3
About 75% of U.S. crude oil requirements were met by U.S. oil produc-
tion in the first three quarters of 1973, and this cushioned the effect on
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supply in the U.S. Petroleum consumption in the first quarter of 1974 was
down 7% from a year earlier, a considerably smaller decline than in most
European countries.4 Actions by the Federal Energy Office shifted the
brunt of the shortfall to gasoline consumption, although the distribution
of the hardship, as measured by the length of gasoline lines, varied con-
siderably by state. An exceptionally warm winter helped. The consumption
decline perhaps exaggerated the extent of the supply shortfall; by April
the stocks of almost every petroleum product had increased considerably. 5
The 1978-79 Oil Crisis6
Events in Iran in late 1978 confronted the consuming countries with
the prospect of a second shortfall of oil production. Perceptions of the
vulnerability of the Shah began to grow in the latter half of the year
among oil companies,that began adding to their stocks of oil in anticipa-
tion of a possible reduction in supply. During the turmoil which eventually
forced the Shah's departure, Iranian oil production dropped, and oil exports
were suspended entirely in January and February of 1979. The fear of a
prolonged shortage sparked considerable pressure on spot markets, where
prices soared. Iranian oil production was eventually resumed in the second
quarter, but at a level roughly 30% below that of the first nine months of
1978.
In 1978 Iran was theworld's second largest exporter of crude oil, and
responsible for about 15% of the world oil trade. The effect of the cessa-
tion of Iranian exports on the world oil market was of course considerable,
but production increases in other countries (especially Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
the United Kingdom and Nigeria) moderated the effect on world oil supplies.
Data from the Oil and Gas Journal show that total production in non-communist
countries fell by about 4% from the fourth quarter of 1978 to the first
-3-
quarter of 1979, and regained its previous level in the second quarter.
A relatively minor effect on the available supply of oil was worsened by
speculative buying and stockpiling to assure supplies; and, in the United
States, by regulations which precluded access to more expensive supplies.7
The visible effects of the reduction in Iranian oil production was much
smaller than the effects of the 1973-74 oil embargo, but lengthy lines for
gasoline developed in some sections of the country, and particularly in
New York City.
Oil Prices
While the production cutbacks during the oil embargo exposed the vul-
nerability of the consuming countries to a more protracted reduction of oil
supplies, and the behavior of spot prices during 1973-74 and 1978-79 are
an indication of the seriousness with which a potential supply shortfall
is taken, in reality the supply reductions had little effect upon the output
or the employment of the industrial countries, just as the coal strike and
the severe weather of 1977-78 apparently had little effect on U.S. output.
Economies show surprising resilience to supply interruptions in the short
run, and perhaps over longer periods, as the largely unsuccessful attempts
at international boycotts seem to show. While the two past supply interrup-
tions or a future interruption could have been or could be much worse, the
1973 oil embargo did not usher in an age of scarcity of oil supplies. The
supply interruptions quickly subsided, spot market prices receded, and con-
sumers could purchase all the oil they wished at the going prices. Indeed,
the 1974-75 recession in the industrial countries weakened demand for pe-
troleum, and produced some concern among the producing countries of an oil
supply glut. Production was adjusted, and prices weakened at
times in the 1974-78 interval.
-4-
This is not to say that the events of five years ago were unimportant-
in fact they had a profound effect upon the industrial economies, and
changes in energy markets have had a great deal to do with poor economic
performance of late. But the effects have stemmed from the price of oil
and other energy substitutes, rather than from its lack of availability.
It is the dramatic rise in the price of oil (and, for reasons which will
be stressed below, the rise of the price of oil relative to the price of
output of the consuming countries) which has forced difficult adjustments
upon the rest of the world. This paper will review the effects of the oil
price rise from a number of standpoints: the effects upon aggregate demand,
aggregate supply, potential (full employment) output, and the effects upon
the inflationary process. Before examining these issues, it will be useful
to present a chronology of price movements.
From the mid 1950's to 1970 the price of crude petroleum trended
downward slightly, and fell somewhat more in real terms (relative to output
prices in the consuming countries). Dividing the posted price of Saudi
Arabian crude oil by the unit value of industrial country exports (as a rough
measure of the relative price of crude oil imports) gives an average 1966-
1970 value 31% below that of 1956-60.8 This may overstate the actual fall
in the relative price of energy in the consuming countries since posted
prices did not always reflect transactions prices, and since industrial
countries gave tariff and quota protection to their domestic fuel industries.
In the United States the wholesale price of fuels, power, and related pro-
ducts relative to the GNP deflator was 17% lower in 1966-70 than in 1956-60.
Although the most dramatic increase in world oil prices occurred in
the first quarter of 1974, the price of oil had already risen substantially
by 1974. From December 1970 to October 1973, the posted price of Saudi
-5-
Arabian light crude oil increased from $1.80 to $5.12, while the Saudi
Arabian government take on crude oil production is estimated to have jumped
from 88¢ per barrel to $3.05/bbl. 9 The explanation of this price rise and
the shift in the balance of power away from the companies and toward OPEC
has been analyzed elsewhere. Suffice it to say here that the exhaustion
of U.S. spare productive capacity, and the United States' consequent turn
to world markets for 100% of its marginal requirements (rather than 12%
under the Oil Import Program) was an important factor.
In December 1973, during the embargo, the OPEC ministers met in
Tehran and announced that the posted price for Saudi Arabian light crude
for January 1974 would be raised to $11.65 a barrel, yielding a govern-
ment take of $7 per barrel. Changes in sales prices and in participation
further boosted the government take on crude oil productions to $10.12
a barrel by the December 1974 price revisions.
Subsequent revisions raised posted prices to $13.34 in early 1979.
~- . After Iranian oil production had resumed, OPEC ministers met in Geneva
and announced that, effective July 1, oil prices would be raised to between
$18.00 and $23.50 a barrel, depending upon various surcharges. The dis-
persion of crude oil prices has been substantial, with Saudi Arabian oil
selling at $18.00, Kuwait's at about $19.50, Iran's at $22.20 and the
African light crudes at about $23.50.10
Using the posted price of Saudi Arabian light crude as a rough indicator
of world oil prices, and export unit values of industrial countries as an
index of the prices of their products, Figure 1 shows the movement of the
relative price of oil from 1972 to July 1979. The index rises at the end of
1973 and then reaches a peak in the first quarter of 1974, During the next
five years the index of the relative price of oil falls, due both to infla-
i a
ii <
i-9
i--
"~~
:: v
ii . <d
i-
.j
i i
- C ii 
0ir ~ ~ ~ ~ f
. ' Q~~'ii :
0> 0: : f X
ii rl
*+: o
)Q
:: 1
i r'
ii ::: si
Cii S-f i i a : X
.. 
.
i. W~~~~~~~~~.ri 1ii m~~~~s*. i
:i r
.
CHr
i- 1Z --
-i
7-..
C..-V1
-r-
= ii
i!
ii
ii
::
::
O ii
C ii
·-' Mli
?:
::
ii
1!
ii
A ::V I!
 ::
I ;;
II
ii
i:
i!
h iiY
4 ii
ii
ii
ii
ii
O ii
F ii
x
'V
r.
(U
C
ti
0O
x
a
0
0
r-4
03
CI
0
0
,-4
ll
rN
,-4
0
Co
V;
0%
0\rl
0
0
40
a)
9-4
')
u
-H
'A
0
e
OH4ico
0
-4
O
C)Ca
0
-P4
-H
-4
co
0
CD
-4
'.4
0
Co
h
:: v
:: ; '
:: 0
.. C
I
Bff
: z
c_.
Z.; 
"I
r..r
*N.
r.
-6-
tion in the industrial countries and the depreciation of the dollar, al-
though the 1975 appreciation of the dollar relative to other industrial
country currencies reversed, for a time, the decline in the relative price
of oil. In 1979, the deterioration of the relative price of oil was re-
versed by price increases early in the year and by those announced in
Geneva at the end of June.
As I shall argue at some length below, it is the increase in the price
of oil relative to the output prices of the industrial countries that is
the crucial feature of the macroeconomic adjustment problems of the 1970's,
and the feature that distinguishes "supply shocks" from a general inflation
of world traded goods prices. It is also the appropriate focal point from
the point of view of OPEC price-setting behavior, since the price of oil
relative to the price of manufactured goods appears to be the central con-
cern of OPEC pricing policy. This concern is not new, but goes back to
price negotiations in January 1972, when an agreement was reached for an
increase in posted prices of 8.59% to compensate for the 1971 devaluation
of the dollar, with a second revision in June 1973 after the second devalu-
ation of the dollar.11 In the period since the 1974 price rise, the OPEC
ministers have repeatedly warned the industrial countries that failure to
control their rates of inflation would lead to further increases in the
price of oil. As the oil minister from Kuwait told a western audience
before the 1979 Geneva meetings, "It is not to your benefit or to ours to
see the real price of oil fall". 12
The 1974-1975 Recession
Revised data show that real gross national product fell in each
quarter of 1974, slowly in the first three quarters and then dramatically
-7-
in the fourth quarter of 1974 and the first quarter of 1975. The depth
of the decline came as a surprise to most forecasters. Although consumer
demand had weakened, business demand remained strong in 1974, and forecasters
in September predicted little change in the coming quarters.1 3 Real GNP
fell by 6.6% from the fourth quarter of 1973 to the first quarter of 1975
and the unemployment rate peaked at 9.0% in May, 1975. It was the worst
postwar recession the United States had experienced.
Although the fall in business activity was sharpest in the United
States, the recession was concurrent among the OECD countries. Between
July 1974 and April 1975, OECD industrial production fell by 10% and GNP
by 3%. 14 Unemployment increased from a low of 8 million workers to a high
of 15 million workers, with migrant laborers in Europe being particularly
hard hit. Inflation, already high from the co-ordinated expansion of 1973,
accelerated in the OECD countries. Both the recession and the working
through of the oil price increases brought some moderation, but rates of
price increase have nevertheless remained high in several of the OECD
countries.
Recent analyses (Mork and Hall (1978), Hudson and Jorgenson (1978)
and Okun (1975)) have attributed a major role to the rise in energy prices
in explaining the 1974-75 recession. Eckstein (1978) reviews the rise in
energy prices and concludes:
The energy crisis was the single largest cause of the Great
Recession. Without it, the economy would have suffered no worse
than a year of small GNP decline in 1974, and would have seen
1975 as the first year of recovery. But when the energy crisis
was superimposed upon an already highly vulnerable economic situ-
ation, it was sufficient to turn the beginnings of recovery into
the sharpest decline of the postwar period.1 5
In what follows I shall outline the effects of energy price increases
on the United States economy. One issue, which was the subject of consid-
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erable concern and debate in 1974 and which is not covered here, is that
of financing oil deficits, or "recycling". In the wake of the 1974 oil
price increases, it was feared that, given the inability of the producing
countries to spend their increased revenues and their preference for highly
liquid and secure investments, capital markets would not be able to finance
the required deficits in the balances of payments of the consuming countries.1 6
This worry was not borne out in the ensuing years. Interest rate differ-
entials moved funds among financial centers, and international banks suc-
cessfully intermediated the supply of funds to longer maturities. The bal-
ance of payments difficulties of less-developed oil consuming countries were
resolved by direct aid, IMF facilities, and increased recourse to private
capital markets, while industrial balances of payments were guaranteed by
the "Safety Net". The allocation of balance of payments deficits among the
industrial countries was an important issue,1 7 but the financing of those
deficits turned out not to be a critical problem.
Energy Prices, Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
When the oil price increases were announced at the beginning of 1974,
the initial reaction of policy makers, at least in this country, was to
consider the price changes as an external, inflationary impulse, and to
advocate restrictive policies. Thus monetary growth slowed considerably
in the United States in 1974. As an introduction to the discussion, it is
useful to examine the question: what made the rise in the price of imported
oil in 1974 different from an external inflation (a rise in the general world
price level for traded goods)? To answer this, we develop a simple aggre-
gate demand and supply model and investigate the effects of changes in world
prices, and changes in oil prices.1 8
FIGURE 2
Aggregate Supply and Demand, and
The Effects of General Foreign Inflation
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Figure 2 graphs aggregate demand and supply (volume of domestic output)
against the price of domestic output, P . The aggregate demand curve is
drawn with the assumption of a given quantity of money, government fiscal
policy, and level of foreign prices. It slopes down and to the right for
the following reasons. An increase in the price of domestic output lowers
the real value of the money stock, and raises interest rates. This causes
demand (particularly investment demand) to fall. The fall in the real
value of money holdings may also discourage domestic demand through its
adverse wealth effect. Finally, a rise in the price of domestic goods,
given foreign prices, makes foreign goods cheaper, shifting demand away
from domestic goods.
The aggregate supply curve in Figure 2 is drawn on the assumption that
wages are fixed (at least in the short run).19 Aggregate supply slopes up
and to the right because an increase in price leads firms to operate at a
higher marginal cost and therefore higher output.
A general rise in the price of traded goods (a general external
inflation) is illustrated in Figure 2. The aggregate supply curve is un-
affected by the rise in external prices, but the aggregate demand curve
shifts to the right for the following reason. An increase in foreign prices
relative to domestic prices raises foreign demand for domestic goods. The
foreign price increase also shifts domestic demand away from foreign,and
toward domestic goods. The increase in output at B implies reduced unem-
ployment and upward pressure on wages. Rising wages cause the aggregate
supply schedule to shift up, reducing output and further increasing prices,
unless a contractionary policy reduces domestic demand. Thus a general rise
in foreign prices leads to an eventual rise in domestic prices, and perhaps
only a temporary increase in output,
FIGURE 3
A Rise in the Relative Price of Imported Oil
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P
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An increase in the price of oil relative to the prices of other traded
goods has quite different effects in this framework, and these are illustrated
in Figure 3. Since oil (or more generally, energy) is an input to the pro-
ductive process, at a given wage and level of output costs of production
increase and therefore the supply price must rise. The aggregate supply
curve shifts up in Figure 3.
The effects upon aggregate demand are not completely clearcut, but
there are strong reasons for thinking that the aggregate demand curve will
shift to the left instead of to the right. First, there is no longer a rea-
son for assuming a substitution effect toward domestic goods, since the
price of oil, and not the price of foreign goods with which domestic output
competes, has gone up. Second, if expenditure on energy can't be reduced
very much when its price goes up, total spending on energy must rise, leaving
less expenditures on domestic goods. Finally, as was the case with the. 1974
price increases, if the oil producers cannot spend their increased revenues
-"1 and instead save a large fraction of them, then world demand for the kind of
goods the home country produces will fall. The resulting reduction in ag-
gregate demand (leftward shift of the curve) reduces total output and employ-
ment, although moderating (perhaps) the rise in prices.
It is the rise of the relative price of oil that is crucial in this
context. If the oil price rise is accompanied by an equal rise in the world
price of the goods the country produces then the analysis of Figure 2 applies.
It is the effect of the relative price change which will show up throughout
the analysis, altering the conclusions of conventional macroeconomic models
with a single commodity price.
Effects Upon Demand
We shall now consider in some detail the effect of oil price increases
upon aggregate demand in Figure 3. The argument will proceed from a discus-
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sion of the effects upon income to effects upon expenditure, with a brief
discussion of the effects upon wealth and its expenditure effects. Finally
we consider the effects upon investment demand.
In the textbook development of macroeconomics, the circular income-
expenditure process is introduced to show that each product sale results in
an equal amount of income, divided among the factors of production. In an
economy that imports some inputs (intermediate goods, or primary factors
such as oil) not all of the income generated goes to domestic factors, since
a part goes to foreigners. If relative prices and input proportions do not
change, then an increase in output leads to a proportionate increase in do-
mestic income, and no harm is done by referring to domestic output as domes-
tic income, as most models do.
However, when the price of the imported input rises relative to that
of domestic output, then domestic income changes occur. These income changes
are most severe in the case of fixed input proportions, when the amount of
imports needed to produce our unit of output cannot be reduced. To illus-
trate this point, suppose that imports make up 10% of total costs, and the
price of imports rises by 50% relative to the price of domestic output. If
there are fixed proportions, then the share of imports in total factor income
rises from 10 to 15 percent, and the domestic income from one unit of pro-
duction falls by 5/90 = 5.56%. The domestic income generated by any level
of domestic production falls as a result of the relative price change. 20
If there are possibilities for substitution in production, then the
use of imports in production can be reduced, and the effect upon domestic
income moderated. The extent to which domestic income is maintained depends
upon the extent of substitution, which is captured by a parameter called the
own-price-elasticity of substitution. If this elasticity is 1 , as in a
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Cobb-Douglas production function, then imported inputs are reduced by the
same proportion as their price increases, and domestic income per unit of
product does not change.
George Perry (1978) has assembled a series on business inputs of energy.
He finds that the ratio of energy to output declines by 10.2% between 1973
and 1976, a period in which the relative price of energy rose by 57%. Perry
attributes most of the 10.2% fall to causes other than the rise in energy
prices (a point which will be discussed below), but if we take the entire
figure as representing price substitution, payments to energy per unit of
output rise by 41.0%. If we take the share of energy in inputs to be 5%, the
finding of several recent estimates, 21 non-energy factor income per unit of
output falls by 2.16%. Econometric estimates of the own-price-elasticity
of energy demand have been somewhat larger. Berndt and Wood (1975) find an
elasticity of -.47 which would imply a fall in domestic factor income of 0.79%
per unit of output.
If the country produces some of its energy and imports the rest, then
part of the increased payments for energy inputs provide additional income
to domestic factors in the energy industries. However in the United States,
prices for domestically produced fuels were largely controlled, so that most
if not all of the additional payment for energy in production went to foreign
producers. This was an unfortunate aspect of the price controls policy - it
was that action which would minimize substitution away from energy and maximize
the payment to foreign factors.
The effect of the rise in the price of imported oil in 1974 was there-
fore to lower domestic income for any level of output. Here domestic income
is measured in units of (command over) domestic goods, since it is the pro-
duction and sale of domestic goods which generates domestic income. But a
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given level of income in units of domestic goods now represents a lower real
income when measured in terms of a basket which includes domestic goods and
imported oil. (The appropriate measure, since a significant proportion of
consumer expenditures go to direct energy purchases for transport, heating
and lighting - 9.16% in the last CPI revision.2 2)
A rise in the relative price of oil at a given level of domestic income
(measured in units of domestic goods) produces an income effect (which reduces
expenditure on all goods) and a substitution effect away from oil and other
energy. If the substitution effect is small (precisely: if the short-run
price elasticity of energy demand is less than one) then the income offset
dominates, and expenditure on domestic output at a given level of income falls.
However, expenditure on domestic goods and expenditure on foreign goods
are not the only alternatives for disposal of income. Part of income is
saved, and savings may absorb some of the effects of the relative price
change. If the proportion of income saved increases with real income, as
most simple Keynesian models assume, then a rise in the price of imported
oil would lower real income and lower the proportion of income saved. This
effect, associated with Laursen and Metzler (1950) might increase expendi-
ture on both foreign oil and domestic goods from reduced savings, moderating
the decline in aggregate demand above.
These are the main effects that occur through the income-expenditure
channel. Several macroeconomic models emphasize the effects of changes in
real wealth upon consumption. If other prices (and in particular, wages)
are not sufficiently flexible to fall, then the rise in oil prices forces
the general price level up through its own rise and through its effect upon
prices of domestic output. This causes asset holdings to fall in real value,
lowering the wealth and therefore the expenditure of domestic consumers.
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The rise in prices may also severely affect the liquidity of consumers,
causing a further retrenchment of expenditure. The "consumer balance
sheet" as a determinant of expenditure is examined by Mishkin (1977) who
finds that it explains a significant proportion of the decline in expendi-
ture, particularly for consumer durables, during the 1974-75 recession.
Two additional, policy-determined factors which played a role in the
1974-75 recession deserve mention. The first is the behavior of the money
stock, and the second is the effect of the price rises on the stance of
fiscal policy through the progressive tax system. To combat what was seen
as an inflationary shock to the economy, monetary growth slowed in 1974.
As a result the real value (in terms of the consumer price index) of the
broadly defined money stock (M2) fell by 4.0% from the fourth quarter of 1973
to the fourth quarter of 1974. Interest rates rose to record levels in mid-
1974, and the demand for investment goods, particularly housing, was severely
affected. Inflation rates hit 11% (year to year changes) in 1974, raising
money but not real incomes. This forced many taxpayers into higher tax
brackets and, due to the progressivity of the income tax system, raised the
proportion of income taken in taxes. Federal receipts rose 12.6% from calen-
dar 1973 to 1974, compared to an 8.1% increase in nominal GNP and a 1.4% fall
in real GNP. Personal income tax receipts rose by 15%, although personal in-
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come minus transfer payments (roughly: taxable income) rose by 8%. This
increase in the proportion of income taxed was inflation's effect, and exerted
a substantial drag on aggregate demand.
So far we have mainly discussed determinants of consumption expenditure.
Investment demand is reduced by higher interest rates, but a complete story
requires a word about the marginal productivity of capital. Since a rise in
energy prices lowers non-energy factor incomes, the average rate of return
-15-
on the existing capital stock would fall, presumably lowering the demand
for additional investment. Other effects depend upon the characteristics
of the production process. If capital can be substituted for energy in
production (capital-energy substitutability) then the demand for capital
services would increase with a rise in energy prices. If capital use is
associated with energy use so that additional capital requires additional
energy (capital-energy complementarity),then the demand for capital ser-
vices falls with an increase in the price of energy.
Capital-energy substitutability or complementarity is an area of con-
siderable controversy, and a problem which has important implications for
the level of investment and medium-term economic growth. Econometric anal-
yses seem to indicate that capital and energy are complements, while engin-
eering, or process, studies conclude that they are substitutable. (For a
careful discussion of the evidence, see Berndt and Wood (1979).) We shall
not examine this question in detail, other than to mention that certain in-
dustries (viz. energy producing industries) are obvious candidates for addi-
tional investment, and to raise the conjecture that energy is complementary
to existing capital and substitutable with capital in prospective investment.
Thus the energy usage, or energy efficiency of a given type of capital good
is nearly fixed, and energy to capital usage cannot be altered once one type
of capital good (for example, one type of refrigerator) is installed. But
if types of capital goods (e.g. types of refrigerators) vary as to their
initial cost and energy efficiency, as engineering studies suggest, or if
the energy usage of the existing capital stock can be reduced by additional
investment (for example, additional insulation) then investment demand may
be increased by the energy price rise.
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Effects on Supply and Productivity
The empirical evidence that has been accumulated suggests strongly
that prices are determined, at least in the short run, by a markup over
unit costs.24 If energy prices rise and other input prices do not fall,
then domestic product prices will rise, on a first approximation by the
proportion of energy in total costs. This causes the upward shift in the
aggregate supply curve in Figure 2. If wages rise (due to indexing, or for
other reasons described below) then the upward shift of the aggregate supply
curve will be magnified.
If energy prices rise relative to the price of domestic output (if the
OPEC producers pursue a policy of maintaining a higher real price of oil),
then other factor returns must fall relative to the price of output and re-
lative to the price of oil as well. This change in relative factor prices
alters the desired input proportions, factor productivity, and even desired
output as a simple example will show.
After the 1974 rise in oil prices it was reported that oil tankers were
running at slower speeds to conserve fuel oil. In this case, tankers were
substituting capital services (ship days) and labor (crew days) for energy,
and at the same time reducing their flow rate of output (ton-miles per day).
As a result of the change in input proportions the average productivity of
labor (ton-miles per crew day) and capital (ton-miles per ship day) both
fell, and these are the effects-to be expected in general from changes in
input proportions.
If production processes do allow some substitution of other inputs
when energy becomes more expensive, then in general the productivity of
those inputs which are substituted must fall. We will concentrate on labor,
because the capital stock is largely fixed and therefore always employed,
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and because the possibilities for substituting capital for energy appear to
be limited in the short run. At a given level of output, with a rise in en-
ergy prices, the firm will substitute labor for energy inputs if possible.
This will lower the average productivity of labor, since more labor is now
being used to produce the same volume of output. The substitution will also
lower the marginal product of labor, since the supply of other inputs is
now spread more thinly across the labor employed, and each new laborer has
less other inputs to work with. For this reason, one would expect the
equilibrium (full employment) real wage to fall in terms of the price of
the domestic product.
The extent of substitution possibilities and the effect of the rise
in energy prices on labor demand and labor productivity have been the area
of some recent controversy. Robert Rasche and John Tatom (1977b) have made
a case for considerable substitutability of labor and energy in production,
and therefore for a considerable impact on labor demand and average labor
productivity. Rasche and Tatom estimate a Cobb-Douglas production function
for the output of the U.S. private business sector in terms of inputs of
capital, labor and energy.
Y = Aert Kl-1a La ES
The estimates that they find are a = .65 and $ = .12 , which, if
the Cobb-Douglas form is correct, should also be the shares of labor and
energy in total costs. The Cobb-Douglas form imposes considerable substi-
tutability between energy and labor, and the change in labor demand in pro-
duction would be a+8 times the change in the relative price of labor.
From 1972 to 1977 the price of energy relative to labor rose by 78%;25 this
would indicate an increase in labor demand at a constant level of output of
about 12%, and a corresponding fall in the average productivity of labor.
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The conclusions of Rasche and Tatom of considerable substitution poss-
ibilities for energy and the substantial effect of a rise in energy prices
on productivity have been challenged by Perry (1978) and Denison (1979).
The challenges have been on two grounds. Rasche and Tatom did not have in-
formation on energy inputs, and instead used an equilibrium energy demand
relationship involving relative prices. The 12% estimate of energy's share
in total costs is much higher than the 4 to 5% which others have found.
This would overstate the effect on labor demand considerably. (Substitution
for 8 = .05 and a = .70 would reduce the increase in labor demand at con-
stant output to 5.2%.) Perry and Denison also argue that the Cobb-Douglas
function overstates the degree of substitutability between labor and energy.
Perry (1978) builds a time series of business fuel consumption per
unit of output and estimates that it falls by 10.2% between 1973 and 1976,
while the price of energy rises relative to output by 57% over the same
period. He then estimates the trend of energy use per unit of output from
1949 to 1973, and attributes onenhalf to two thirds of the 10.2% reduction
to trend changes. Much of the rest he attributes to elimination of non-pro-
ductive energy use, and concludes that possibilities for substitution away
from energy toward labor (and therefore pssiblities of a fall in the
average product of labor) are quite limited.
The calculation of energy input is an important step in the right
direction, but Perry probably errs in his calculation of the trend effect.
Energy use per unit of Gross National Product can be easily calculated, and
this ratio did fall steadily in the postwar period, until about 1965. But
then a sharp reversal occurred. Energy consumption rose by 5% annually from
1965 to 1970 while GNP grew by 3.2% per year. The reasons for this reversal
are not completely understood, but much of the change can be attributed to
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the failure of electricity generation to improve its energy conversion
ratio after 1965.26 Therefore it is not clear what, if anything, should
be subtracted from (or added to) the 10.2% decline in business energy use
per unit of output, but it appears much more likely that possibilities
for substitution of labor for energy exist in the short run.
Other econometric estimates indicate some possibilities for substi-
tution, but lower than those of a Cobb-Douglas function. Berndt and Wood
(1975) estimate a partial elasticity of substitution between labor and energy
of .65 which, if energy's share in costs were 5%, would indicate an increase
in labor demand per unit of output of (.78).(.05),(.65) = 2.54%. Hudson and
Jorgenson(197 %), using a sectoral model which emphasizes energy, find that
real GNP falls by 3.2% from 1972 to 1976 due to the increase in energy prices,
while labor demand declined by only 0.6% (or 0.5 million jobs), and "as a
consequence, productivity growth fell substantially over the period 1972-76. "27
The increase in labor demand per unit of output comes from two sources in
their model, the substitution of labor for energy in each sector, and the
shift in final demand away from energy intensive and toward labor intensive
industries.
The substitution of labor for energy may be the key to the recent changes
in productivity growth, the topic examined by Denison (1979).
The growth rate of National Income Per Person Employed (NIPPE)
fell from 2.43 percent in 1948-73 to -.54 percent in 1973-76...
According to my estimates there is no unexplained retardation
in the rate of growth of productivity until 1974, and the drop
in the rate that started at that time was abrupt and large. I
consider this timing an important clue in any attempt to unravel
the mystery surrounding the productivity slowdown. 28
Denison rejects the rise in energy prices as the explanation for the
productivity bread, based largely on Perry (1978). As I have said above,
I find Perry's estimates inconclusive, and I consider the question still open.
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One may be tempted to conclude that since greater substitutability of
labor for energy in production involves a greater fall in labor productivity,
the more substitutability one has,the worse off one becomes. This conclusion
is incorrect. The discussion above on demand effects stressed the distinction
between output. and income that goes to domestic factors. The smaller the
substitution possibilities, the greater the fall in income received by non-
energy factors of production when energy prices rise. It is the desire to
produce at lower cost that leads to substitution in production, and substitu-
tion leads to a reduction in payments to (largely foreign) energy.
The substitution of labor for energy would also play an important social
role, by cushioning the unemployment affects of the fall in output. Because
substitution possibilities exist, the effects of the rise in energy prices
and reduction in output can be spread across the labor force. More people
can continue to work, but each is paid a bit less in real terms because of
the fall in productivity, just as one could share unemployment by reducing
hours and sharing the available work.
Rasche and Tatom (1977a) and others have noted that employment has
recovered much faster from the recent recession in comparison to its behavior
during previous recessions. This is an indication that labor substitution
(taking place with some lag) alleviated the unemployment effects of the re-
cession.
Effects on Potential Output and Growth
If firms use less energy to produce their output, then when all other
inputs (capital, labor) are fully employed, the level of total output will be
reduced, just as conservation of fuel in our tanker example lowered the
transportation output of the ship. If one defines potential output as the
output of cost minimizing firms when all domestic resources are fully employed,
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then potential output falls as a result of the increase in the relative price
of imported energy. (The reader is reminded once more, however, of the dis-
tinction between output and income when energy prices change.)
Calculations of potential, or "high employment" output have conventionally
been made using an empirical relationship between employment and the rate of
growth of output known as Okun's law. Substitution in production would alter
the relationship between labor and output, and thus affect the calculation of
potential output. This would have important implications for analyzing fiscal
policy, since the stance of fiscal policy is determined by government expendi-
tures and receipts at potential output, rather than at current output. It
would also have important implications for determining how close the economy
is to full utilization, and therefore to inflation (although in this case the
rate of unemployment is an alternative, and preferable, measure).
Rasche and Tatom (1977a) and Perry (1978) examine the issue of potential
output and reach opposing conclusions. Rasche and Tatom find potential output
increases by only 6.0% from 1973 to 1976, while the Council of Economic Advisers'
measure indicates potential output rose by 11.0%- during this period. Perry
(1978) finds essentially no change in the estimate of potential output due to
the rise in energy prices, since, for the reasons reviewed above, he finds
essentially no substitution away from energy.
The extent to which potential output dropped due to the rise in the
relative price of energy is one issue. An equally important issue is what
will happen to the path, or growth rate, of potential output. An increase
in energy's relative price leads to a fall in the real return on capital, and
therefore a lower demand for investment. In addition, if capital and energy
are complements, then the rise in energy prices lowers the demand for capital
services in production and further depresses the rate of return on the existing
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capital stock. As the labor force grows, the labor intensity of production
will increase. This will raise the marginal product of capital, and raise
investment demand. Thus investment will recover from a rise in energy prices
but only after a period of slow growth in output and productivity. If there
is no future change in the relative price of energy, then the previous rate
of output growth will be restored. Models which assume a rising real price
of energy (e.g. Hudson and Jorgenson (1978b)) produce a permanently lowered
output growth rate.
Effects on Inflation
If wages and other factor returns were fully flexible, then there would
be no necessity for a rise in the general price level with a change in the
nominal price of energy. Other factor returns could fall sufficiently to
allow product prices to fall, maintaining the same level of a composite
price index. If other prices don't fall, then a rise in the price of energy
relative to other prices can only be accomplished through a rise in the gen-
eral price level. Much of the extraordinarily high rate of inflation in 1974
can be described in this fashion, as an adjustment to the rise in oil prices
in the first quarter.
One can draw a logical distinction between the impact effect of the rise
in energy prices on the prices of other goods, and any inflationary process
which may or may not arise from the relative price change. In practice it
is difficult to maintain this distinction, for the cost increases caused by
the rise in energy prices may take some time to completely pass through in
the prices of other goods. Prices of direct energy use (e.g. gasoline) and
goods with a very high energy or petroleum content (petrochemicals, fertili-
zers) would rise quickly. Prices of other goods might respond to increases
in costs from direct energy use in production, but the response would be
-23-
slower to the increased energy costs of intermediate good inputs. Increases
in costs in the production of capital goods would be the slowest to pass
through into costs of finished consumer goods.
The adjustment time would depend to a greater extent on how quickly
energy prices facing energy users rose. For the industrial countries as
a whole, from Figure 1, the relative price of energy rises very quickly and
reaches its highest point in the first quarter of 1974. From then until
1979, inflation and the depreciation of the dollar lower the relative price
of energy for Europe and Japan, easing the adjustment to the 1974 rise.
In the United States prices paid for energy did not rise by the full
extent of the OPEC price increase, because price controls on domestic oil
and gas production kept prices down, and because rate hearing processes
delayed the increase in electricity prices. Over time, average prices for
energy increased as cost pass-throughs in electric generation were allowed,
as price controls on natural gas production were relaxed, as more of United
States oil production passed into uncontrolled categories, and as the United
States imported a higher fraction of its total energy use, for which it paid
the higher world price.
The wholesale price index for fuels, power and related products relative
to the Gross National Product deflator (a general index of goods and services
prices) is plotted in Figure 4. In contrast to the relative price of oil for
the industrial countries shown in Figure 1, the relative price of energy in
the United States rises continuously through the period. Because this kind
of adjustment in energy prices took place in the United States, the impact
of the OPEC price increases in 1974 was translated into a higher rate of infla-
tion in the United States in the latter half of the 1970's. (The determination
of what is adjustment and what is the "underlying rate of inflation" is a
difficult question.)
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The empirical evidence on what determines prices suggests strongly that
prices, even in the short run, are determined largely by unit costs of pro-
duction. Since roughly two-thirds of costs are labor costs, an inquiry
into the effects of the oil price rise in initiating an inflationary process
must center on the labor market.
The macroeconomic theory of wage determination goes back to A.W. Phillips,
who found a relation between the unemployment rate and wage increase in
England over long periods of time. The theoretical foundations of the Phillips
curve were refined by E.S. Phelps and Milton Friedman, who argued that real,
and not nominal, wages were at issue in the bargaining and wage determination
process. Unemployment might affect the path of wages, but inflation which
was expected by all parties in the bargaining process would result in equiva-
lent wage increase.
In a simple macroeconomic model with a single commodity price there is
no difficulty in defining "the real wage." A rise in energy prices compli-
cates the definition, for the energy price increase is a change in relative
prices, or a terms-of-trade change, which introduces at least two goods into
the real wage definition.
The domestic producer is interested in his cost of labor relative to the
price of his product, and defines the real wage in this fashion. We argued
above that a rise in the price of energy relative to the price of the product
would require a fall in the wage relative to the product price. For the pro-
ducer the real wage, in terms of current wages and prices, is now too high.
The wage earner is concerned with his wage in terms of the goods he buys,
including energy. For the wage earner, with the rise in energy prices, the
current real wage is too low.
To illustrate this point, consider the price changes which occurred in
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the United States. Between 1973 and 1974, the implicit deflator for personal
consumption expenditures (a consumption basket index) rose by 10.81% while
the Gross National Products deflator (a domestic product price index) rose
by only 9.66%-a difference of 1.15 percentage points. If no substitution
away from energy in production is assumed, it is possible to net out the
increased production expenditure for energy as Robert Gordon (1975b) does.
His gross national product price index net of food and energy rises by 7.1%
from 1973 to 1974, or 3.7 percentage points less then that of the personal
consumption deflator. 30
The question of which real wage definition is controlling in the wage
setting process is therefore crucial for whether a rise in the relative price
of energy initiates a round of wage-price inflation. 31 There are reasons for
believing that changes in the real wage defined in terms of a consumption
price index determines at least a part of wage change, and therefore that an
increase in the relative price of energy leads to a round of inflation.
The most straightforward reason for thinking that the consumption real
wage determines wage change is wage contract indexation, almost all of which
is done on the basis of a consumption price index. Of the 9.7 million workers
the Labor Department estimates are covered by major collective bargaining
agreements, some 5.8 million (60%) have contracts with escalator clauses. 32
Most cost-of-living adjustments are based on changes in the Consumer Price
Index, the most common of which is a 1 cent per hour increase for each 0.3
or 0.4 percentage point change in the CPI. 33 Indexation is mch more wide-
spread in Europe (with the exceptions of France and Germany) than in the United
34States or Japan, and would therefore make adjustment to a rise in the re-
35
lative price of energy more difficult. There is also reason for believing
that wage changes respond to the consumption price index even in those cases
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without explicit indexation clauses, either because wage setting follows the
pattern of major agreements, or because consumption price changes are issues
in the bargaining process.
If wages rise because of the rise in energy prices, then the aggregate
supply curve would shift up further in Figure 3, since increasing wage costs
increase the supply price at any level of output. Prices would rise, lower-
ing the real wage, and output would fall, raising unemployment. This wage-
price spiral would continue until unemployment and disappointed real wage
expectations reconcile labor to a new, lower real wage. The policy author-
ities would be faced with a difficult choice, since a policy of increasing
demand might prolong the inflation process.
The empirical evidence on this kind of wage adjustment process is mixed.
Klein (1978) attributes wage increases in Britain and Scandinavia after 1973
to the rise in oil prices. 36 In contrast, Gordon (1977), using lagged changes
in a price index net of food and energy, and lagged change in a consumer price
index, finds that the consumer price index changes do not help to explain
U.S. wage inflation. Gordon concludes: "none of the 1973-74 inflation in
food and energy prices 'got into' wages, and all pre-1971 wage equations that
allow any influences of food and energy prices drastically over-predict the
37
cumulative 1971-76 wage increase."
Dohner (1979) investigates an alternative model where rates of wage
change are determined by previous values of the real wage. The real wage
defined in terms of a consumption price index does affect wage determination
in the United States and the United Kingdom, and equations with lagged real
wage terms better explain (in out-of-sample prediction) the behavior of wages
in 1974 and 1975. Sachs (1979), in reviewing the trend of real wages after
the oil price rise, finds that real wage growth slows in the United States,
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providing some scope for demand policies, but wage growth squeezes profits
in Europe and Japan, limiting the scope for increasing output. The effect
of the oil price rise in spurring wage inflation is an important and unsettled
issue, but the preliminary results, I think, indicate some effect of energy
price rises in increasing inflation beyond that required for the energy price
adjustment. A more careful modeling of the effects of energy price increases
on the wage process, would require a more explicit attention to the institu-
tional arrangements which govern wage change than macroeconomics has tradi-
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tionally had.
Conclusion
If the implications of the analysis are gloomy, it is because the effects
of a rise in the relative price of oil are rather gloomy, and impose difficult
adjustments upon the consuming countries. The rise in the relative price of
oil lowers the real income of the consuming countries since more of their
output is needed to pay for the now more expensive oil. This fall in real
income must be distributed among domestic factors of production, and if the
factors are unwilling to accept a reduction in their real income, then infla-
tion occurs to reconcile the inconsistent claims on (now lower) national income.
The fact that energy use is more expensive affects production decisions, low-
ering output and lowering productivity.
If the relative price of oil rises to a higher level and stays there,
then the adjustment is eventually completed. Prices no longer rise due to
the rise in the relative price of energy, and incomes begin to grow through
investment and technological advance. If the relative price of energy falls,
through inflation in the consuming countries, then the adjustment is eased
or reversed, until the next round of energy price increases. If the relative
importance of energy falls, because of substitution over time away from energy
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use in production or consumption, then the effects of the rise in energy's
relative price can be permanently moderated.
I will close with a few remarks about economic analysis. The oil price
change is a difficult analytical problem because it involves a substantial
relative price shift. Traditional macroeconomic models do not describe
these effects because the aggregation in those models assumes that relative
price shifts do not take place. Recent theoretical models by Gordon (1975a),
Phelps (1978) and Solow (1979), and by Bruno and Sachs (1979) and Dohner (1978)
for open economies have been developed for this purpose, with the substantial
impetus of hindsight. Distinctions between output and income, and income and
real income; and the precise definition of real magnitudes (for instance, the
real wage) are all extremely important.
There is also reason to distrust the implications of econometric models,
which have been estimated for periods of near constancy in relative prices.
One example might be the econometric finding of capital energy complementarity.
With labor a large share of costs, and energy a small and perhaps declining
share of costs over much of the postwar period, techniques may have developed
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to substitute labor for capital, with little regard for energy use. Thus
it is not surprising that additional capital use was associated with additional
energy use, or that capital and energy would appear as complements in the post-
war period. Higher energy prices may well encourage future techniques which
substitute capital for energy.
Experience with higher relative prices for energy will improve econome-
tric models, as well as theory. But higher energy prices are so new that
econometrics should not substitute for good judgement in analyzing the economic
affects of higher energy prices.
-..
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